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2 Abstract
Abstract
This thesis consists of three self–contained game–theoretic analyses of the con-
tractual relationship between borrowers and lenders. A key element of this rela-
tionship is asymmetric information: the players tend to have superior informa-
tion concerning their strategic variables than their opponents. Optimal contracts
for diﬀerent environments are derived and studied. They include ‘bankruptcy’
games, which are designed to structure the parties’ bargaining under certain cir-
cumstances.
The ﬁrst chapter questions the idea that being a unique lender to a ﬁrm is
better than sharing the lender’s role. Even borrowers with poor prospects will
apply for loans, if their main goal is to be ﬁnanced, and re–ﬁnanced if necessary.
With one lender, reﬁnancing is always provided once former loans are ‘sunk’.
With two lenders, the situation may be diﬀerent: ineﬃcient negotiations have to
determine how the overall loss is allocated. Some borrowers may therefore not be
reﬁnanced, and this may keep borrowers with poor prospects from applying for
loans.
The second chapter extends this model by adding a timing dimension: a
borrower ﬁnds out about poor prospects earlier than his lender. He can ask for
reﬁnancing, or simply ‘wait and pray’. Either ‘soft’ contracts or ‘tough’ contracts
may be optimal contracts: ‘soft’ contracts treat the borrower well if he asks
for reﬁnancing, while ‘tough’ contracts don’t (and the lender will not have the
option of reﬁnancing). ‘Hybrid’ contracts are strictly worse than the two ‘pure’
types. From this we draw conclusions for the design of bankruptcy laws, and for
empirical work on bankruptcy.
The third chapter analyses the interdependence of ﬁnancial and production
decisions. Debt contracts are frequently thought to lead to excessive risk taking
— in a Cournot setup this means excessive production. At the same time, debt
is a costly type of ﬁnancing, which should reduce production. This conﬂict is
analysed in a setting which allows to endogenise ‘debt’ contracts. The main result
is that there is no excessive production, and ﬁnancial constraints reduce output.
However, for large levels of ‘inherited’ debt, it may be that output increases in
the level of debt.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to explore strategic aspects of bankruptcy: problems
of bargaining power outside of and inside bankruptcy, informational problems,
and interdependencies of ﬁnancial decisions or situations with the investment or
output market decisions of ﬁrms. A key element for the analysis is asymmetric
information: it limits the eﬃciency of using contracts to determine what actions
economic agents agree to take under what circumstances. Bankruptcy is analysed
as part of a ‘wider’ contract, which is not ‘complete’ (i.e. some relevant clauses
that would improve all parties’ payoﬀs cannot be added to the contract), and
problems of bargaining power in possible renegotiations are found to have a strong
impact on what types of contract are optimal in equilibrium.
Bankruptcy is an important element of the business world, not only because
of the large number of bankruptcies that happen every year1, but also because of
its sometimes drastic consequences. For a small ﬁrm, bankruptcy will typically
mean “liquidation”: a buyer is found for the assets of the ﬁrm, jobs will be lost
and creditors will be repaid less than they are owed. Large ﬁrms may do better:
being “too big to fail”, their existence will rarely be endangered. Nevertheless,
bankruptcy will imply that ﬁnancial claims are not repaid, and that jobs are lost,
frequently including those of the ﬁrm’s managers.
Bankruptcies can get quite some media coverage. One factor that determines
the degree of attention is the size of the ﬁrms, or the number of jobs that may
be lost. The interest may also be motivated by the causes of a bankruptcy, e.g.
1 The Statistisches Bundesamt reports more than 19’000 business insolvencies in 1997 in the
area of the former F.R.G., with aggregate liabilities of $15,5bn (press release, 5. March 1998).
For the U.S., the Financial Times (3.3.1998) reports more than 83’000 businesses failing, with
liabilities over $37bn.
9
10 Introduction
serious fraud (as in the case of Barings Bank), or major management mistakes (as
in the case of Herstatt Bank in Germany). Additionally, the U.S. have experienced
some spectacular cases: the U.S. reorganisation procedure,2 Chapter 11, protects
ﬁrms (and their management teams) from their creditors to an extent unseen in
other countries3. In some cases Chapter 11 may have been abused to achieve other
goals than dealing with inadequate balance sheets (see Delaney (1992)): Texaco
reduced damages awarded to a competitor by a court; Manville dealt with product
liability charges; Continental Airlines ‘renegotiated’ union contracts.4
Bankruptcy plays an important role in several branches of economic theory.
At a very general level, it is an essential ingredient to the idea that ‘market forces’
ensure that the assets of an economy are brought to their most productive use.
In such a survival–of–the–ﬁttest view, ﬁrms have to compete for the assets they
want to use, as well as for the customers that buy their products. Those which
are ineﬃcient users of some assets will be driven into bankruptcy, while the best
users of an economy’s assets survive. A failure by the bankruptcy mechanism
to sort out viable from nonviable companies will lead to a suboptimal use of an
economy’s assets. The investments that are the easiest to ﬁnance may not be the
most eﬃcient ones, and assets that are locked in failed investments may not be
freed for more eﬃcient users.
From a contract–theoretic (as well as legal) perspective, bankruptcy laws are
important because they aﬀect the respective rights and bargaining positions of
contracting parties. For example, it is very hard to contract around bankruptcy
laws: they are not default options, which become rules if contracts do not specify
alternatives, but instead are mandatory rules, which cannot be ‘contracted away’.
Similarly, decisions are made by voting, and dissenting minorities may be forced
2 U.S. bankruptcy laws are divided in “Chapters”. Roman ﬁgures (e.g. Chapter X, Chapter
XI) refer to the ‘Chandler Act’ of 1938, which was a major revision of the ‘Bankruptcy Act’ of
1898. Arabic ﬁgures (e.g. Chapter 7, Chapter 11) refer to the ‘Bankruptcy Code’ of 1978.
3 For a concise survey of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code see Section 2 in Senbet and Seward
(1995).
4 Additionally, Chapter 11 cases have attracted attention because of their costliness. It is
not clear, however, whether these costs are really signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of other
major restructurings, e.g. liquidations, mergers or going publics.
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to back down.
Furthermore, the bargaining positions of contracting parties may be diﬀerent
inside bankruptcy than outside of it. In Chapter 11, for instance, a bankrupt
debtor receives not only protection from all claimants, but also the possibility
to continue running the ﬁrm, using new super–priority “debtor–in–possession”
ﬁnancing. This may be diﬀerent from the bargaining position of a debtor who
tries to renegotiate his obligations privately. Not surprisingly, this has lead to
complaints about Chapter 11 in the business press.5
Besides inﬂuencing the bargaining positions, formal bankruptcy procedures
can also aﬀect the objectives of the contracting parties. This happens because
decisions are made by majority–voting, and minorities (even absent or unknown)
may be bound by such an agreement. Some classes may even have an incentive
to collude, to transfer wealth to themselves from other parties6. While in a
transaction–cost free world there cannot be disagreement about any decision, in
bankruptcy each party has an incentive to care for its own payoﬀ, only. For
instance, secured creditors may favour the liquidation of a ﬁrm over its (risky)
continuation, while unsecured creditors (and equityholders) might have opposite
preferences.
Finally, bankruptcy laws have strong eﬀects on ﬁrms’ investment behaviour.
This is now well understood, and referred to as either “risk–shifting” or “debt
overhang” problems. Both describe agency problems that may arise if a ﬁrm
has issued both debt and equity. The key idea is uncertainty: the use of debt
ﬁnancing has the result that the payoﬀ to equityholders is a convex function of
income, and therefore a ﬁrm may undertake nonproﬁtable variance–increasing
investments, and forgo proﬁtable variance–reducing ones. An example for this
agency problem is the bankruptcy case of Eastern Airlines. Weiss and Wruck
5 See e.g. “Management by Bankruptcy” (Fortune 31.10.1983), “Bankruptcy as a Corpo-
rate Management Tool” (A.B.A. Journal 1.1.1987), “The Uses and Abuses of Chapter 11”
(Economist, 18.3.1989) and “The Kindness of Chapter 11” (Economist 25.5.1991).
6 This problem is very concrete in Chapter 11 cases, where the debtor has the right to
classify claims into classes. It can happen that small dissenting groups are joined with larger
groups, with completely diﬀerent types of claims, but whose interests are aligned with those of
the debtor’s management.
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(1998) describe how the airline was kept operating (a “high–variance negative
present value project”), even though it was forced to gradually sell oﬀ all assets
to ﬁnance its current losses.
Eastern Airlines also points at another important eﬀect that bankruptcy laws
have on nonﬁnancial decisions: it may aﬀect the competitive position of a ﬁrm,
as well as that of its rivals. Eastern Airlines is an extreme example for this eﬀect.
Chapter 11 did not only protect it from its creditors, but it also shielded it from
its competitors. A ‘cooperative’ judge allowed it to reduce its prices below costs,
in order to gain back market share, and to start its economic recovery.7 This
recovery never happened, and after almost two years Eastern had to be shut down,
but undoubtedly Eastern’s prices had a major impact on its competitors’ price
setting and earnings. On the other hand, its ﬁnancially sounder competitors could
not answer by using ‘predatory strategies’ themselves, e.g. by cutting their prices
to drive Eastern into insolvency and therewith out of the market, as Eastern was
bankrupt, already.
Bankruptcy procedures are supposed (both in theory and practice) to achieve
many goals at the same time, many of them being conﬂicting goals. Not sur-
prisingly, this makes bankruptcies very complex episodes. This is most striking
if one regards the ‘ﬁrm’ as a nexus of contracts: many parties meet repeatedly,
at diﬀerent points of time, to negotiate their contributions to the ﬁrm’s pro-
duction process. These parties may have diﬀerent preferences and objectives.
In a second–best world, in which some contingencies are noncontractible, it can
happen that the parties have to renegotiate their contracts: some unexpected
or undescribable event may occur, which limits the ﬁrm’s capability of fulﬁlling
its promises, and nowhere it is speciﬁed which party should suﬀer how much.
This can lead to several types of ineﬃciency, which court–supervised mandatory
bankruptcy procedures are supposed to mitigate.
Firstly, each party will have an incentive to renegotiate its contract with the
ﬁrm secretly, to improve its own position relative to that of other contracting
parties. For instance, a supplier may require pre–payment of deliveries, which
7 cf. Borenstein and Rose (1995) and Weiss and Wruck (1998). At one stage, Eastern Airlines
charged $12 for the connection New York – Washington (Economist, 18.3.1998).
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strains the ﬁrm’s liquidity; creditors may ask for immediate repayment of their
loans, if necessary by forcing the ﬁrm to sell some of its assets; a bank may reduce
the ﬁrm’s overdraft facility. This is a zero–sum game, in which the parties spend
resources to grab a larger share of a pie that is too small. Apart from wasting
resources, this ‘run on the assets’ may also endanger a recovery of the ﬁrm. For
this reason, reorganisation procedures put a ‘stay’ on all claims, i.e. no debt–
collection eﬀorts may be undertaken. Free from harassment from its creditors,
the ﬁrm has time to consider its alternatives and negotiate with its claimants
(the advantage for the lenders is that they need not worry about possible ‘runs’
on the ﬁrm’s assets anymore).
Secondly, clearly deﬁned rights and obligations in bankruptcy avoid a costly
duplication of debt–collection eﬀorts from the side of the ﬁrm’s creditors. It
is suﬃcient if these eﬀorts are delegated to one party, for instance a trustee
appointed by the court, as in Germany, or a (privately appointed) Receiver, as in
the U.K. Furthermore, a court will have better possibilities than private claimants
to investigate the reasons of the bankruptcy, as well as the whereabouts of the
debtor’s assets (this is the interpretation of “bankruptcy” in Gale and Hellwig
(1985): the lender investigates the borrower’s income).
Thirdly, under court supervision, the parties can reach agreements by voting,
which bind minorities. As a consequence, no party has veto power which would
allow it to hold up the other negotiating parties. This is a relevant advantage
of bankruptcy procedures, compared with privately negotiated reorganisations.
In the U.S., for instance, private renegotiations of public debt (under the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939) require that all holders of that debt agree with a change
of the terms of the contract (this diﬃcult starting point for negotiations with pos-
sibly atomistic debtholders is analysed in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)). This
was made worse by a decision in the LTV bankruptcy case, where some creditors
had agreed to reschedule or cancel some of their claims in private negotiations,
and afterwards LTV ﬁled for bankruptcy. The court decided that the generous
creditors’ claims were the rescheduled ones, not the original claims, which has
added additional disadvantages to private workouts ever since.
Additionally, court supervision allows to bind minorities which are absent
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during the negotiations, or even unknown (the ‘Scheme of Arrangement’ in the
U.K. requires large majorities for this case). This can be relevant in connection
with cases of product liability or environmental damage.
These collective action or coordination problems have not generated much
interest from the side of economic theorists recently. One reason is that they
may be interesting from a theorist’s point of view, but they are not speciﬁc to
problems around bankruptcy. Another reason is that contract theorists cannot
really provide consistent theories that explain why mandatory procedures are
necessary, or even why contracts are incomplete, i.e. why parties rely on laws and
courts to decide for them, instead of making their contracts more detailed.
Apart from the above coordination problems, bankruptcy procedures are sup-
posed to solve several strategic problems.
The function that is reﬂected in most economic writing about bankruptcy
is its role as a bonding device: if poor performance is followed by punishment,
e.g. by the loss of one’s job, or of future incomes, this should improve the ex
ante incentives of the managers or shareholders to ensure that the performance
is good enough. The use of bankruptcy as a bonding device is helpful to provide
incentives for more eﬃcient behaviour outside of bankruptcy. Examples of papers
that use this bonding function of bankruptcy include Hart and Moore (1995) and
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), whose models are based on a possibility to punish
by liquidating a project; in Diamond (1984), a debt contract explicitly speciﬁes
the degree of punishment as a function of the debtor’s default; in Gale and Hellwig
(1985), the punishment is introduced in the form of ‘inspection costs’.
Next, bankruptcy is supposed to shape the parties’ incentives inside bankruptcy.
An important function of bankruptcy is to separate viable from nonviable ﬁrms,
such that the former can be reﬁnanced, and the latter sold or liquidated. This
is not an easy task, as normally it is diﬃcult to tell whether the ﬁnancial dis-
tress that some ﬁrm is experiencing is temporary or fundamental, i.e. whether
the maturity structure of its ﬁnancial obligations is poorly matched with its cash
ﬂows, or whether the ﬁrm’s operations are systematically loss–making. Whoever
decides on the fate of the ﬁrm in the end will have to rely on the information and
advice that the negotiators contribute.
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Unfortunately, under most countries’ bankruptcy laws, the payoﬀs from dif-
ferent alternatives that each party can expect are only imperfectly linked with
the total payoﬀ. A party may therefore favour a suboptimal alternative, because
it gives it a higher payoﬀ. One reason for this could be diﬀerent preferences
over diﬀerent outcomes. Another reason lies in the priority structure of diﬀerent
claims, and ‘absolute priority rules’, which require that certain obligations are to
be fulﬁlled before others can be addressed.
For instance, secured lenders may prefer liquidation to reorganisation, in par-
ticular if the liquidation value is suﬃcient to repay their outstanding loans8 (banks
must also be concerned with the eﬀect of a liquidation on their image both as
lenders and as deposit takers). Unsecured lenders may prefer reorganisations,
because they participate in the upside (their claims may be repaid if the reor-
ganisation is successful, and as trade creditors they may proﬁt additionally if the
ﬁrm’s health is restored), but not in the downside9 (if their share of the liqui-
dation value is small). The shareholders of an insolvent ﬁrm will always favour
its reﬁnancing, as long as they can keep a share in the reorganised entity. The
employees of the ﬁrm will be interested in in keeping their jobs.10 The managers
will additionally worry about their future position in the job market (e.g. about
their reputation).
The inﬂuence of certain parties on the outcome of a bankruptcy can be strong.
In Germany, a rescue is practically impossible without the cooperation of a ﬁrm’s
banks. Similarly, in the U.K. the holder of a ‘Floating Charge’ must be convinced
to cooperate. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges sometimes have strong
preferences for rescuing ﬁrms. This is most explicit in France, where creditors
have little say in bankruptcies. In the U.S., the inﬂuence seems to depend on the
bankruptcy courts, or the judges. For instance, the Bankruptcy Court of Miami
seems to have taken a tough line on bankrupt ﬁrms in the past two decades, while
8 For them, ‘continuation’ is a risk–shifting attempt from the side of claimants with lower
priority.
9 The unsecured creditors will argue that the ﬁrm is exposed to a debt overhang, which
causes ineﬃcient underinvestment.
10 Trade unions, however, may sometimes care more about their industry–wide bargaining
power, cf. Weiss and Wruck (1998).
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the Southern District of New York has built up a reputation for being excessively
management–friendly (see e.g. Delaney (1992) or Baird (1995)).
While the bonding role of bankruptcy is well understood, the incentive prob-
lems inside bankruptcy have not been studied in great detail, yet. Given that
there seem to be many types of incentive problem connected with bankruptcy
negotiations, which can have a strong impact on the ﬁnal outcome, as well as on
incentives outside of bankruptcy, more research in this area is necessary. This is
the purpose of the present thesis.
The complexity and multitude of incentive problems makes it necessary to
concentrate on a subset of problems, while abstracting from others. For instance,
negotiation problems between several lenders are analysed in chapter 1, but ig-
nored in chapters 2 and 3; the ﬁrm’s income is modeled in reduced forms (“high”
or “low”) in chapters 1 and 2, while in chapter 3 we introduce a production pro-
cess, as well as an oligopolistic market for the ﬁrm’s output; in chapters 1 and
2, ﬁnancing is necessary to ﬁnance some ﬁxed setup investment, while in chap-
ter 3 ﬁnancing is needed to cover production costs, and is therefore scalable; in
chapters 1 and 2, a ‘failed’ ﬁrm can be ‘rescued’, which is not an issue in chapter
3.
In its modeling technique, this thesis follows a traditional approach in corpo-
rate ﬁnance: ﬁx some elements of the legal environment (e.g. the types of ﬁnancial
contracts that exist, or the bankruptcy laws), assume some market (or contract-
ing) imperfections, and then explain existing institutions (e.g. “debt contracts”,
“leverage”, etc.) as a second–best response to these imperfections. Depending
on the interests of the researcher, more or less of the legal environment is as-
sumed to be given exogenously. A large strand of the literature analyses the use
of ‘leverage’, i.e. the debt–equity ratio, as a second–best tool in solving incentive
problems. Another strand (the ‘security design’ literature) analyses in what sense
the ﬁnancial contracts that we observe can be considered as optimal responses
to some informational or agency problems (for a survey of both literatures see
Harris and Raviv (1992)). The two ﬁelds are joined in a series of models that
endogenises both the structure of ﬁnancial contracts (debt, equity), and the ma-
turity and priority structure of several classes of claimants (see e.g. Berglo¨f and
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von Thadden (1994), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Hart and Moore (1995),
Rajan and Winton (1995) and Repullo and Suarez (1998)).
The approach taken in this thesis is that of security design. This is most
explicit in Chapter 3, where the ﬁnancial contract that the parties sign (a debt
contract) is derived from primitives as an optimal contract. In the other two
chapters, the structure of the repayment functions is not suﬃciently detailed
to be able to speak of ‘debt’ or ‘equity’, say. The primary interest with those
chapters was in endogenising other aspects of ﬁnancial relationships: the number
of contracting parties in chapter 1, and the respective bargaining positions in
renegotiations in chapter 2. Chapter 2 represents “security design” in a wider
sense, as the goal was to explain the structure of optimal bankruptcy laws, as a
function of the economic environment.
Chapter 1 of this thesis addresses a mechanism which is frequently used in
agency models: threaten to make ex post ineﬃcient decisions to improve some
other party’s ex ante incentives. The use of bankruptcy as a bonding device is an
example for this type of mechanism: the creditor threatens to liquidate the ﬁrm if
a promised repayment is not made, and this threat induces the owner–manager of
the ﬁrm to increase his (unobservable) eﬀort, say, or to pay out all (unobservable)
earnings.
Renegotiation is a threat to the eﬃcacy of this type of contracts: once the
parties have reached a stage at which the contract tells them to make some
ineﬃcient decision, both can improve their payoﬀ by rescinding the old contract,
and avoid the ineﬃciency. Chapter 11 oﬀers a forum for this type of renegotiation:
a bankrupt ﬁrm can renegotiate with its creditor, and if there is a gain from not
liquidating, the chances are high that it will not happen. Not surprisingly, many
authors explicitly or implicitly assume that there is no Chapter 11 in their models
(see e.g. Hart and Moore (1995, footnote 8) or Bolton and Scharfstein (1996, p.
20)).
Chapter 1 explores these renegotiation problems, and shows how they can be
addressed in a very natural way. It explicitly models the ineﬃciencies that can
arise if several parties have to negotiate their contributions to some ‘public good’
(in this case the rescue of a ﬁrm), and it oﬀers an explanation for features of rescue
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negotiations that may sometimes seem to be irrational to an outside observer (e.g.
delays caused by negotiations about details, when a bankrupt ﬁrm is about to
collapse). In the model, the possibility to renegotiate leads to an extreme reversal
of bargaining positions: while a unique lender would normally enjoy a strong
bargaining position, the possibility to renegotiate robs her of a possibility to
threaten to be ‘tough’ (to use bankruptcy as a bonding device). At ﬁrst sight, the
introduction of a second lender should be considered as weakening a ﬁrst lender’s
bargaining position. However, given the ineﬃciencies of multi–party bargaining,
the introduction of a second lender introduces a commitment possibility which
a single lender does not have, and its bargaining power is improved at a stage
where the lender needed it most.
Chapter 1 also oﬀers an analysis of a renegotiation setup that lies between
the two most commonly used extremes. Some models work with one lender,
only. Others assume that the ﬁrm issued public debt to atomistic bondholders,
and that therefore renegotiation is impossible. With two lenders, elements from
both setups are combined: few, nonatomistic lenders take the eﬀects of their
negotiating on the ﬁnal outcome into consideration, and therefore are more likely
to allow for ex post eﬃcient decisions than atomistic lenders; on the other hand,
the higher the number of negotiating parties, the more valuable it is to ‘hold out’,
and even nonatomistic negotiators will therefore sometimes achieve ineﬃcient
outcomes.
Like chapter 1, chapter 2 analyses conﬂicting incentive schemes in dynamic
agency problems: bankruptcy serves as a bonding device to solve some agency
problem (information revelation in chapter 1, eﬀort provision in chapter 2), but
once the proper incentives have been provided, the parties would gain from rene-
gotiating the contract to become softer, i.e. more eﬃcient ex post. In chapter
1 the main actors at this stage are the lenders. In chapter 2, the distribution
of bargaining positions is more intricate. Loosely speaking, the only bargaining
power that the ﬁrm has is not to start bargaining — once the creditor knows that
there is scope for renegotiations, the ﬁrm has nothing in its hand to increase its
payoﬀ above the status quo.
The key idea behind chapter 2 is that the bonding role of bankruptcy requires
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a harsh treatment of a ﬁrm’s manager, say, but that this treatment should not be
too harsh — if it were, his cooperation in revealing a need for renegotiation could
not be ensured. This captures a very serious problems in countries with ‘tough’
bankruptcy regimes: if failure is followed by strong punishment, no debtor will
voluntarily admit that there is trouble ahead — as long as there is hope, and the
trouble is not publicly observable, it may be better to hope that things turn to
the good, and do nothing.
This does not only address an important problem with insolvencies in Ger-
many or the U.K., say, where insolvency practitioners frequently complain that
they get involved in failed companies much too late. It also points at the fact that
bankruptcy is not just a random event, outside of the control of a ﬁrm’s manage-
ment. Quite to the contrary, a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it easy to change its balance sheet
such that a formal bankruptcy is postponed (see also Delaney (1992)). Thus, the
distinction that is normally made in economic theory between incentives inside
or outside of bankruptcy is not precise: as long as the manager of a distressed
ﬁrm is able to shift the start of bankruptcy in time, and may have incentives to
do so, the diﬀerent incentive problems can only be analysed together.
A central role in chapter 2 is played by Absolute Priority Rules (APR). These
rules require that in bankruptcy, claims with high priority are repaid in full
before claims with lower priority are repaid. This makes it diﬃcult — in theory
— to ‘reward’ a manager–owner for revealing ﬁnancial diﬃculties as early as
possible. Interpreted literally, APRs require that shareholders receive nothing
if their ﬁrm is bankrupt, and therefore they will never allow information about
ﬁnancial diﬃculties to be revealed before they would become visible, anyway. In
other words, a strict interpretation of APRs puts a lot of weight on the bonding
role of bankruptcy, and ignores possibilities to improve ex post decisions.
APRs are a generally accepted element of the corporate ﬁnance literature,
because this literature typically uses bankruptcy as a bonding device in its mod-
els.11 In reality, the implementation of APRs is less strict. There is a large
empirical literature which reports major systematic violations of APRs in U.S.
business bankruptcies (started by Franks and Torous (1989)). Two historical
11 Even in Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) the need to adhere to APRs is not questioned.
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examples are less well–known. Firstly, the predecessor of Chapter 11, Chapter
XI of the 1938 Chandler Act, had no APR provisions. This procedure was in-
tended for small business reorganisations, and the conﬂict modeled in chapter 2
may have been relevant when the Act was drafted (cf. N.B.R.C. (1997a, Working
Group Proposal # 1) and (1997b, p. 549)). Secondly, in 1705 Queen Anne of
England signed a statute called “An act to prevent frauds frequently committed
by bankrupts”, which
[. . .] provided that those debtors who cooperated fully would be dis-
charged and would take ﬁve percent of whatever assets were gathered.
Debtors who did not meet with their creditors, who lied to them, or
who refused to reveal the whereabouts of all their assets would be
hanged.
Baird (1987, p. 174)
Chapter 2 criticises the requirement of APRs in ‘soft’ bankruptcy procedures
like Chapter 11: ‘soft’ procedures are designed to lead to early revelation of reﬁ-
nancing needs, and APRs are a tool to make bankruptcy procedures ‘tough’. This
conﬂict is not obviously necessary, and chapter 2, unlike much of the literature,
is very precise about what is good about Chapter 11, and what is bad about it.
The main goal of chapter 3 is to expand the nonﬁnancial side of the ﬁrm in
models of corporate ﬁnance. The typical approach to modeling would be the one
of chapters 1 and 2: a ﬁrm is called a ‘project’, which can be set up by investing
some ﬁxed amount of money, and which will be liquidated at the end of n periods.
The income that the project generates is typically stochastic, and frequently the
support is reduced to “high” and “low”.
While this is helpful in simplifying the analysis, it is important to know
whether the results of the reduced–form models are changed if real investment,
output and marketing decisions are added to the model. In particular because
the interdependence of ﬁnancial contracts and investment behaviour has been
the centre of attraction for the corporate ﬁnance literature during the past two
decades: problems of overinvestment (e.g. in the form of excessive risk taking) or
underinvestment (e.g. due to debt overhang) are driving forces in many models.
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In the model of chapter 3, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial needs are determined by its
production plans, and are therefore scalable; it faces competitors on the output
market, which aﬀects its earnings; and it does not sign some exogenously given
ﬁnancial contract, but designs an optimal contract. The analysis shows that
standard simpliﬁcations come at a price, as they can generate misleading results.
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Abstract
We present a model in which nonatomistic investors ﬁnance projects and
endogenously choose not to be unique lenders. That is, multiplicity of
lenders is not assumed but arises endogenously. We assume that due
to informational asymmetries investors cannot tell apart entrepreneurs
with good projects from those who will have to be reﬁnanced. While
reﬁnancing is sequentially rational, it is not proﬁtable to start such a
project. A unique lender cannot commit not to reﬁnance a project. Two
creditors, however, will have to agree on their respective degrees of debt
forgiveness. Due to ineﬃciencies in their negotiations they can credibly
commit not always to reﬁnance a distressed project. This is harmful ex
post, once the need to reﬁnance has arisen, but it is helpful ex ante, as
it can keep entrepreneurs with nonpromising projects from demanding
to be ﬁnanced.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D92, G21,
G33, G34, G38
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1.1 Introduction
This paper analyses a bank’s incentives to forgive debt and reﬁnance a distressed
ﬁrm. We compare the decision of a unique lender with that of two banks, which
have jointly provided a loan to the ﬁrm. We show that banks may prefer such
co–ﬁnancing, even if they enjoy a strong bargaining position relative to the ﬁrm.
The main diﬀerence between single and multiple banking lies in the negotiations
that are necessary, if the ﬁrm cannot repay its debt but it could proﬁtably be
reﬁnanced.
Suppose that reﬁnancing is proﬁtable, once an initial investment is sunk,
but that ex ante it is not. Some ﬁrms will need reﬁnancing, others not, and the
creditors would like to ﬁnance the latter, only. The entrepreneurs of the respective
ﬁrms, however, who are informed about their prospective ﬁnancial needs, are only
interested in receiving a loan, irrespective of whether it will be performing well
or badly. If the creditors could commit not to reﬁnance a ﬁrm, the entrepreneurs
with ex ante unproﬁtable ﬁrms would prefer to be inactive, instead of being forced
to liquidate their ﬁrm prematurely. A single lender cannot credibly commit to
being tough, as it is always sequentially rational to reﬁnance a distressed ﬁrm,
once the initial loan is sunk. We argue that introducing multiplicity on the side
of the lenders can make such a commitment possible. Even if they agree on the
need to rescue the ﬁrm, two lenders will have to bargain about the distribution
of the overall loss. Asymmetric information between the banks is the cause of
ineﬃciencies in the rescue decision: with positive probability the ﬁrm is not
reﬁnanced, and it is liquidated, instead.
There is a large literature now, which analyses the eﬀects of single or multiple
lending on the decisions of a ﬁrm. One strand of the literature analyses the eﬀects
that the structure of the creditors’ claims has on the possibilities to reorganise
a distressed ﬁrm. Gertner and Scharfstein (1992) and Detragiache (1994) for
instance assume that bonds are held by atomistic investors and therefore cannot
be renegotiated. They analyse the eﬀects of diﬀerent bankruptcy regimes on the
possibilities to reorganise a distressed ﬁrm.
These eﬀects can be used strategically by a ﬁrm, i.e. diﬀerent ﬁnancial struc-
tures can be used to achieve diﬀerent goals. Several papers have asked the ques-
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tion why a ﬁrm may prefer to have one or many creditors. The diﬀerence between
the market–based ﬁnancial system in the US and the bank–based system in Ger-
many and Japan are striking, and an analysis of the relative advantages of the
two systems is an important research program.
A frequently stated advantage of the ‘main bank’ ﬁnancial system in Germany
and Japan is that distressed ﬁrms are rescued more frequently (See e.g. Hoshi et
al. (1990) for the case of Japan, and Edwards and Fischer (1994) for the case
of Germany). Some theoretical papers have analysed the conditions under which
‘main bank’ ﬁnance is more eﬃcient than a system with multiple lenders (See e.g.
Fischer(1990), von Thadden (1995), and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)). As
Edwards and Fischer (1990) conclude, however, these models are not compatible
with the empirical evidence for the German case. While in the models at most one
‘main bank’ can emerge, in reality a German ﬁrm has more than one ‘Hausbank’.
The question to analyse is thus why we may observe more than one nonatomistic
lender. Several answers are possible.
First, one could argue that banks are risk averse and want to spread out their
risk exposure by sharing risks with their competitors. This is certainly true, but
not a very satisfying explanation from a theoretical point of view. Banks are
usually thought of as ‘large’, compared with the size of the average ﬁrm. They
should therefore be able to diversify away most of their risks, as was modeled in
Diamond (1984). This makes them de facto risk neutral, and they should not
suﬀer from risk exposure. After all, it is the banks’ business to deal with risks
and to allocate them optimally, and not to avoid risks. Additionally, it would
be interesting to know whether there is more behind multiple banking than mere
risk–sharing.
Second, a bank may lack the funds to ﬁnance a project. Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995) suggested that such smallness could be a solution to the Soft Bud-
get Constraint problem in centralised economies. Inability to ﬁnance a project
exclusively may be a real problem when ﬁrms are very large. However, even in
cases when the ﬁrms are very small, compared with their banks, we ﬁnd multi-
plicity. As before, there is a need for additional explanations.
Third, ﬁrms may want to have many banks because this protects them from
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being exploited by too strong a partner, as was suggested in von Thadden (1992).
This third rationale for multiple banking implies that neither the banks nor the
ﬁrms enjoy exceptionally strong bargaining positions in their relationship. Nor-
mally it is however conjectured that the banks are in the strong position. Many
situations can occur in which a ﬁrm has to rely on its bank or banks and in which
the bank can cheaply ‘punish’ earlier unfriendly behaviour.
Finally, a recent literature analyses the use of multiple claimants, holding
diﬀerent types of securities, in solving agency problems: the investors may have
poor incentives either to really monitor their debtor, or to make proper use of
their information (e.g. to liquidate a ﬁrm). See e.g. Diamond (1993), Berglo¨f and
von Thadden (1994), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Rajan and Winton (1995),
and Repullo and Suarez (1995).
The present paper oﬀers a rationale for multiplicity, which complements the
explanations above. We argue that multiplicity is requested by the banks, who
use it as a commitment device for eventual renegotiations of the lending contracts.
The ineﬃciencies that arise in rescue negotiations (the banks have to determine
their respective degrees of debt forgiveness) are a threat for entrepreneurs with
bad projects. If the ineﬃciencies are suﬃciently strong, this allows the banks to
deter nonproﬁtable projects, and to ﬁnance high quality ones, only.
The idea that multiplicity can serve as a commitment device was ﬁrst stated
in Hellwig (1991). Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) analyse the role of ‘multiple
lending’ in hardening the ‘soft budget constraint’ of a ﬁrm. In their model,
however, multiplicity is a credible commitment not to rescue only because of the
assumption that lenders are ‘small’, and cannot provide both an initial and a
reﬁnancing loan. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) analyse a renegotiation problem
that is similar in spirit to ours. In their model, too, multiplicity is used as a
commitment to be ineﬃcient in renegotiations, with the result that high quality
ﬁrms borrow from two creditors, while low quality ﬁrms prefer to borrow from
a single creditor. Our model diﬀers from theirs in diﬀerent aspects. First, we
work in a complete contracting environment. There is no variable in this model,
which is ‘observable but not veriﬁable.’ In Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the
entrepreneur can hide the returns of the project, and claim that the returns had
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been low. An optimal contract ‘punishes’ him by threatening to liquidate the
assets that are still valuable to him. In our model, the banks want to keep away
nonproﬁtable projects, i.e. projects with a low probability of being successful.
Second, we model the renegotiation process explicitly, and base it on observations
from a ﬁnancial system with ‘main banks’. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) use the
Nash Bargaining Solution and the Shapley Value, instead, to model bargaining
outcomes.
Finally, a recent strand of literature analyses the strategic use of single or
multiple lending as a commitment device with respect to nonﬁnancial decisions.
More precisely, these papers (see e.g. Yosha (1995) or Bhattacharya and Chiesa
(1995)) study the relative advantages of public or bank lending, if the two regimes
have diﬀerent eﬀects on how sensitive information can leak to a ﬁrm’s competitors.
They thus provide more and richer explanations for multilateral lending, which
add new aspects to the purely ﬁnancial models.
The paper also adds a new variant of a bargaining model to the game theoretic
literature. We model the negotiations between the banks as a war of attrition.
As soon as the banks have been informed that the ﬁrm must be reﬁnanced,
negotiations start. In these negotiations, each of the two banks tries to convince
its opponent to write down the larger fraction of its claims. A rescue is only
possible if one of the banks gives in: it frees the way to a rescue of the ﬁrm by
accepting its opponent’s rescue plan. The reason why the banks eventually give
in is that a rescue may become impossible, and the ﬁrm has to be liquidated.
Each bank has a privately known valuation for the business relationship with the
ﬁrm, which it loses if the latter is liquidated. The impossibility to rescue can
arise at any time, as soon as the parties have started to bargain, and the longer
the rescue is delayed, the more likely it becomes that the banks are forced to
liquidate the ﬁrm. If a bank has a high valuation at risk, it has strong incentives
to accept its opponent’s plan, only to ensure that the ﬁrm is rescued. As the
opponent could have an even higher valuation, however, it also has an incentive
to hold out for a while. This tradeoﬀ determines the banks’ strategies in the war
of attrition.
Admati and Perry (1991), Fernandez and Glazer (1991), and Abreu and Gul
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(1994) are other papers, in which two parties must come to an agreement in time
consuming negotiations. We could have used variants of these models, instead
of the war of attrition, to capture the ineﬃciencies of the renegotiation process.
The models in the three papers, however, are somewhat technical, too, and do
not generate more elegant results than our model. We believe, therefore, that the
war of attrition is a good compromise between the requirements for the analysis
and the tractability of the results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 1.2, the projects
and the entrepreneurs are introduced, and the diﬃculties of a single bank are
discussed. The model is extended in Section 1.3, where two banks ﬁnance a
ﬁrm, and renegotiate if it must be reﬁnanced. These renegotiations are modeled
as a war of attrition. Section 1.4 solves this model to ﬁnd the equilibrium of
the renegotiation stage, as well as that of the whole game. Section 1.5 presents
some empirical evidence, and discusses implications and extensions of the model.
Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model With One Bank
There is a large number of entrepreneurs who can start one project each. Each
entrepreneur privately knows the type of project that he can start, either ‘good’
or ‘bad’. The proportion of entrepreneurs with ‘good’ projects, γ, is common
knowledge.
The timing of a project is the following. In the ﬁrst period, an investment I
must be sunk. In period 2 the project types become publicly observable. Payoﬀs
are earned in the third (the last) period. A ‘good’ project earns R > I, while
a ‘bad’ project earns zero. Both project types can be liquidated, which earns r,
where 0 ≤ r < R. A ‘bad’ project can be ‘rescued’ in period 2: if an additional
amount J is invested, a payoﬀ R¯ is earned, instead of zero.
Assumption 1.1 It is proﬁtable to rescue a ‘bad’ project in period 2, as R¯−J >
r. However, it is not proﬁtable to ﬁnance a ‘bad’ project ex ante: R¯− J − I < 0.
Neither should a random sample of projects be ﬁnanced: γ(R− I) + (1− γ)(R¯−
J − I) < 0.
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The entrepreneurs’ payoﬀs depend on whether their projects were started and
completed. If a project was not started, the entrepreneur earns zero utility. If
the project was started, and either completed successfully (if ‘good’) or rescued
(if ‘bad’), his utility is M > 0. If a project was started and then liquidated, this
causes harm to the entrepreneur, and his payoﬀ is –m (where m > 0).
The entrepreneurs have no wealth of their own, and need outside ﬁnance
to start their projects. We assume that a project cannot be separated from
its entrepreneur. ‘Good’ projects cannot be continued without him, and ‘bad’
projects cannot be rescued — both types would have to be liquidated. The
entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability. No punishment can be used
legally to inﬂuence the entrepreneurs’ decisions, except for the liquidation of the
project, which gives them negative utility.
As we assume that it is not proﬁtable to ﬁnance a cross section of projects, an
investor must ﬁnd a way to separate the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ projects. Ideally,
only the former would be ﬁnanced. A bank could propose a contract which
speciﬁes that ‘bad’ projects are liquidated in period 2. It would like to commit
never to reﬁnance, as this would prevent the entrepreneurs with ‘bad’ projects
from applying for initial loans I. Unfortunately, as one can easily verify, such
a threat is not credible. Entrepreneurs with both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ projects will
apply for I, as those with ‘good’ projects have nothing to fear, and those with
‘bad’ projects know that there will be a rescue. As a result, the single bank faces
a random sample of projects, and it has to reject all loan requests. Due to a lack
of commitment no project is undertaken, even though there would be valuable
investment opportunities.
1.3 The Model With Two Banks
The lack of a commitment possibility in the case of a single bank can be overcome
(at least partially) by having more than one creditor for each project. If each of
two banks provides, say, half of the initial loan, both have some rights over the
returns of the ﬁrm at t = 3. If the entrepreneur asks for the additional loan J , a
part of the total investment will have to be written oﬀ. The banks will bargain
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over how much each should forgive. If this bargaining is suﬃciently ineﬃcient,
and the consequences of this ineﬃciency cause harm to the entrepreneur, the
underinvestment problem can be solved.
It will be shown below, that two banks can commit to rescue with a probability
which is strictly smaller than one. There is a critical value for this probability,
which we denote by q¯. It is determined by the entrepreneurs’ utility functions:
q¯M − (1− q¯)m = 0. (1.1)
If an entrepreneur’s ‘bad’ project is rescued with probability q¯ and liquidated
with probability (1− q¯), his expected payoﬀ is exactly zero. He is thus indiﬀerent
between applying for a loan, and being inactive (which earns a sure payoﬀ zero).
If the rescue probability is strictly below q¯, he prefers not to apply for the loan. In
this case, only the entrepreneurs with ‘good’ projects apply for funding. There-
fore, if the banks can credibly commit not to reﬁnance with a probability larger
than (1− q¯), multiple banking strictly dominates bilateral lending relationships.
The model with two banks incorporates some observations about private work-
outs and bankruptcy negotiations that are reported in the business press, in
empirical and descriptive papers (e.g. Fischer (1990) and Edwards and Fischer
(1994)), in studies on the banking system and insolvency procedures in Germany,
and in the large literature on the reform of the bankruptcy laws in Germany.
These observations, or ‘stylised facts’, are:
1) Banks seem to have a strong bargaining position.
2) The parties involved try to keep the negotiations secret.
3) The banks want to terminate the negotiations quickly.
4) It is likely that customers and suppliers are lost if they hear that there are
rescue negotiations.
5) Whether to rescue or not is rarely subject to dispute.
6) The parties rather bargain about who is to sacriﬁce how much.
We have used these observations to construct a model of debt renegotiations,
such that it captures important elements of an existing ﬁnancial system, and it
generates results which can again be compared with reality. To do so, we must
expand the model with a single bank, by adding some assumptions. Two com-
1.3. THE MODEL WITH TWO BANKS 33
ments will be helpful before this is done. First, all additional assumptions could
have been added to the model with a single bank, without changing any of the
results. This has not been done, as it would have complicated the exposition
unnecessarily. Second, we will make assumptions that are much more restrictive
than is necessary to generate the results. Again, this is done to simplify the no-
tation. Where assumptions are ‘extreme’, we mention this fact, and oﬀer weaker
alternatives to the reader.
We model the renegotiation process between the two banks of a ﬁrm as a War
of Attrition. Each of the two banks tries to convince its opponent to carry the
burden of reﬁnancing. An outside observer of the negotiations will ﬁnd that no
progress is being made for a while: the banks fail to come to an agreement on how
to split the overall loss R¯ − I − J , if there should be a rescue. The negotiations
can end in two diﬀerent ways. Either one of the banks gives in, i.e. it accepts
the rescue plan of its opponent. Or fate turns against the ﬁrm: a rescue becomes
impossible for exogenous reasons, and it must be liquidated. In the latter case,
each bank incurs a loss (additional to the ﬁnancial loss). The size of this loss is
privately known by the respective bank. In equilibrium, the higher it is, the more
a bank fears liquidation, and the less it is willing to reject its opponent’s rescue
plan.
We now introduce the extensions of the single banking model, proceeding
along the observations listed above. The equilibrium of the war of attrition will
be analysed in Section 1.4.
The ﬁrst observation states that banks are the main players in rescue negoti-
ations. This is captured by assuming that they are the only bargaining parties,
and by assuming that the courts strictly enforce Absolute Priority Rules. These
rules specify that no party may receive any of the returns of the ﬁrm, if the banks
have neither been repaid in full, nor have agreed to such a payment.
Observation 2 describes how the banks want to keep the negotiations secret.
It is helpful in achieving this goal to conclude an agreement as quickly as possible
(See Observation 3). The reason for this wish for secrecy lies in the bankruptcy
laws, which in most countries favour the banks (France is a notable exception).
The assets of the ﬁrm usually are used as collateral for the loans from the banks,
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and absolute priority rules enforce the need to repay these claims ﬁrst. The
customers and suppliers are the parties who typically do badly in bankruptcy.
Similar to a bank run, they have every incentive to request what they are owed,
as soon as they discover the ﬁrm’s problems, and not to engage in any new trades
(except possibly on a cash–only basis). We model this sensitivity of a rescue to
the cooperation of these parties as a heavily reduced form of observation 4.
Assumption 1.2 At any time during the rescue negotiations, the public can
discover that there are such negotiations going on. This happens by the time
t with probability F (t). If the negotiations have been discovered, a rescue becomes
immediately impossible, and the project must be liquidated.
Assumption 1.2 is much more extreme than is necessary for the results. Nev-
ertheless, it is not unrealistic. Firms whose assets consist almost exclusively of
human capital are an example. If the competitors of an advertising company
ﬁnd out that it is in diﬃculties, they will try to hire its best employees on the
spot. Robbed of its most valuable ‘assets’, the distressed company is not worth
rescuing anymore, and must be liquidated. For this reason, a formal insolvency
in this industry can end after a couple of hours. Furthermore, there is anecdotal
evidence from the UK, which indicates that secrecy may be a crucial requirement
for a successful rescue. The Bank of England assists in the rescue of distressed
large companies, by coordinating the parties’ eﬀorts as soon as possible. It is not
uncommon that in the negotiation meetings the parties have to use coded names
to identify the distressed ﬁrms, even if everybody is informed about the real ones.
Secrecy may also be relevant if without it potential customers are lost. Imagine
that a customer in a travel agency hears that an airline is ﬁnancially distressed.
He has strong incentives, in this case, to book his ticket with another airline, as
the airline may be bankrupt before he has completed his journey.
We have to make some technical assumptions, in order to make the model
tractable:
Assumption 1.3 The ‘discovery technology’ F of the public has a mass point
with measure π > 0 at t = 2, and a density f with support (2, τ ], where τ < ∞.
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The mass point at t = 2 is necessary for the uniqueness of the equilibrium strate-
gies.1 These are determined by two diﬀerential equations, the solution of which
is not unique without a socalled boundary condition. The mass point leads to a
static lottery over rescue and liquidation at t = 2, which gives us such a boundary
condition. This lottery is a logic extension of the dynamic war of attrition game
to a discrete pre–stage, and is therefore used in the model: as will be shown
below, the dynamic war of attrition is the limiting case of a discrete time game,
if the length of a time unit becomes inﬁnitesimal.
Assumption 1.3 further restricts the support of f to a ﬁnite interval. The
reason for this is that the results would be diﬃcult to interpret if τ = ∞ (it
would be possible that the banks bargain endlessly). It is by no means a necessary
assumption. Furthermore, one can easily imagine why the ﬁrm’s distress should
be discovered in ﬁnite time. For example, there may be legal obligations to make
the distress public, if certain contingencies arise.
Observation 5 states that the negotiating parties normally agree that the ﬁrm
should be rescued (if they start to negotiate). This is captured by the complete
information about the costs and returns of a rescue, and by the assumption that
a rescue is proﬁtable (Assumption 1.1). Not everything is common knowledge
between the negotiating parties, however.
Assumption 1.4 After signing the initial loan contract, each bank Bi develops
a privately known valuation i for the business relations with the ﬁrm. i is a loss
that the bank incurs if the ﬁrm is liquidated. The valuations are independently
and identically distributed, with a common probability density function g. g is
strictly positive on its support IR+, continuous and diﬀerentiable. Denote the
cumulative distribution function with G.
There are many possible interpretations for the loss of i if the ﬁrm is liquidated.
For instance, it may be an estimate of future proﬁts from dealing with the ﬁrm.
Alternatively, the bank may incur costs or lose proﬁts because the liquidation of
its debtor damages its public image or leads to tighter supervision by the banking
regulator. Finally, i may parametrise agency problems within the bank. A bank
1A simple alternative to the mass point assumption will be discussed below, see Lemma 1.1.
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manager’s career prospects may be worsened, if ‘his’ ﬁrm must be liquidated.
Similarly, the bank manager and the entrepreneur may have become good friends.
In both cases, the decision making unit in the bank would lose something if the
ﬁrm is liquidated, and would prefer to rescue it.
The banks’ willingness to assist a distressed debtor is frequently underlined
in studies of the German ﬁnancial system (see e.g. Schneider–Lenne´ (1992)). It is
questioned in Fischer (1990). His evidence, however, is based on interviews with
insolvency practitioners, and can therefore be assumed to be biased to the banks’
disadvantage. In their analysis of private workouts in the US, Gilson et al. (1990)
conclude that restructuring is the more likely, the more debt is owed to banks.
This may be caused by the banks’ superior skills and capabilities in attempting
to rescue a ﬁrm, but it may also signal that banks are more willing to rescue a
ﬁrm than other creditors. In the model this willingness to rescue is captured by
the valuation i.
Assumption 1.4 and the next assumption jointly capture observation 6, that
the banks bargain about who has to bear how much of the loss. The set of
outcomes that the banks can achieve is restricted to simplify the analysis, that is
how the net surplus s (the returns R¯ minus the cost J and the opportunity cost
r) from rescuing can be split (it is positive because of assumption 1.1.)
Assumption 1.5 The banks ﬁght for the whole surplus s := (R¯ − r − J). No
oﬀer to share the surplus is made or accepted. If one bank gives in it receives its
share ri in the liquidation value r of the ﬁrm from the other bank, where r1 and
r2 are speciﬁed in the initial contract. The winning bank is committed to rescue
the ﬁrm immediately, but may keep the returns for itself.
As before (see Assumption 1.2), the formulation of Assumption 1.5 is much
stronger than necessary. A sharing rule saying that the gross surplus R¯ − J
can only be shared in proportions α and (1 − α), where α = 1
2
, would be suﬃ-
cient. This would lead to signiﬁcant complications of the analysis, however, which
are not rewarded by the additional insight that one gets.
This completes the introduction of the model with two banks. As one can
easily see, the assumptions that have been added in this section could also have
1.3. THE MODEL WITH TWO BANKS 37
been introduced in the single bank model, without changing anything. The loss
of a valuation i if the ﬁrm is liquidated would make a single lender even more
willing to reﬁnance a ‘bad’ project. This rescue happens already without the
valuation, however.
In the model with one bank, a strategy for the bank consisted of a ﬁnancing
and a reﬁnancing decision. In the case with two banks it is slightly more com-
plicated. We ﬁrst consider the part of the strategy which is used in the rescue
negotiations. If a ﬁrm needs reﬁnancing, the sequence of events is the following.
First, the banks decide whether they want to give in immediately. If none of the
banks has given in, the negotiations are discovered with probability π, and the
ﬁrm must be liquidated. With probability (1 − π) the continuous time war of
attrition starts. We assume that if both banks give in simultaneously, each ‘wins’
with probability 1
2
.
A strategy is a function Ti : IR+ −→ [2, τ ], which determines for each moment
of time whether a bank Bi with valuation i should give in or not. It will be
shown in Section 1.4, that if the equilibrium strategy tells this bank to stop at
time Ti(i), it will stop at every later time, as well. Thus, we will deﬁne Ti as
determining the ﬁrst time at which a bank plans to stop. This includes the static
lottery which is played because of the mass point in F at t = 2.
One may wonder why the banks cannot renegotiate the lending contract, after
it has been signed. Both are fully aware of the ineﬃciency that will arise, if the
contract is renegotiated using the war of attrition. Why cannot one bank (or
a third bank) take over all debt for a ﬂat price? Suppose B1 would make such
an oﬀer to B2. B2 would claim to have a valuation 2 = 0 and not to fear the
war of attrition, in order to increase the takeover price. B1 would claim to have
the same valuation, to decrease the price. None of the two has any incentive to
admit having a positive valuation, until a rescue is really needed. In this case,
however, the war of attrition will start. The time that passes by is the only
credible information about one’s valuation, as talk is ‘cheap’, and neither before
nor during the war of attrition the parties can renegotiate more eﬃciently. Even
a bank with valuation i = ∞ would wait until a rescue is necessary, as it might
be that the opponent gives in. Nothing is lost by waiting until t = 2, at which
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time both banks can prevent a liquidation with probability one by giving in.
1.4 Equilibrium Strategies
The ﬁrst step in solving the renegotiation game is to determine which types
would want to start the war of attrition, and which types would prefer to give
in immediately, in order to secure the rescue of the ﬁrm. If no bank gives in
immediately, the negotiations are discovered with probability π (the mass point
in F ), and the ﬁrm is liquidated. With probability (1 − π) the continuous time
war of attrition starts.
A bank with a very high valuation at stake will not want to gamble for the
surplus s, and stop immediately. We must determine which is the lowest valua-
tion, for which this is still true. Denote this cut–oﬀ value of bank Bi with λi. If
its valuation is i > λi, it should strictly prefer to give in immediately, while if
it is i < λi, it should want to start the war of attrition, and plan to stop later
than t = 2.
We deﬁne λi as the valuation with which a bank Bi is indiﬀerent between
giving in immediately, and starting the war of attrition, if it is sure that the
opponent will either give in immediately (with probability 1 − G(λ2)), or will
start the war of attrition without giving in (with probability G(λ2)).
Consider the bank with valuation i = λi − ε, where ε > 0. Given the
deﬁnition of λi, there must be a δ > 0, such that it will strictly prefer to start the
negotiations, if the probability that the opponent gives in immediately, as soon
as the negotiations have started, is δ. Thus, a bank with a valuation below λi
has an incentive to hold out for a strictly positive amount of time. A bank with
a valuation higher than λi, however, strictly prefers to give in immediately.
Lemma 1.1 The cut–oﬀ values λ1 and λ2 are deﬁned implicitly by
λ1 =
s
2π
(
1−G(λ2)
G(λ2)
)
and λ2 =
s
2π
(
1−G(λ1)
G(λ1)
)
. (1.2)
Since λi is continuous and monotonic in λj, a symmetric solution exists. It can
happen that there are multiple solutions, since the two equations in Lemma 1.1
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must be solved simultaneously. We assume that the banks play the symmetric
solution in this case12, and denote the common cut–oﬀ value with λ.
As was mentioned before, the war of attrition is only one of many possible
ways to model negotiations with ineﬃcient delays. The model could have been
slightly simpliﬁed by assuming that the support of G is bounded (see Assumption
1.4). Suppose it was common knowledge that the highest value i that a bank
can attribute to its business relationship with a ﬁrm is A < ∞, because a bank’s
line manager cannot ‘bet the ranch’. The results would be qualitatively the same,
except that we would have λ = A. Our formulation allows for banks that give
in immediately with a certain probability, depending on the parameters of the
model.
If both banks decided to stay in the game, the war of attrition starts. A
strategy Ti in this war of attrition speciﬁes the earliest instant at which a bank
wishes to stop, given the realisation of its potential loss, i. Lemma 1.2 derives
some characteristics that equilibrium strategies must have. In Proposition 1.1
we will show that these necessary conditions are also suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a unique equilibrium, together with the boundary conditions that are
determined in Lemma 1.1.
Lemma 1.2 Let T1 and T2 be equilibrium strategies of the game deﬁned above.
Then the strategy Ti is (i) strictly decreasing in the liquidation loss i, (ii) con-
tinuous, and (iii) diﬀerentiable. (iv) Bank Bi stops at τ if and only if i = 0.
In equilibrium it will never be the case that the bank with the higher loss level will
decide to stay in longer than its opponent. The threat of the public’s discovery
must have strictly more weight in a bank’s reasoning the higher i is, while the
gain from winning, the surplus s, is constant. Only a bank with zero liquidation
loss will wait until τ , and it will not want to stop earlier than τ . A bank with
2A suﬃcient condition for uniqueness can be found by inverting λ2(λ1), and requiring that
the slope of this inverse is never equal to the slope of λ1(λ2). It is, however, diﬃcult to interpret:
g()
[G()]2
·
g
(
G−1
[
s
2π+s
])
[
G
(
G−1
[
s
2π+s
])]2 = (2πs
)2
∀ ∈ IR+.
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strictly positive loss level will either stop immediately at t = 2 (if it has costs
i ≥ λ) or at some moment after t = 2 but earlier than τ .
At every moment, both players update their beliefs about the opponent’s valu-
ation. Since Ti is continuous and strictly decreasing, each i is mapped one–to–one
with a stopping time Ti(i). Ti can be inverted to yield a function Li : [2, τ ] →IR+.
At each instant ti there is a valuation Li(ti) with which a bank would plan to
stop. As time passes by, a player’s expectation about the maximal valuation that
his opponent could possibly have decreases. Bygones are not ‘bygones’ in this
game: every second that passes by signals information about a bank’s valuation,
and is relevant for the present and future decisions of the opponent.
As was mentioned above, the ﬁniteness of τ is not a necessary condition for
the tractability of the model. If the function f had an inﬁnite support, then
Lemma 1.2(iv) would state that banks with zero liquidation loss never stop, and
banks with strictly positive loss levels plan to stop at some ﬁnite time.
Li, the inverse of the strategy function Ti, is the lowest cost level that would
make bank Bi want to stop at time t. It will be helpful for characterising the
equilibrium strategies in the following. These are determined by ﬁnding for each
moment t1 a valuation L1(t1), such that B1 is exactly indiﬀerent between stopping
at t1, and waiting for a small amount of time Δ, and giving in then (The derivation
is similar to that of the cut–oﬀ values λi).
If the bank gives in at time t1, its payoﬀ is r1 for sure. We require this payoﬀ
to be equal to the expected payoﬀ, if it decides to wait until t1 +Δ:
r1 =
G(L2(t1+Δ))
G(L2(t1))
[
(F (t1+Δ)−F (t1))
1−F (t1) (r1 − L1(t1)) +
(1−F (t1+Δ))
1−F (t1) r1
]
(1.3)
+G(L2(t1))−G(L2(t1+Δ))
G(L2(t1))
[
F (t1+Δ)−F (t1)
1−F (t1) (r1 − L1(t1)) +
1−F (t1+Δ)
1−F (t1) (R¯ − r2 − J)
]
.
The second expected payoﬀ (on the right hand side of (1.3)) has four components.
The opponent may have a low valuation, and plan to give in later than t1 + Δ.
By this time, the negotiations may have been discovered, and the ﬁrm must be
liquidated. The bank receives its share r1 of the liquidation value r, but loses
L1(t1). If the negotiations are not discovered, it will give in at time t1+Δ, which
earns r1. On the other hand, the opponent may plan to give in between t1 and
t1 + Δ. As before, the negotiations may be discovered, or they may not. In the
latter case, the ﬁrm is rescued. The bank pockets the surplus R¯ − J , and pays
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r2 to the opponent. We abstract from the possibility that both may give in at
t1 +Δ simultaneously, as the probability that this happens is negligible.
(1.3) can be simpliﬁed by rearranging, subtracting r1 on both sides, and by
substituting s for (R¯− r1 − r2 − J). A division of both sides by Δ leads to
G(L2(t1))−G(L2(t1 +Δ))
G(L2(t1))Δ
(
1− F (t1 +Δ)
1− F (t1)
)
s = −
(
F (t1 +Δ)− F (t1)
(1− F (t1))Δ
)
L1(t1).
(1.4)
Since the strategies are diﬀerentiable everywhere it is possible to take the limit
as Δ goes to zero. The same procedure can be repeated for the second bank, and
we get a system of two diﬀerential equations:
L′2(t1) = −
(
G(L2(t1))
g(L2(t1))
)(
f(t1)
1− F (t1)
)
L1(t1)
s
, (1.5)
L′1(t1) = −
(
G(L1(t2))
g(L1(t2))
)(
f(t2)
1− F (t2)
)
L2(t2)
s
. (1.6)
Given the strategy of the opponent, (1.5) determines the optimal response of
bank B1, if it has loss level L1(t1) = 1 (the two are equivalent, if the equilibrium
strategy tells bank Bi with cost level i to stop at time ti) and bank B2 plays
strategy L2(·). If (1.5) were an inequality, B1 would either want to wait longer
than t1 (if <), or it would want to have stopped earlier (if >).
Since by Assumption 1.2 the probability density function g is strictly positive
on IR+, G has an inverse function G
−1 : [0, 1] →IR+. (1.5) and (1.6) can be
integrated, and this leads to the following reaction function for bank Bi:
Lj(ti) = G
−1
(
G(λ) · exp
{
−
∫ ti
2
(
f(t)
1− F (t)
)
Li(t)
s
dt
})
. (1.7)
(1.7) implicitly describes the strategy of bank Bj that makes bank Bi exactly
indiﬀerent between stopping at ti and stopping at ti + Δ (where Δ is a small
amount of time), given its cost level Li(ti). The analogous can be done to derive
the strategy of the other bank. The solution to these two equations will give us
the equilibrium strategies for the banks. We will continue with the diﬀerential
equations (1.5) and (1.6), and show that there is a unique equilibrium. The reac-
tion functions will be helpful in Section 1.5, where we present some comparative
statics.
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With the help of the diﬀerential equations and the boundary conditions it is
now possible to describe the equilibrium strategies of the players for the whole
renegotiation game.
Proposition 1.1 The renegotiation game has a unique symmetric Bayesian equi-
librium, which is implicitly described by the system of diﬀerential equations (1.5)
and (1.6), and the boundary conditions T1(λ) = T2(λ) = 0. The equilibrium
strategy for bank Bi is:
Type i stops at t if and only if i ≥ Li(t),
where Li(t) is determined in (1.7).
We can now ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies for the whole game with two banks,
including the ﬁnancing decision. Whether an entrepreneur with a bad project
applies for a loan in the ﬁrst period depends on the probability with which his
project is rescued in the second period. In (1.1) we determined an upper bound
q¯ to this probability, such that ‘bad’ projects are not ﬁnanced.
Proposition 1.2 If the probability of non–rescue due to bargaining delays is high
enough, ∫ λ
0
2F
(
T1(1)
)
G(1)g(1) d1 ≥ MM+m , (1.8)
the entrepreneurs will apply for the initial loan if and only if the project is of the
‘good’ type.
Proposition 1.2 is the main result of the paper. There are cases in which a
ﬁnancial system with multiple banking performs strictly better than one with
single bank lending. If the condition in (1.8) is met, the banks prefer to require
co–ﬁnancing by a second bank to being a single lender.
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1.5 Empirical Implications
The main result of the paper is that banks might want to syndicate a loan to
a ﬁrm, if they fear to ﬁnd themselves in a harmfully weak bargaining position
if the ﬁrm has to be reﬁnanced. The loan is shared for strategic reasons, and
the banks propose to share even if they have all bargaining power. There can be
other reasons for why loans are syndicated, however, like (see the Introduction)
risk aversion, the sheer size of the loan, or because the strong competition on the
lenders’ side. These reasons complement each other, and it is not clear which one
was the most important if a loan has been shared.
There is some empirical work on this question for the US and for Germany. For
the US, Gilson et al. (1990) have analysed the performance of private workouts.
One of their results is that debt restructurings are more likely if the number of
lenders is small, which could support the result above. For the case of Germany,
Fischer (1990) and Edwards and Fischer (1994) report that all but the very small
ﬁrms have several ‘main banks’, which could be interpreted as supporting the
conclusions in this paper.
Interesting evidence is reported in Armendariz (1994). She analyses the per-
formance of several development banks, i.e. the default rates of their loans. Some
of these banks require that projects are co–ﬁnanced by commercial banks, while
others usually are the unique providers of capital. The former enjoy considerably
less arrears in the repayment of their loans. Her interpretation of these facts
is that the requirement of co–ﬁnancing hardens the Soft Budget Constraint of
development projects, exactly what the results above suggest.
A similar observation can be made if ﬁrms grow: suppose that for a small ﬁrm
R¯s−Js > Is, while for a larger ﬁrm R¯l−Jl < Il. Then a ‘main bank’ could require
that a growing ﬁrm ﬁnds a second main lender, for instance by committing to
ﬁnance only a fraction of a major investment. Similarly, a bank could require
co–ﬁnancing if ﬁxed costs of rescuing a ﬁrm are higher than the net surplus s for
small ﬁrms, but lower for larger ﬁrms.
We now analyze other implications of the model. The equilibrium strategies
of all parties are unique, and therefore we can analyse the eﬀects of varying some
of the parameters of the model.
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Proposition 1.3 A higher expected value of the ﬁrm R¯, a lower liquidation value
r and a lower additional loan J lead to later concessions. This in turn implies
that the liquidation of a ‘bad’ ﬁrm becomes more likely.
The intuition behind Proposition 1.3 is clear: if the prize is increased, and the
expected costs of ﬁghting remain unchanged, the banks have an incentive to ﬁght
longer. The implications for rescue negotiations are surprising, however. Of two
otherwise identical candidates for a rescue, the one with a higher post–rescue
return R¯, i.e. the more proﬁtable, is more likely to be liquidated. Similarly, the
one with a lower liquidation value is more likely to be liquidated. This seems to be
counterintuitive, as usually we would expect a valuable rescue to be undertaken.
The result follows from two modeling assumptions. First, the negotiations are
ineﬃcient, as the ‘cake’ that is to be split can disappear at any time. Second,
the banks’ valuations for the surplus from a rescue and for the rescue itself are
independent. Suppose that s depends on the number of employees of the ﬁrm,
and that the banks’ public relations suﬀer if they cause unemployment by not
assisting a distressed debtor (they lose i). In this case we would expect a bank
to be more willing to rescue if the ﬁrm is larger.
A ‘valuable’ ﬁrm could therefore be rescued for diﬀerent reasons, either be-
cause a rescue is proﬁtable (large s), or because failing to rescue would cause
indirect costs (large i). The second reason is an incentive problem that is simi-
lar to the one underlying our assumption: once a project has been ﬁnanced, its
investors have too strong incentives to reﬁnance it (see Mitchell (1993) or Aghion
et al. (1996) on the problems that this can cause for banking regulation).
The result should hold, however, in situations in which the valuations i are
small, compared with the surplus from a rescue, s. One could analyse the reﬁ-
nancing decisions of foreign banks, that care less about their public image outside
their home country. Similarly, one could analyse these decisions in sectors, re-
gions, or during time periods, in which unemployment and bankruptcies are not
considered as being major problems.
A further implication of Proposition 1.3 concerns the allocation of the assets of
a distressed ﬁrm. Many bankruptcy procedures are court–led, and contain rules
that are meant to protect the interests of all parties. This may make it diﬃcult
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to use the assets in the most eﬃcient way, as for instance their quick sale to the
highest bidder. The liquidation value of a ﬁrm is therefore lower than necessary
if a formal procedure is started, with the consequence that a rescue becomes less
likely.
The variables R and I (the return of a ‘good’ project and the initial invest-
ment) have no eﬀect on the strategies, because of the simpliﬁed structure of the
model. As was suggested above, we could allow a bank’s valuation i to depend
on the size of its stake in the ﬁrm. The larger the loan, the more the bank is
exposed to public scrutiny, and the more it will therefore be willing to cover up
‘mistakes’ by rescuing the ﬁrm.
Similarly, the relative shares ri in the liquidation value r play no role. The
reason for this is that the bank receives a payment of at least ri whatever the
outcome of the negotiations. We could easily change the sharing rule such that
ri plays a role in the banks’ renegotiation strategies. For instance, a sharing rule
could require that the bank that gives in receives a share α < 1
2
of the surplus.
Next, consider a variation in the public discovery technology, the density
function f . Suppose that π remains constant, and that f is changed to f1 such
that the hazard rate is higher (the term f/(1−F ) on the RHS of (1.7)). Assume
that this makes the second discovery technology is superior, i.e. it becomes more
skewed to the left. The RHS of (1.7) becomes more negative, and in order to
restore the equilibrium L2 must become steeper and L1 must decrease.
Proposition 1.4 Assume that early discovery becomes more likely, such that the
hazard rate of the discovery technology f/(1−F ) increases. Then the banks tend
to give in earlier.
Rescue negotiations can become more diﬃcult to hide, if the disclosure require-
ments for banks or ﬁrms are tightened. The introduction of a new business paper
in a region can have a similar eﬀect. The eﬀect of a change in the discovery
technology by varying π is similar: an increase in π leads to a reduced stopping
time for all types (see Lemma (1.1)). Unfortunately the eﬀect on the likelihood
of liquidation is not easy to specify for the general case, as two eﬀects are op-
posed: the banks stop earlier but discovery becomes more likely. This would be
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interesting, as one could derive implications for disclosure rules of stock markets,
or for the beneﬁts of having a more transparent economy. Consider the following
change, however:
Proposition 1.5 Suppose that the support of f is rescheduled such that f1(t) =
f(α · t), where α < 1. Then the banks tend to stop earlier, but the probability of
liquidation is unchanged.
Suppose that the speed of all information channels is increased symmetrically.
In this case the moment of sure discovery τ has an eﬀect on the stopping time
of a bank with cost i = 0, but not on the relative stopping times of the other
types (as it does not appear in the derivations). In this case, the improvement
of the discovery technology had no material eﬀect. Thus, stricter disclosure re-
quirements can be neutral, and therefore (depending on the parameters) welfare
reducing or improving.
Similarly, we can analyse changes in the distribution of types. Here the ‘hazard
rate’ is somewhat complicated, as the types are revealed ‘backwards’, i.e. the
ﬁrst types that reveal themselves by stopping are those with high costs i. The
‘reversed’ hazard rate is thus g()/G(). We encounter the same diﬃculties as in
Proposition 1.4, as we can determine (using the equilibrium conditions (1.5) and
(1.6)) the eﬀect on the banks’ strategies, but not the eﬀect on the probability of
liquidation.
Proposition 1.6 Assume that the probability of  being low is higher, such that
the ‘reverse’ hazard rate of the type distribution g/G increases. Then the banks
tend to give in earlier.
This seems to be a surprising result, as one would expect ‘tougher’ banks to hold
out longer. However, the result states that a bank with type  will stop earlier.
This is intuitive, as it must be more pessimistic about its strength relative to other
types. The overall eﬀect cannot be determined without making assumptions on
the functional forms of f and g.
Negotiation costs can easily introduced to the model. They have been omitted
for simplicity, but can be expected to have an eﬀect on rescue negotiations. Ex-
amples for such costs are the need to set up a management team which analyses
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the ﬁrm’s state and the rescue plans (i.e. the opportunity costs of sending bank
managers to attend negotiations), legal costs (the costs of hiring lawyers), or the
material costs of planning and negotiating (expenses for business consultants and
industry experts, travel expenses).
Proposition 1.7 Assume that each bank incurs a continuous cost c per unit of
time dt, while the negotiations take place. Then the banks tend to stop earlier
than in the case of no costs, and rescues are more likely.
Even though this type of bargaining costs reduces the net surplus from a rescue,
this material loss has no eﬀect on the banks’ decisions. At each instant, the
past costs are sunk, and ‘bygones are bygones’. However, c has an eﬀect on the
decision whether to wait another inﬁnitesimal amount of time. It decreases the
expected payoﬀ from waiting, and therefore the banks stop earlier with higher
costs. Thus, while the already incurred costs have no eﬀect, the costs that have
to be incurred if the negotiations continue are relevant for the decision to stop.
Finally, the entrepreneurs’ utility functions are relevant. As m, the utility loss
that an entrepreneur incurs if his project is liquidated, increases, funds become
available for more parameter settings. Thus, there is a use in this model for the
stigma that is attached to a business failure. While we do not want to suggest
that this is a good way of solving incentive problems, we can conclude from the
model that the ﬁnancing patterns of two regions or industries should be diﬀerent
if bankruptcy is ‘not a big deal’ in one of them, while it has strong negative
connotations in the other.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the diﬀerence between single and multiple banking. It concen-
trates on renegotiation problems, which are shown to be solved better in the case
of multiple banking. We assume that entrepreneurs ask banks for loans, such that
they can start projects. These may be of a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ type, where the type
of a project can be observed by the respective entrepreneur, only. ‘Bad’ projects
need reﬁnancing at an intermediate stage, which makes them nonproﬁtable from
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an ex ante perspective. However, once the initial loan is lost, reﬁnancing is better
than the only alternative, liquidation.
A single bank cannot commit not to reﬁnance a bad project, which would
keep entrepreneurs with ‘bad’ projects from applying for a loan. Two banks,
however, can commit not to reﬁnance with some probability. The reason for this
are ineﬃciencies in the negotiations between the banks, when they have to agree
on their respective degree of debt forgiveness. If the probability of liquidation is
suﬃciently high, entrepreneurs with ‘bad’ projects do not ask for a loan at all.
We model the negotiations as a war of attrition. Each of the two banks incurs
a privately known loss, if the ﬁrm is liquidated, and therefore would like to have
it reﬁnanced. Additionally, reﬁnancing is proﬁtable, once the initial loan is sunk.
The banks have to agree on how to split the costs and revenues, if they reﬁnance
the ﬁrm. These negotiations take time, and the longer they last, the more likely
it becomes that a rescue becomes impossible (for exogenous reasons). In order
to prevent this, the banks plan to ‘give in’ after a while, i.e. to let the opponent
pocket the gain from rescuing, only to make sure that the ﬁrm is reﬁnanced.
There is a unique equilibrium in this game: the higher the potential loss, the
earlier a bank decides to give in. The negotiations can last for a while, if both
banks’ potential losses are low, and therefore the ﬁrm is liquidated with positive
probability.
The model is designed to isolate the advantage of multiplicity for the lenders.
We thus abstract from many aspects which are relevant for the choice between
bilateral and multilateral ﬁnance, as well as for reorganisation procedures. One of
these is the tradeoﬀ between single and multiple banking. Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996) analyse a case where either single or multiple lending may be optimal,
and also derive results for voting rules, as well as for the optimal use of assets as
collateral. Similarly, the eﬀects of diﬀerent bankruptcy laws need further analysis.
In the model the two banks decide to share the highest priority rank. It would
be interesting to analyse a model in which their claims have diﬀerent ranks. A
further topic for future analysis is whether and how a distressed ﬁrm is rescued,
if the banks do not enjoy the highest priority rank.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1
(1.9) compares the respective payoﬀs for bank B1 with valuation λ1, given λ2:
G(λ2)r1+(1−G(λ2))
(
R¯− J − r
2
+ r1
)
(1.9)
= (1−G(λ2))(R¯− r2−J)+G(λ2)
[
(1− π)(R¯− r2 − J) + π(r1 − λ1)
]
The left hand side of (1.9) is the expected payoﬀ if bank B1 gives in immediately.
With probability G(λ2) the opponent has a low valuation and does not give in.
The ﬁrm is rescued, and the bank receives r1. With probability 1 − G(λ2) the
opponent gives in, as well, and the net surplus is shared (in expected terms).
The right hand side of (1.9) is the payoﬀ if the bank gives in as soon as the
war of attrition has started. With probability 1−G(λ2) the opponent has a high
valuation and will give in immediately. The bank rescues, pockets the surplus
R¯− J , and pays r2 to the opponent. With probability G(λ2) the war of attrition
starts. It is discovered with probability π, and the ﬁrm is liquidated. With
probability (1− π), the game could continue, but by deﬁnition the bank plans to
stop, which earns r1.
Some simpliﬁcations of (1.9) and of an analogous equation for bank B2 lead
to the two equations in Lemma 1.1. There is always an interior solution for the
cut–oﬀ levels: If λi goes to zero, the λj(λi) goes to inﬁnity, while if λi goes to
inﬁnity it goes to zero. 
Proof of Lemma 1.2
(i) We ﬁrst show that Ti is nonincreasing, and then that it is strictly decreasing.
By utility–maximisation it must be the case that
V1(t1, T2(·), 1) ≥ V1(t′1, T2(·), 1) ∀t′1, ∀t1 = T1(1) (1.10)
and
V1(t′1, T2(·), ′1) ≥ V1(t1, T2(·), ′1) ∀t1, ∀t′1 = T1(′1), (1.11)
where Vi(ti, Tj(·), i) is the expected payoﬀ of bank Bi with cost level i, if it stops
at ti, and bank Bj plays strategy Tj(·):
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Vi(ti, Tj(·), i) = Pr{Tj(j) ≥ ti}
(
F (ti)(ri − i) + (1− F (ti))ri
)
(1.12)
+
∫
{j |Tj(j)<ti}
[
F (Tj(j))
(
ri−i−(R¯−rj−J)
)
+(R¯−rj−J)
]
g(j) dj.
The payoﬀ of a bank depends on the chosen stopping time ti, the opponent’s
strategy Tj and the (privately known) loss i of losing the ﬁrm. With probability
Pr{Tj(j) ≥ ti} the opponent plans to stop later than ti. If the public discovered
the negotiations (This happens with probability F (ti)), the payoﬀ is (ri − i). If
the secret was kept well, the bank receives ri from bank Bj who rescues the ﬁrm.
The second term of (1.12) is the equivalent if the opponent plans to stop earlier.
Here the bank receives (R¯ − J) if the ﬁrm can be rescued and pays rj to the
opponent.
We can rewrite these two inequalities (1.10) and (1.11) using (1.12). Sub-
tracting the RHS of (1.11) from the LHS of (1.10), and the LHS of (1.11) from
the RHS of (1.10), we get
Pr{T2(2) ≥ t1}F (t1)(′1−1)+
∫
{2|T2(2)<t1}
F (T2(2))(
′
1−1)g(2) d2
≥ Pr{T2(2) ≥ t′1}F (t′1)(′1 − 1) +
∫
{2|T2(2)<t′1}
F (T2(2))(
′
1 − 1)g(2) d2
or, rearranging,
[(
1−Pr{T2(2) < t1}
)
(F (t1)−F (t′1))
]
(′1−1)
≥
[∫
{2|t′1<T2(2)<t1}
F (t′1)g(2) d2 −
∫
{2|t′1<T2(2)<t1}
F (T2(2))g(2) d2
]
(′1 − 1).
If t1 > t
′
1, the following holds:(
1− Pr{T2(2) < t1}
)
(F (t1)− F (t′1)) ≥ 0,
0 ≥
∫
{2|t′1<T2(2)<t1}
[F (t′1)− F (T2(2))] g(2) d2,
and it must be the case that ′1 ≥ 1. On the other hand, if t′1 > t1:
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(
1−Pr{T2(2) < t1}
)
(F (t′1)−F (t1))
≥ Pr{t1 < T2(2) < t′1}(F (t′1)− F (t1))
≥
∫
{2|t1<T2(2)<t′1}
[F (t′1)− F (T2(2))] g(2) d2,
and it must be the case that 1 ≥ ′1. Thus for all t1, t′1, in equilibrium (′1 − 1) ·
(t′1 − t1) ≤ 0, i.e. the strategies are nonincreasing in the liquidation loss.
Assume that T1 is not strictly decreasing, i.e. there are a, b > a, such that
for all  ∈ [a, b], T1() = θ. Then there is an ε > 0 such that all types 2 with
T2(2) ∈ (θ − ε, θ] prefer to wait until θ and stop then, if the opponent did not
stop. Then the types  ∈ [a, b] could gain by stopping at θ− ε instead of θ: The
probability of winning is not aﬀected, but the risk of losing  is diminished.
(ii) Assume that T1 is discontinuous at . Then there are ta, tb > ta such that a
type  never stops at any t ∈ (t1, t2). A type 2 with T2(2) ∈ [ta, tb) would thus
wait only until ta, and stop if the opponent did not stop. This implies that no
one stops at any t ∈ (ta, tb). But then there are types ˆ1 and an ε > 0 such that
T1(ˆ1) ∈ [tb, tb + ε], who prefer stopping at some t ∈ (ta, tb).
(iii) Assume that Ti is not diﬀerentiable at .
(a) Let the lefthand derivative be higher than the righthand derivative (Ti is
ﬂatter to the left of ). Then there is an ε > 0 such that no type j stops at any
t ∈ (Ti()− ε, Ti()]. It pays to wait longer since after the point of discontinuity
it becomes relatively likely that the opponent stops. This holds since both f and
g are continuous and diﬀerentiable.
(b) Let the righthand derivative be higher. Then there is an ε > 0 such that no
type j stops at t ∈ [Ti(), Ti()+ε). It pays to stop earlier since it becomes more
likely that Bi stops immediately after Ti().
In both cases Tj is not continuous, contradicting (ii) above.
(iv) If type 1 = 0 stops at θ < τ , all types with higher loss level stop earlier
because of Lemma 1.2(i). Then in equilibrium no type of the other bank should
stop later than θ. There is an ε > 0 such that types 1 ∈ (0, ε] ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to wait until θ and wait for the opponent to stop. 
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Proof of Proposition 1.1
The diﬀerential equations are Lipschitz–continuous on [2, τ ] which implies that a
solution exists and is unique (See e.g. Birckhoﬀ and Rota (1978, Ch. 6)). At each
t ∈ [2, τ ], the (expected) payoﬀs from stopping or non–stopping can be compared,
as was done in deriving (1.5). Since the strategies are strictly decreasing, at
t < T1(1), i.e. if L1(t) > 1, the payoﬀ to bank Bi with loss level 1 will be higher
if it waits. The opposite holds for L1(t) < 1. For all t ≥ t1, type L1(t1) can only
decrease his payoﬀ by waiting, and will stop whenever possible.
The players constantly update their beliefs using Bayes’ Rule. If a player
stops at the wrong time (this is the only deviation that is possible) the opponent
will have no diﬃculties in updating his beliefs: If a player stops too early, the
game is over and beliefs are not relevant anymore. If a player waits too long, the
strategy tells him to stop immediately: Type i stops at any time t if t > Ti(i).
Again, the opponent can update his beliefs without problems. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Follows directly from the Assumptions and Proposition 1.1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3
The reaction curves Li (see (1.7)) are shifted outward, if s is increased. The
indirect eﬀect via the cut–oﬀ value λ goes in the same direction: λi(λj) is shifted
outward, as well (see Lemma 1.1). 
Proof of Propositions 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6
As Proposition 1.3: analyse the equilibrium conditions (1.5) and (1.6), and the
indirect eﬀect via the cutoﬀ value λ in Lemma 1.1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.7
(1.7) is changed to
L2(t1) = G
−1
(
G(λ) · exp
{
−
∫ t1
2
[(
f(t)
1− F (t)
)
L1(t)
s
+
c
s
]
dt
})
. (1.13)
A comparison of (1.13) with (1.7) shows that all types will want to stop earlier,
including zero–cost types. 
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Abstract
This paper studies optimal bankruptcy laws in a framework with asym-
metric information. The key idea is that the ﬁnancial distress of a ﬁrm
is not observed by its lenders for quite a while. As early rescues are
much cheaper than late rescues, it may pay if the creditors are forgiv-
ing in bankruptcy, thereby inducing the revelation of diﬃculties as early
as possible. Either ‘tough’ or ‘soft’ bankruptcy laws can be optimal.
‘Hybrid’ procedures are found to be redundant, and possibly harmful.
Absolute Priority Rules may be helpful as a part of pure liquidation pro-
cedures, but their introduction is (partly) inconsistent with the design
of ‘soft’ procedures like Chapter 11. The paper also reviews evidence on
the performance of Chapter 11, questioning many negative results.
JEL No G32, G33, G38
Keywords: Bankruptcy, Reorganisation, Chapter 11,
Absolute Priority Rule, New Value Exception
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2.1 Introduction
Even though the causes of a bankruptcy may be exogenous, the timing, i.e. the
start of a formal procedure is highly endogenous. ‘Bankruptcy’ does not hit a
ﬁrm like a ﬂash. There are plenty of methods for a ﬁrm to hide or even cover
up ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Cash ﬂows can be freed to ﬁnance current losses, e.g.
by cutting R&D or replacement investments, or by reducing the quality of the
ﬁrm’s products. Changes in the accounting practices can achieve the same goal.
Artiﬁcial reductions in the valuations of obligations and increases in those of
assets can generate additional ‘income’. Typically these methods are easy to
implement, and it is diﬃcult to observe or even prove that a business decision
was not based on sound principles.
One advantage of delaying formal bankruptcy by hiding the ﬁnancial diﬃ-
culties is that this also delays (or possibly even prevents) its usually unpleasant
consequences for the managers and owners of the ﬁrm. Another advantage is
that the diﬃculties could be of a temporary nature, and that the ‘breakthrough’
(or ‘turnaround’) will come later than expected. The manager/owner of the ﬁrm
could simply ‘wait and pray’, and if he is lucky nobody else can tell that there
had ever been diﬃculties. The costs of doing so are borne by the creditors: Early
rescues of a ﬁrm are typically cheaper than late rescues, and more likely to be
successful. Delays cause opportunity costs because the assets of the ﬁrm cannot
be brought to their most eﬃcient use. Further costs arise if the delay is achieved
by cutting investments in the future of the ﬁrm (R&D, plants and machinery, rep-
utation, etc.). Not only does this make it more costly to rescue the ﬁrm (as more
wrong decisions must be corrected), but a rescue may even become impossible.
In this paper we analyse the tradeoﬀ between two conﬂicting goals of a ﬁrm’s
creditors. On the one hand, they want a bankruptcy procedure to be tough on the
borrower, as a harsh punishment may increase his incentive to generate suﬃcient
earnings to repay. On the other hand, the creditors want to prevent the waste
of resources that takes place if a rescue is necessary but not undertaken in time.
Clearly, if bankruptcy is a strong punishment, a borrower keeps the unpleasant
information for himself and prefers to ‘wait and pray’. An obvious method to
obtain the necessary information is to reward its revelation. However, this implies
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that the borrower is rewarded for poor outcomes. This works against the ‘eﬀort’
incentives: it limits the extent to which the borrower can be punished, and if
‘eﬀort’ is relevant, its provision must be ensured by raising the entrepreneur’s
payoﬀ after good outcomes. Thus, the creditors have to trade oﬀ a waste of
resources if a rescue is possible for higher costs of eﬀort provision. It is not clear
a priori whether one of the incentive problems is more relevant, or if both can be
solved at the same time.
More concretely, we model an entrepreneur who can start a project by in-
vesting both eﬀort (either a high or a low level), and a ﬁxed amount of capital.
The outcome can be good or poor. Eﬀort has the disadvantage that it causes
disutility, but it also increases the probability of realising a good outcome. The
entrepreneur does not have the funds to invest, and must therefore borrow from
an investor. Writing a ﬁnancial contract is made diﬃcult by two types of asym-
metric information. Firstly, the entrepreneur’s eﬀort choice is unobservable. The
contract can only be contingent on the ﬁnal outcome, and a wedge between the
entrepreneur’s respective payoﬀs after good and poor outcomes is necessary to
provide an incentive to invest enough eﬀort. We assume that it is essential that
the entrepreneur chooses the high eﬀort level, if the project is to be proﬁtable.
Given that Limited Liability prevents very low payoﬀs for the entrepreneur, the
wedge must be created by oﬀering a suﬃciently high payoﬀ if a good outcome is
realised.
Secondly, at an intermediate stage the entrepreneur receives a signal about the
prospects of his project. This signal is not observable by anyone except himself.
The creditor would be interested in this information, however, as it could be
possible and proﬁtable to invest more money in a bad project. If she wants to
realise such an eﬃciency gain (or reduce her expected loss), she has to ‘buy’ the
information from the entrepreneur. She cannot rely on him to just inform her
that he needs more money, as he could also choose a ‘wait and pray’ strategy: If
no additional money is invested, a bad project may nevertheless become a good
project with some probability. The revelation of bad news is costly in terms of
eﬀort incentives: a reward for telling the truth is paid when poor outcomes are
likely. This drives up the payoﬀ that the entrepreneur must receive if a good
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outcome is realised, to make sure that he invests the high eﬀort level.
This tradeoﬀ between being soft and tough when the prospects are bad (in
‘bankruptcy’) is exacerbated by another (realistic) assumption: if a borrower
demands more funds for a rescue, the creditor cannot tell whether a rescue is
really worth undertaking, or whether the borrower is simply going to use up
those funds to keep the ﬁrm aﬂoat for a while (the latter is a complaint that can
be heard in many Chapter 11 cases). Thus, a misuse of the creditor’s softness
may be quite expensive, and the equilibrium contract must prevent such waste.
While it is obvious that a borrower would prefer to be treated well in bankruptcy,
we would not a priori expect a creditor to share this wish. We therefore isolate
the creditor’s willingness to be soft and forgive debt by assuming that the investor
has all bargaining power. That is, she designs the contract, and the entrepreneur
can only accept or reject it. In equilibrium the investor will propose a standard
debt contract, to which she has added a ‘bankruptcy clause’: this clause deter-
mines the actions and events if the entrepreneur announces that he will probably
be unable to repay his debt. The ‘bankruptcy clause’ can be either ‘soft’ on the
manager, inducing an early revelation of information, or ‘tough’, i.e. treating him
as badly as possible if poor outcomes are realised.
Our work has implications for the design of bankruptcy laws. ‘Optimal
bankruptcy laws’ are identiﬁed as those ‘bankruptcy clauses’ that the parties
would have added to their contract, if there were no transaction costs in relation
to writing such a ‘complete’ contract. A bankruptcy law is thus ‘optimal’, if it
replicates the optimal contract in a transaction cost free environment. One result
is that either tough procedures or soft procedures may be optimal, but mixed
procedures, which contain elements from both types of procedure, may be much
worse than the two pure procedures. This result is relevant for the bankruptcy
laws in many countries. In the UK and in Germany, for instance, there have been
attempts to introduce ‘softer’ bankruptcy laws. At the same time the drafters of
the new legislation tried to preserve the ‘punishing role’ of bankruptcy. Our pa-
per shows that this can backﬁre. In the UK, the procedure called Administration
is rarely used, as a creditors who holds a Floating Charge can opt out and start a
much tougher procedure (Administrative Receivership); Similar results should be
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expected in the daily practice of the new Insolvenzordnung in Germany, where the
bargaining position of the manager or owner has not been signiﬁcantly improved,
compared with the current law.
A second result concerns Absolute Priority Rules. These rules establish a
creditor’s right to object to payoﬀs that holders of lower ranked claims (for in-
stance equityholders) receive, if this creditor’s claim has not been repaid. Our
result is that a soft procedure must violate Absolute Priority Rules to some de-
gree. The entrepreneur must be rewarded if he cooperates in a rescue by revealing
information early, whether the debtors have been repaid or not. In the extreme,
he should be rewarded even if the ﬁrm must be liquidated, and no debt is re-
paid at all. This extreme result highlights the diﬃculties that a consistently
designed ‘soft’ procedure might encounter in practice, in particular if confronted
with much more appealing (and traditional) arguments in favour of ‘tough’ pro-
cedures. Note, however, that this violation of Absolute Priority Rules concerns
only the ranking of debt and equity. Nothing is implied about the use of Absolute
Priority Rules between diﬀerent classes of debt.
There are striking similarities between the soft bankruptcy procedure in this
paper, and Chapter 11, the procedure that is used in the US for reorganisations.
One of the major diﬀerences is that there are no ‘direct rewards’ in Chapter
11. Quite the contrary, there are Absolute Priority Rules which are supposed
to be strictly enforced (if the parties disagree). We argue that indirect reward
systems are being used, instead. Equity can earn a reward in Chapter 11 cases
because it is endowed with a strong bargaining position. We argue that this need
to reward indirectly is the main source of many ineﬃciencies that are blamed
on the procedure, and that much of the bad press of Chapter 11 needs to be
revised or targeted more precisely. It is also an ineﬃcient way of rewarding,
as a lender’s bargaining position determines the payoﬀ. If he knows that he is
perfectly substitutable, the incentive to ﬁle, and thereby reveal the bad news, are
small.
Our work has implications for other aspects of the US Bankruptcy Code, and
for the revision which is currently under way. The ‘New Value Exception’ can be
interpreted as a cheap method to ‘reward’ shareholders for ﬁling early: manager–
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owners of distressed ﬁrms are commonly assumed to have superior information
about the value of the assets and their best use. By allowing them to cash in on
this superior information the reward that a soft procedure requires is much less
costly to the lenders than a direct reward.
This paper adds to the literature on bankruptcy (see e.g. Baird (1995) or
White (1996) for a survey) by showing how the softness of a bankruptcy procedure
may improve the timing of restructuring decisions. For the purpose of clarifying
the analysis only, we are ignoring other important aspects of bankruptcy. In
particular, we assume that there are no collective action problems on the side
of the creditors. These problems have been discussed in earlier contributions,
and possible solutions have been suggested (see e.g. the mechanisms suggested
by Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion et al (1992 and 1994)). While these papers
concentrate on ex post bargaining problems, we in this paper concentrate on ex
ante incentive problems, i.e. decisions of ﬁrms outside of bankruptcy.
Several papers have analysed the eﬀects that the US procedures Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11 have on a ﬁrm’s incentive to cooperate either outside or in bankruptcy
(or both). These include Bebchuk (1991), Bebchuk and Chang (1992), Moora-
dian (1994) and White (1994). Our paper diﬀers from these in two dimensions.
Firstly, we do not start with exogenously given bankruptcy procedures, but de-
rive ‘optimal procedures’ from ﬁrst principles. Secondly, we analyse two types
of incentive problems that arise ‘outside of bankruptcy’. On the one hand, a
procedure has eﬀects on both the eﬃciency of the bargaining outcome and on ex
ante eﬀort and investment decisions; these have been thoroughly studied in the
earlier literature. On the other hand, a procedure will also need to secure the
entrepreneur’s cooperation in starting a rescue, which is a relatively new topic.1
Related papers include Gromb (1994), Heinkel and Zechner (1993), Giammarino
and Nosal (1995) and Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1995). Gromb (1994) anal-
yses a creditor’s willingness to forgive debt in a multiperiod lending situation,
extending the model in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) to many periods. As in our
1The conjecture that soft procedures may be useful to induce early bankruptcy ﬁlings can
be found in Jackson (1986, ch. 8), Baird (1991, 1993, and 1995), White (1989 and 1996), and
Aghion et al. (1992 and 1994).
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model, the investor has all bargaining power, and the entrepreneur is protected by
limited liability. Nevertheless, the investor has strong incentive to forgive debt,
because threats to terminate a lending relationship may not be credible.
Heinkel and Zechner (1993) and Giammarino and Nosal (1995) analyse the
eﬀects of diﬀerent contractual and legal regimes on creditors’ debt forgiveness, and
on the entrepreneur’s renegotiation timing decision. One of the results in Heinkel
and Zechner (1993) is that there can be gains from allowing for deviations from
Absolute Priority Rules.
Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1995) analyse boundaries to using bankruptcy
as a bonding device. If an entrepreneur is treated too badly in bankruptcy, this
has a negative impact on his ex ante choice between investing in marketable
nonspeciﬁc human capital, or in more productive ﬁrm–speciﬁc human capital.
As a solution, the authors suggest to introduce bankruptcy laws that give the
entrepreneur additional bargaining power if things go badly. One possibility is
to give him the exclusive right to make the ﬁrst oﬀer in a Rubinstein bargaining
game, and to artiﬁcially delay any following counteroﬀers (as in Chapter 11).
Other related problems are studied in Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Boot
and Thakor (1993), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Aghion et al. (1996).
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) study the incentive of a manager to smoothen the
reported income and the dividends of a ﬁrm over time. The manager corrects
low values upwards and high values downwards because he wants to protect the
private beneﬁts that he derives from controlling the ﬁrm. Boot and Thakor (1993)
and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) analyse the incentive of a bank regulator to
close down undercapitalised banks, if bank closures may cast doubt on his past
monitoring eﬀort or ability. Aghion et al. (1996) study the problem of restoring
the banking systems of Eastern Europe to health. A government that wants to
recapitalise distressed banks must be careful how it treats the managers of these
banks, as it needs their information on their real ﬁnancial needs. A treatment
that is too soft leads to excessive demands for reﬁnancing, while if the treatment
is too tough, bad loans are hidden and simply rolled over.
A potential further application of our model is Golden Parachutes. Knoeber
(1986) analyses their eﬀect on a manager’s incentive to invest eﬀort, if an optimal
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contract requires deferred payments, i.e. when the eﬀects of the manager’s eﬀort
become visible. The manager has a weak bargaining position if the ﬁrm changes
owners in a ‘hostile takeover’, as the new owners could simply ﬁre him and keep
the deferred promised payments for themselves. His model could be extended to
include the manager’s ﬁght against a takeover, or even his encouragement of a
takeover, by using our model.
Finally, in independent research, Levitt and Snyder (1996) have analysed a
similar agency problem, and derive similar results.2 A principal employs an agent,
who must invest unobservable eﬀort to start a project. The ﬁnal outcome can
be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, where the agent’s eﬀort increases the probability of the
former. At an intermediate stage, the agent privately observes the probability of
the ‘good’ outcome. If this probability is low, the principal would like to share
this information, as he could costlessly terminate the project prematurely (the
likely bad outcome is a loss). Early termination, however, makes initial eﬀort
more costly, as it decreases the eﬀect that eﬀort has on whether the good or the
bad outcome will be observed in the end.
The papers diﬀer completely in the extent to which the results are applied.
Our paper was motivated by the observation that there are important conﬂicting
goals that reorganisation procedures are expected to achieve. Our model has
important implications for both the design of bankruptcy laws, and for the large
literature which analyses the performance of Chapter 11 in the US.
While the models are diﬀerent, the type of results that are generated are
quite similar. In our model, the optimal procedure may be either ‘tough’ or
‘soft’, a result which cannot be generated in a model which is simpler than the
one presented here (see Section 2.4). In Levitt and Snyder (1996) there is a
corresponding result, which states that the extent of revelation that is induced
by their optimal incentive schemes will depend on the parameters of the model.
However, this result only holds if their contract space is constrained to non–
randomized decisions. With randomizing, Levitt and Snyder (1996) obtain an
unrealistic optimal contract which is similar to our ‘contract for many types’ in
Section 2.4. In our paper, we additionally address renegotiation issues, i.e. the
2We thank John Moore for drawing our attention to their work.
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problem of the lack of credibility of a ‘tough’ procedure, which would be diﬃcult
in the model by Levitt and Snyder (1996).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 the model is pre-
sented. In Section 2.3 we derive the equilibrium contracts, and some implications
for bankruptcy laws. In Section 2.4 we discuss simpliﬁcations and extensions of
the model, and justify the unorthodox use of three project types. In Section 2.5 we
introduce a renegotiation possibility, which restricts the use of tough bankruptcy
procedures. Section 2.6 compares the ‘soft’ procedure with Chapter 11, and re-
views and reinterprets evidence of its performance. Section 2.7 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
There is an entrepreneur, who can start a project but has no wealth of his own,
and an investor. She may oﬀer to ﬁnance the entrepreneur’s project, if they can
ﬁnd a contract under which both parties break even.
The project extends over up to ﬁve periods. In period 1, an amount K must
be invested, and the entrepreneur must invest eﬀort e˜ ∈ {0, e}, which the investor
cannot observe (this can easily be generalised to a continuous choice, see Section
2.4).
In period 2, the type of the project is realised. It is g (‘good’) with probability
e˜, b (‘bad’) with probability a(1−e˜), and φ (‘failure’) with probability (1−a)(1−e˜).
Thus, if the entrepreneur did not invest eﬀort in period 1, the type must be either
b or φ. The type can be observed by the entrepreneur, only.
In period 3, the project can be reﬁnanced by investing an amount J (a ‘res-
cue’). This money could be necessary to install a new organisational structure,
say, or to start a price war. If the project type is g, the payoﬀs are unchanged, as
a ﬁrm that is doing well presumably does not have to change its organisation, or
market strategy. If the type is b, the project becomes a ‘good’ project (type g).
Here a reorganisation of the ﬁrm’s policies might be helpful, and for simplicity we
assume that it is guaranteed to be successful. Finally, with the ‘failure’ type we
model a ﬁrm that should be liquidated, but this fact is not common knowledge.
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We assume that it would starve publicly in period 4, but if it is reﬁnanced, the
additional funds J allow the project to continue until t = 5.
In period 4, a ‘failure’ type that was not reﬁnanced in period 3 ‘starves’
publicly, and must be liquidated. A ‘bad’ type that was not reﬁnanced becomes
a ‘good’ type with probability b. The idea is that the entrepreneur has a ‘wait and
pray’ strategy, i.e. he can hope that there will be a ‘breakthrough’ or ‘turnaround’
of his business (if he is lucky in the end, the investor is not able to tell that there
had been diﬃculties at an intermediate stage).
Finally, in period 5, the (veriﬁable) payoﬀs are earned. A ‘good’ project
earns Y , a ‘bad’ project y < Y . A ‘failure’ earns nothing, whether it has been
reﬁnanced or not. If the project was not terminated earlier, the entrepreneur
additionally earns a private beneﬁt r. That is, if the project type was φ, and it
was not reﬁnanced, the entrepreneur does not earn the private beneﬁt r, while in
all other cases he does.
While the entrepreneur is perfectly informed about every variable as the
project progresses, the investor cannot observe the eﬀort decision, nor can she
observe the type of the project in period 2. This captures the idea that while
the causes of ﬁnancial distress may be exogenous, the start of ‘bankruptcy’ is
not an exogenous event, but can in most cases be delayed or triggered early by
a distressed ﬁrm. As was outlined in the Introduction, a ﬁrm can change its ac-
counting practices, and value assets and obligations diﬀerently. Similarly, it can
economise on its investments, in order to be able to ﬁnance current losses.
The entrepreneur must make two decisions. First, he must decide how much
eﬀort to invest in period 1. Second, he must decide whether to reveal his informa-
tion in period 3. If the type of his project is ‘bad’, he can make its rescue possible
by revealing the type. He can also claim that the type is ‘good’, and hope for a
breakthrough in period 4. If he is lucky with this ‘wait and pray’ strategy, the
investor will not be able to tell whether the type was really ‘good’ or not.
We observed in the Introduction that late rescues are more costly and less
likely to succeed than early ones. We model this by assuming that ‘early’ rescues
(in period 3) are proﬁtable,
Y − J > bY + (1− b)y, (2.1)
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while later rescues are impossible. While the rescue of a ‘bad’ type is proﬁtable
ex post (in period 3), ex ante it is not:
Y − J < K. (2.2)
We also assume that a ‘failure’ type project should not be reﬁnanced:
J > r. (2.3)
There is no monetary proﬁt from reﬁnancing a ‘failure’ project, and the en-
trepreneur’s private beneﬁt from completing the project is smaller than the cost
of rescuing.
The players have the following utility functions:
Investor: V = XI , (2.4)
Entrepreneur: U = XE − ce˜ + r˜, (2.5)
where XI and XE are monetary incomes, c is a positive constant, e˜ is the eﬀort
that the entrepreneur invests at t = 1, and r˜ is zero, if the project was terminated
prematurely, and r otherwise (r may be the satisfaction of having completed a
project, for instance).
We assume that the investor has all bargaining power from the start. She
designs the contract initially, and once the project has started, the entrepreneur
can be replaced at any instant, without aﬀecting the payoﬀs. We make this
assumption to isolate the investor’s willingness to forgive debt, in order to allow
for an early rescue if this is necessary. It is quite intuitive that the entrepreneur
should prefer a ‘soft’ over a ‘tough’ contract, but this is less straightforward if
one considers the position of the investor.
Note that the investor’s bargaining power is not unrestricted, however: the
entrepreneur is protected by limited liability. He cannot receive negative transfers,
and the worst punishment that can be inﬂicted on him is a loss of control over
the project and of any income.
We make some assumptions on the parameters of the model. First, the private
beneﬁt r is not high enough to induce the entrepreneur to invest eﬀort without
any monetary incentives. We can write this condition as
c > (1− a)r. (2.6)
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Second, the eﬃcient choice for the entrepreneur is to invest the high eﬀort level
e, and the project is viable if he does. A suﬃcient condition for this to hold, even
in the case with asymmetric information, is that the inequality
(1− a)Y + aJ > c− (1− a)r (2.7)
is suﬃciently strict.
2.3 Optimal Contracts
In this section we derive and compare the contracts that the investor may want to
propose in equilibrium. In a ﬁrst best environment, the entrepreneur would invest
the high eﬀort level, and the investor would have the necessary information for
an eﬃcient rescue decision. With asymmetric information, this is not necessarily
the case. When searching for the contract that maximises her payoﬀ, the investor
must take into account several constraints: the entrepreneur should accept the
contract, he should invest eﬀort, he should reveal the project type if the investor
needs to know it, and the limited liability constraint must be met. We use
the Revelation Principle to ﬁnd the optimal contract. As we follow a standard
procedure, the maximisation program and the solution are in the Appendix.
We ﬁnd two types of contract, of which one will be the equilibrium contract,
depending on the parameters of the model. These are described in Propositions
2.1 and 2.2.
Proposition 2.1 The following Tough Contract (CT ) may be an optimal con-
tract for the investor:
§1 At t = 1, the entrepreneur receives K from the investor and invests it in his
project.
§2 If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is of either a ‘bad’ or
a ‘failure’ type, the entrepreneur is ﬁred immediately, and all eventual earnings
belong to the Investor. She may reﬁnance or liquidate the project, and keep the
returns for herself.
§3 If §2 does not apply, and the return is Y , the entrepreneur makes a payment
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Y − c
1−ab +
1−a
1−ab r to the Investor. If the entrepreneur cannot make this payment,
the returns of the project belong to the Investor.
The tough contract has much similarity with a standard debt contract. §1 and §3
specify the use of the loan K and the repayment if the project was successful (the
investor receives Y − c
1−ab +
1−a
1−ab r). §2 makes provisions for the case in which the
entrepreneur has told the investor that he may not be able to repay the amount
speciﬁed in §3. §2 can be interpreted as a ‘bankruptcy clause’, which could also
be omitted if there were an equivalent bankruptcy law. This bankruptcy law
would be a pure liquidation procedure: if the investor discovers that the project
type is either b or φ, she may take over control of the assets and of all returns.
Obviously, the entrepreneur has no incentive to reveal a b or φ type under a tough
bankruptcy regime, as the payoﬀ from remaining silent is strictly higher for type
b and unchanged for type φ.
Thus, by proposing a tough contract, the investor willingly ignores the possi-
bility to rescue the project early. Before we discuss the possible reasons for this,
we present the alternative contract.
Proposition 2.2 The following Soft Contract (CS) may be an optimal contract
for the investor:
§1 At t = 1, the entrepreneur receives K from the investor and invests it in his
project.
§2.a If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is of a ‘bad’ type, the
investor reﬁnances the project, and if at t = 5 the return after rescuing is Y , the
entrepreneur pays Y − b · c
1−ab to the Investor.
§2.b If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is a ‘failure’, the project
is liquidated, and the entrepreneur receives a payment r from the Investor.
§3 If §2 does not apply, and the return is Y , the entrepreneur makes a payment
Y − c
1−ab to the Investor. If the entrepreneur cannot make this payment, the
returns of the project belong to the Investor.
Like the tough contract, CS contains elements from a standard debt contract (§1
and §3), and bankruptcy clauses (§2.a and §2.b). The debt contract part diﬀers
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only in the size of the repayment in the last period: it is higher with a tough
contract, i.e. the entrepreneur’s reward for successful outcomes is higher if CS is
signed. The bankruptcy elements of CT and CS diﬀer considerably. Under a soft
regime, the entrepreneur decides (in equilibrium) to reveal his type in the third
period. If the type is b, he receives a payoﬀ which is the same as his expected
payoﬀ if he decided to ‘wait and pray’, i.e. if he pretended that the project was
a g type. Similarly, the entrepreneur has no incentive to lie if the type of his
project is φ. Revealing this information earns him a reward r, while the best lie,
pretending to have a ‘bad’ project, would earn him exactly the same payoﬀ (in
the form of a private beneﬁt, however).
Proposition 2.3 One of the two contracts CS and CT achieves the highest payoﬀ
for the investor. That is, no other contract achieves a strictly higher payoﬀ.
Propositions 2.1 to 2.3 are proved jointly, using the Revelation Principle (see the
Appendix). The intuition behind the results is that the contract should ﬁrst of
all provide an incentive to put in eﬀort, as otherwise the project is not proﬁtable.
The next question is how ‘expensive’ it is to get the entrepreneur to reveal bad
news truthfully, making sure for instance that if the project is a ‘failure’ the
entrepreneur does not claim that it is ‘bad’, only to earn the private beneﬁt r.
This revelation is ‘expensive’ in the sense that it makes the provision of eﬀort
incentives more diﬃcult. A reward for not lying about bad outcomes limits the
‘punishment’ for bad outcomes. The entrepreneur invests eﬀort only if the wedge
between the payoﬀs for good and poor outcomes (bad or failure) is suﬃciently
large. Thus, the only choice that the investor has is to increase the payoﬀ for
good outcomes. Depending on the parameters this might be quite expensive,
compared with the gain that can be made by rescuing a ‘bad’ project. In this
case, the investor prefers to ignore this possibility, and the (‘tough’) contract aims
only at providing eﬀort incentives.
Proposition 2.3 has important implications for bankruptcy laws. The second
paragraph in both CS and CT could be provided by a bankruptcy law, instead of
being added to the contract. This may seem to be a redundant exercise in the
present model, but in more realistic contracting environments a ‘robust’ principle
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may be a good substitute for elaborate individual complete contracts. Unfortu-
nately, there is no convincing theory that shows both why contracts are chosen
to be incomplete, and how publicly provided mandatory laws can improve upon
complete contracts. When discussing the relevance of our results for bankruptcy
laws, we follow the literature in assuming that there is a need for such laws,
and ask how they should be designed. As in e.g. Baird (1995) or Aghion et al.
(1994), we claim that optimal laws should replicate the clauses that the negoti-
ating parties would have added to their contract in the absence of transaction
costs.
In the following we will interpret the bankruptcy clauses in the two contracts
as being ‘optimal bankruptcy laws’. A tough bankruptcy law could for instance
require that the entrepreneur immediately loses all control rights to a trustee.
Furthermore, the creditor may have the right to decide on the use of the assets
of the ﬁrm. Finally, the entrepreneur will receive a payment only if the debt has
been fully repaid. One can easily identify this set of rules as a pure liquidation
procedure, as we can ﬁnd it in many countries (e.g. Chapter 7 in the US). With
a soft bankruptcy law, the entrepreneur may lose control of the ﬁrm, or he may
not. The relevant diﬀerence to the tough law is that he receives a payoﬀ after
ﬁling, even if some debt is not repaid (even if no debt is repaid at all). Chapter
11 is the only procedure that has some characteristics in common with the soft
bankruptcy law. We will investigate these similarities, as well as the diﬀerences,
in more depth in Section 2.6.
We can reinterpret Propositions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 as stating that either soft or
tough bankruptcy laws may be optimal, and that no other type of law is strictly
better. In particular, mixed forms of law may be strictly worse than either of the
pure forms. Consider the following example:
Hybrid Contract (CH):
§1 At t = 1, the entrepreneur receives K from the investor and invests it in his
project.
§2.a If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is of a ‘bad’ type, the
investor reﬁnances the project. The entrepreneur receives a payment only if all
debt has been repaid.
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§2.b If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is a ‘failure’, the project
is liquidated. Payments as in §2.a.
§3 If §2 does not apply, and the return is Y , the entrepreneur makes a payment
Y −ZH to the Investor. If the entrepreneur cannot make this payment, the returns
of the project belong to the Investor.
As in the case of CS and CT , the hybrid contract contains a standard debt contract
part, and a bankruptcy clause. Under this contract, the entrepreneur will claim
to have a g type if the real type is either g or b. With a b type his monetary
payoﬀ is zero after a rescue, while the ‘wait and pray’ strategy promises a positive
expected monetary payoﬀ. However, the φ type has an incentive to claim having
a b type. The investor would then reﬁnance the project, which is nonproﬁtable
in monetary terms, but secures the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt r. The hybrid
bankruptcy law is strictly worse than both pure laws: the ‘bad’ type is not
rescued, the ‘failure’ type is reﬁnanced, and the transfer payment ZH is as high
as the success payment c
1−ab in CS (if eﬀort is to be provided).
How are the transfer payments in CT and CS determined? In the case of
the tough contract CT , the entrepreneur can keep some of the return only if the
project earned Y (remind that no information is revealed in period 3). This
monetary payoﬀ must be high enough to ensure that eﬀort is invested. The case
of the soft contract CS is more complicated. Additionally to the eﬀort problem,
the reward scheme must satisfy several truthtelling constraints. Some of these
are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows the set of soft contracts (including the optimal soft contract
CS), parametrised by the monetary payoﬀs that the entrepreneur receives (keeps)
after ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes, ZY g and Zb (Zb is paid after a successful rescue).
Three incentive constraints for soft contracts are shown. First, the eﬀort
incentive constraint, (ICe). If the ‘bad’ payoﬀ is too high, compared with the
‘good’ one, the entrepreneur has no incentive to put in eﬀort. This constraint
is binding in equilibrium, and the entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between investing
eﬀort and not investing. Second, (ICgb) is the truthtelling constraint if the type
is g. If the reward for admitting that the project is of a ‘bad’ type is too high,
the entrepreneur with a ‘good’ project may pretend to have a ‘bad’ one. As
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Figure 2.1: Incentive constraints for the soft contract CS
J has no eﬀect on the ﬁnal outcome Y , the investor would not be able to tell
what the real type was. This constraint is not binding in equilibrium. Third, the
truthtelling constraint for the ‘bad’ type is (ICbg). If the monetary payoﬀ for a
‘bad’ type is not high enough, the entrepreneur prefers to pretend that the type
is g, and decides to ‘wait and pray’. This constraint is binding in equilibrium,
and the entrepreneur with a ‘bad’ type is indiﬀerent between revealing this fact
and pretending that the type is g. We have omitted the truthtelling constraints
that refer to type φ (four constraints). The only of these that is binding is that
an entrepreneur with type φ should not claim to have type b, only to be rescued.
The area enclosed by the thick lines is the set of incentive compatible soft
contracts, in which the entrepreneur invests eﬀort, and reveals the type truth-
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fully. Inside the area some indiﬀerence curves are shown. The preferences of the
two parties over soft contracts are exactly opposed, where the investor prefers
contracts with lower monetary payoﬀs for the entrepreneur, while the latter’s
preferences are exactly opposed. As the investor proposes the contract, her most
preferred incentive compatible soft contract (ZSY g, Z
S
b ) lies in the southwest corner
of the area (marked by broken lines).
The ﬁgure is not easy to complete, as the preferences and incentive constraints
are diﬀerent contracts that are not ‘soft’, and the payoﬀ functions are discontinu-
ous at regime switches. The south east area for instance, where (ICbg) is violated
(the truthtelling constraint of the bad type), contains the set of tough contracts.
With tough contracts, there is no revelation at all in equilibrium: Zb is so low
that the entrepreneur prefers to ‘wait and pray’ with a b type, and therefore
the investor is not interested in rewarding the revelation of type φ, either. The
players’ preferences are again strictly opposed in the set of tough contracts, and
their indiﬀerence curves are vertical. The equilibrium monetary pay that the
entrepreneur can expect after a ‘good’ outcome Y lies between c and ZSY g (not
shown). This payoﬀ is as low as possible, and the ‘tough’ (ICe) (not shown either)
is binding in equilibrium.
While the players’ preferences over the two contracts cannot be shown graph-
ically, this is possible algebraically. The entrepreneur exerts eﬀort under both
contracts, and the expected private beneﬁt is the same under both contracts,
too. Therefore his preferences are determined by the ﬁnancial rewards, only.
Under the soft contract the rewards are higher in all states, and we have proved
Proposition 2.4 The entrepreneur strictly prefers the soft contract CS over the
tough contract CT .
Within both sets of contracts, the players’ preferences are strictly opposed. The
preferences over contract types are not necessarily opposed, however, as the payoﬀ
funcions are not continuous at the incentive constraints.
Proposition 2.5 The investor prefers the soft contract CS over the tough con-
tract CT if and only if
Δ := (1− e)a
[
(1− b)(Y − y)− J
]
− 1− a
1− ab r > 0. (2.8)
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Δ is the diﬀerence between the investor’s payoﬀ from oﬀering CS and from oﬀering
CT . We can analyse its elements in more detail, i.e. analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent
project parameters on the investor’s preferences:
Proposition 2.6 The investor’s preference for CS over CT increases in the rescue
gain. It decreases in the eﬀect of eﬀort on type, in the probability of the ‘failure’
type, in the size of the private beneﬁt, and in the likelihood of a ‘breakthrough’ of
a ‘bad’ type.
The above proposition follows from diﬀerentiating Δ in (2.8) with respect to its
variables. That CS is the more attractive the higher the rescue gain (1−b)(Y −y)−
J , is obvious. Δ decreases in the eﬀect of eﬀort on type, since with high values of e
the rescue decision and gain become less likely. As e approaches 1, the expected
gains from rescuing converge to zero. The cost of rescuing, however, remain
strictly positive: the diﬀerence between the entrepreneur’s expected monetary
payoﬀs is 1−a
1−ab r,, if e goes to 1. The reason for this is that he must receive a bribe
r if the type is φ, which is strictly unproductive (its only beneﬁt is to prevent
a lie with wasteful consequences). This bribe decreases the wedge between the
expected payoﬀs from investing and not investing eﬀort in period 1. In order to
satisfy the eﬀort incentive constraint, the expected payoﬀ for a g type must be
increased, relative to that in the tough contract.
Next, we diﬀerentiate Δ with respect to a, the conditional probability that the
type is not φ, if it is not g. This derivative is negative, and we can conclude that
as the probability of a ‘failure’ type increases, the soft contract CS becomes less
attractive. There are two reasons for this. First, as a decreases, the possibility
to rescue the project becomes less likely to arise. Second, the costs of revelation
increase in a, as the ‘failure’ types must be bribed not to claim to have ‘bad’
types.
The eﬀect of the entrepreneur’s private beneﬁt r on Δ is negative, as well.
With either contract, r increases the investor’s payoﬀ, as it is a payoﬀ to the
entrepreneur which is linked to the outcomes g and b, but which is not earned if
the type is φ. It is thus more likely to be earned if eﬀort is invested in period 1.
This costless (for the investor) incentive on the eﬀort decision is aligned with those
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that the investor wants to provide, and serves as a substitute for the payments
that she must make. In the soft contract, however, r is the bribe, that must
be paid to the entrepreneur with project type φ. This second eﬀect more than
oﬀsets the ﬁrst eﬀect on the investor’s payoﬀ: while her payoﬀ with contract CT
increases in r, its payoﬀ with CS decreases in r.
Finally, b is the probability of a ‘breakthrough’ for a ‘bad’ type. That is, if the
parties decide to ‘wait and pray’ with type b, the probability of being lucky is b.
b increases revelation costs, even though with types b and φ the entrepreneur is
always indiﬀerent between lying and telling the truth. The reason for this is that
the incentives to invest eﬀort require a higher payoﬀ after successful projects. The
entrepreneur’s monetary payoﬀs paid under CS are higher than those under CT ,
and the diﬀerence (the revelation costs) is increasing, too. The second reason for
the decreased attractiveness of CS is simply that the opportunity costs of rescuing
decrease in b: hoping for a breakthrough pays more, the higher b is.
The disutility of eﬀort, ce, has a direct eﬀect only via e. c appears in the
payoﬀs to the entrepreneur, but it cancels out when we compare the investor’s
respective payoﬀs. The reason for this is that the model is simpliﬁed: the eﬀort
levels are ﬁxed. In a more general setting (e.g. with continuous eﬀort, see Section
2.4) it would play a role similar to e: the more weight the investor must give to
the eﬀort decision, relative to the truth revelation problem, the less attractive
the soft contract becomes.
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2.4 Simpliﬁcations and Extensions
The model in this paper is somewhat unusual in that it has three types of project
(‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘failure’), instead of the usual two. The reason for this is that
the results become unrealistic if the model is too simple. More precisely, if there
were only a good and a bad type, the investor could obtain the entrepreneur’s
private information at no cost. She could make the entrepreneur with a bad
type exactly indiﬀerent between revealing his information, and claiming to have
a good type, without aﬀecting the incentive to invest eﬀort. This is easy to see
if we assume a = 1, or r = 0: Δ in Proposition 2.5 would always be strictly
positive.
Obviously, it is not realistic that all potentially insolvent ﬁrms should be
rescued. Similarly, it is realistic to assume that the managers of a ﬁrm who
know that it should be liquidated would nevertheless try to have it reﬁnanced,
by claiming that a rescue is both possible and proﬁtable. Finally, it is realistic to
assume that it is hard for outsiders to tell whether a ﬁrm should be rescued, or
whether the managers just claim that it should.
The failure type φ is a simple way to introduce these elements of realism to the
model. Not that the relevant aspect that φ adds is not the enlarged type space.
With many bad types, even with a continuum, the results remain degenerate (see
below). The relevant aspect that φ adds is a new truthtelling constraint, which
is binding. The failure type can claim to be a bad type, but must be prevented
from doing so at a cost. There is no gain from separating the type from the other,
but there is a loss if it is not separated, and the investor wants to rescue b types.
Adding additional types who could claim to be good types is not suﬃcient to
achieve the result. Suppose there were two bad types, b and B, that can both be
rescued. Suppose further that B > b, and that r = 0 (for simplicity). If under
a soft contract the investor promises to rescue both bad types, a type b could
claim to have type B. The truthtelling constraints require that both are at least
indiﬀerent between revealing their type, and claiming to have a good type. As
B > b, type b should be expected to earn an information rent in a soft contract.
If the project is rescued, the outcome is the same for both types, and the investor
would not be able to tell whether it was b or B. The investor can propose the
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following contract, however:
Contract for many bad types (CB):
§1 At t = 1, the entrepreneur receives K from the investor and invests it in his
project.
§2.a If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is of type B, the investor
reﬁnances the project with probability (1− ε), where ε > 0. All returns belong to
the Investor, whether the project is rescued or not. If there is no rescue, and the
project returned Y , the entrepreneur receives a payment 1
ε
· c
1−ab from the Investor.
§2.b If at t = 3 the entrepreneur reveals that the project is of type b, the investor
reﬁnances the project with probability one. If the rescue was successful, the en-
trepreneur makes a payment Y − b · c
1−ab to the Investor.
§3 If §2 does not apply, and the return is Y , the entrepreneur makes a pay-
ment Y − c
1−ab to the Investor. If the entrepreneur cannot make this payment,
the returns of the project belong to the Investor.
One can easily verify that all types will be truthfully revealed. Furthermore,
revelation costs go to zero in the limit, as ε goes to zero. That is, both the
entrepreneur’s information rent and the losses due to ineﬃcient rescue decisions
go to zero, and the soft contract dominates the tough contract. Exactly the same
mechanism could be used to separate a higher number of bad types, or even a
continuum. §2.a would have to be applied to all types, except for the lowest–b
type, for which §2.b has to be applied.
Both this model and the contract CB are unsatisfactory for several reasons.
One is the fact that revelation is virtually costless and that the bad projects
are (almost) always rescued. Next, it is not possible to characterise the optimal
contract without further assumptions. The investor’s payoﬀ decreases in ε, so she
would want to choose it as small as possible. It cannot be set to zero, however,
and therefore we need e.g. a budget constraint for the investor to specify the
optimal contract.3 A further unattractive aspect of the model is that the tough
contract is not completely tough. The investor can easily separate the two bad
3In a somewhat diﬀerent model, Levitt and Snyder (1996) encountered similar diﬃculties.
In their model, the principal can achieve a second best result in the limit, using a mechanism
similar to CB. They solve the problem by assuming that the principal cannot randomize.
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types by rescuing type b, only, and making this type exactly indiﬀerent between
revelation, and claiming to have type g (or B). As before, this type of revelation
is costless. The preferences of the players over diﬀerent contracts are as in our
model above. For any ε > 0 we could deﬁne an equation as in Proposition 2.5,
which determines the investor’s preferences over the two contracts.
How robust are the results or our model to changes in other assumptions?
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀort decision. Suppose that the entrepreneur has to choose
an eﬀort level e in the interval [0, 1], which causes disutility c e
2
2
. With some
additional assumptions the problem is well behaved, and easy to solve. The
investor’s maximisation problem is unchanged, except for (ICe): on the right
hand side (cf. the Proof of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 in the Appendix) we now
have ce, instead of c, and this condition is binding by deﬁnition. The investor
now maximises over all feasible e, i.e. she compares the optimal contracts for each
e, and chooses the best eﬀort level and the respective contract for her equilibrium
oﬀer.
Proposition 2.7 Extend the model such that the entrepreneur can choose an
eﬀort level e ∈ [0, 1], at cost c e2
2
. Then either a tough or a soft contract (which
are similar to the contracts described in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2) may be optimal,
depending on the parameters. The entrepreneur chooses a smaller eﬀort level if
the soft contract is oﬀered.
Thus, the result that either a soft or a tough contract may be optimal is not driven
by the discrete eﬀort choice assumption. Furthermore, as one would expect, the
induced eﬀort level is lower with the soft contract. Nevertheless, the investor may
prefer the soft contract, because it involves a more eﬃcient rescue decision. The
condition on the parameters corresponding to the deﬁnition of Δ in Proposition
2.5 is changed to
Δˆ =
(
1− e
S
2
− e
T
2
)
a [(1− b)(Y − y)− J ]− (1− a) r, (2.9)
which can be positive or negative.
Other changes in the assumptions do not aﬀect the qualitative results, as long
as the changes are not too large. Introducing equity for instance, has small eﬀects,
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as long as the entrepreneur’s initial wealth is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the project.
The same is true if the project earns a lower income if it is separated from the
entrepreneur. The ‘outside option principle’ applies in this case: up to a certain
degree the additional bargaining power does not change the results. If the need
for his presence endows him with a strong bargaining position in renegotiations,
however, the entrepreneur need not fear bankruptcy anymore, and he may be
willing to reveal a bad type even without a soft contract.
Unlimited liability aﬀects the results considerably. It allows the investor to
punish the entrepreneur for bad outcomes, and therefore he cannot capture any
information rents. The investor can easily guarantee ﬁrst best decisions, and
if the punishments are transfer payments (say, the entrepreneur expects a high
exogenous income in the last period), the investor can even achieve her ﬁrst best
payoﬀ.
2.5 Optimal Contracts without Commitment
The contracts in Section 2.3 were optimal under the restriction that there is
no renegotiation during the game. However, in reality it is not possible to ex-
clude renegotiations of a contract. No court would try to enforce a contract that
all parties want to rescind and substitute by another contract. Under a tough
bankruptcy law, the parties can gain from negotiating around the oﬃcial proce-
dure, but this possibility causes more harm (in terms of eﬀort) than it helps (in
terms of more eﬃcient rescue decisions).
Proposition 2.8 If the parties signed contract CT , there is scope for renegotia-
tions between period 1 and period 2 (at time 1.5, say). The renegotiated contract
is a soft contract (a bad project is rescued), but with lower transfers to the en-
trepreneur than in CS, if the type is g or b. It gives the entrepreneur unchanged
utility, while the investor’s payoﬀ is increased. Being able to predict this, the
entrepreneur will choose the low eﬀort level in period 1.
As the investor has all bargaining power, she can propose the renegotiated con-
tract. She can easily ﬁnd the cheapest soft contract: instead of an eﬀort incen-
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tive constraint, it must satisfy a participation constraint from the side of the
entrepreneur. His expected payoﬀ may not be lower, otherwise the renegotiated
contract would not be accepted, and the initial contract would be valid. Revela-
tion was costly under the optimal soft contract CS, but here the transfer r to type
φ is cross subsidised by the other two types. If the transfer for good outcomes
was ZTY under the tough contract CT , the renegotiated good transfer will be
ZRY g = Z
T
Y −
(1− e)(1− a)
e+ (1− e)ab r (2.10)
(The transfer to a bad type will be b · ZRY g). While the payoﬀ to a φ type is
strictly higher under the renegotiated contract (r instead of zero), the payoﬀ to
the other two types is strictly lower. The entrepreneur can, of course, predict
the possibility to renegotiate, and, expecting a smaller diﬀerential between good
outcomes and bad outcomes, has no incentive anymore to put in eﬀort.
Both in reality and in the model, renegotiation is a serious issue. The advan-
tage of the tough contract was the use of bankruptcy as a bonding device: no
prisoners are taken if there is no success. If renegotiations cannot be exluded, the
ex post ineﬃciency which makes CT tough is not credible anymore.
One possibility to restore an eﬃcient choice of eﬀort is to start with higher
transfers in the original tough contract. However, as one can easily construct,
the lowest such transfer will be renegotiated to the best soft contract CS, which
could therefore have been written as initial contract.
Another possibility is to allow for one round of renegotiation at t = 1.5.
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) we can construct a renegotiation proof
contract for period 1, which will be substituted by one of two contracts that the
investor proposes at t = 1.5. In equilibrium, the entrepreneur chooses to invest
eﬀort with probability f , where 0 < f < 1. The investor does not know whether
eﬀort was invested, and oﬀers a menu of 2 contracts, from which the entrepreneur
may choose one.
Proposition 2.9 Assume that abc > (1 − a)r, and that the parties expect rene-
gotiations at t = 1.5. The investor’s renegotiation oﬀer will consist of one soft
contract CS0, which the entrepreneur may accept or reject. In equilibrium, the
entrepreneur invests eﬀort with probability f , where 0 < f < 1. If he did not
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invest eﬀort, he will accept the new contract CS0, and the project is either res-
cued or liquidated in period 3. If he did invest eﬀort, he rejects the new contract,
and the tough contract CT remains valid. Whatever the eﬀort decision is, the
entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ is not changed by the renegotiations.
Knowing which contracts he will choose at t = 1.5 in each case, the entrepreneur
is indiﬀerent between investing eﬀort or not. He is thus willing to play a mixed
strategy, i.e. investing eﬀort with probability f . The investor, on the other hand,
cannot proﬁtably renegotiate this type of contract, given her belief that the en-
trepreneur has invested eﬀort with probability f . The contract is renegotiation
proof in the sense that there is no strict gain that can be realised by renegoti-
ating before t = 1.5 (at t = 1.25, say). The tough contract with renegotiation
is not unique, unfortunately: for any f ∈ (0, 1), the renegotiation oﬀer is the
same. The entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between investing eﬀort and not investing,
and therefore there is a continuum of renegotiated tough contracts, which are all
identical, except for the eﬀort decision f .
Even if it is renegotiated, the contract CT remains a tough contract. With
probability (1 − f) the rescue decisions are eﬃcient, but with probability f , the
parties ignore the possibility to rescue early. As in the case of the full commitment
contracts, we can analyse the players’ preferences over the two contracts. While
the entrepreneur’s payoﬀ is not aﬀected by the renegotiation possibility, this is
not true for the investor.
Proposition 2.10 The investor prefers the soft contract CS over the tough con-
tract CT , which will possibly be renegotiated to CS0, if and only if
f · (1− e)a
[
(1− b)(Y − y)− J
]
− 1− a
1− ab r (2.11)
+e
[
(1−f)[Y −a(Y −J)]+(1+f)(1−a)r−(1−f)c
]
> 0.
Thus, even if we allow for renegotiations after the eﬀort decision, the parties can
write a tough contract, which may be either better or worse than the soft contract
(from the investor’s point of view).
A third approach to renegotiation is to analyse how costly renegotiations
are, and how likely they are to be successful. Aspects which are not modeled
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above can make renegotiations of contracts costly, maybe to such an extent,
that renegotiations will not happen. Ineﬃcient bargaining may be one reason for
imperfect renegotiations. It is generally assumed that the more parties participate
in negotiations, the more diﬃcult it gets to achieve an eﬃcient outcome. Many
actions that are necessary for a renegotiation are costly, and their provision by one
party is a public good for all parties of a contract. Information has to be gathered
and distributed, a negotiation procedure must be speciﬁed, and negotiations must
take place. As private renegotiations require unanimous consent, there is ample
space for holdups from each side, if there is asymmetric information between the
negotiating parties. We have not modeled this aspect of bankruptcy procedures
due to lack of space. Two models with ineﬃciencies in renegotiations that are
due to asymmetric information are analysed in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and
in Povel (1995).
Ineﬃcient renegotiations may make the tough contract CT credible, in par-
ticular if the costs of renegotiation are ﬁxed to a large extent. They are not
a watertight means to prevent renegotiations, however. Additional obstacles to
private renegotiations of debt contracts are provided by the sections of company
and bankruptcy laws. Many bankruptcy laws have features that make formal
bankruptcy more attractive than informal workouts. These advantages can in-
duce the contracting parties to trigger a formal bankruptcy procedure, which on
its turn may make renegotiation diﬃcult or costly.
The obstacles to renegotiation in formal bankruptcy may be the following:
minimal requirements on capital structure must be met for a reorganisation to be
approved by the courts (In Germany, a ‘Vergleich’ is possible only if 35% of the
unsecured debt can be repaid within a year); too many parties may enjoy highest
priority, i.e. too many parties have a high threat point, and may ﬁnd it hard to
give in (claims by employees and the government usually make large fractions of
total indebtedness; trade creditors in Germany can secretly secure their claims by
using the retention titles clauses); secured creditors may dispose of ‘their’ assets
(in Germany, secured creditors have to be repaid before a procedure can even
be started; in the UK, a lender secured by a ‘ﬂoating charge’ may appoint her
own ‘administrative receiver’); ﬁnally, Absolute Priority Rules provide additional
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scope for holdups, as payments to low ranked claims can be vetoed by claimants
with higher ranks.
The legal environment can also make both formal bankruptcy more attractive,
and private renegotiations more diﬃcult. ‘Tax losses’ are an important asset in
bankrupt companies, and they are transferable to other companies (and therefore
valuable) only in formal bankruptcy procedures. Similarly, in formal bankruptcy,
it is often possible to evade regulation. Private renegotiation can be made diﬃcult
if reﬁnancing parties can be accused of having been a ‘Shadow Director’, or of
having caused additional losses by delaying an imminent insolvency. For example,
a bank that participates too much in the informal reorganisation of a German
company may face such accusations if the company does not recover, with the
consequence that its claims lose priority ranks.
While the obstacles to renegotiation that come from the multiplicity of the
creditors seem to be unavoidable, the claim that tough bankruptcy laws are de-
signed to prevent renegotiations would probably go to far. The discussions around
the recent reform of the German bankruptcy laws show up the conﬂict of inter-
ests: as in the UK, the main goal of bankruptcy law is to enforce the repayment
of debts. Therefore, a bankruptcy procedure is expected to resemble the tough
§2 in CT . After reviewing the insolvency practice in the UK, a parliamentary
commission wrote:
It is a basic objective of the law to support the maintenance of
commercial morality and encourage the fulﬁlment of ﬁnancial obliga-
tions. Insolvency must not be an easy solution for those who can bear
with equanimity the stigma of their own failure or the responsibility
for the failure of a company under their management. (Cork Report,
1982, Chapter 4, at 191)
(Similar statements can be found in German legal writings.) On the other hand,
both countries have reshaped their ‘reorganisation’ procedures recently, with the
intention of minimising the losses from unnecessary liquidations. Not only do the
contracting parties try to realise all gains from bargaining (as one would expect
from looking at bargaining models), but the state tries to overcome the legal
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obstacles, as well. These obstacles are a consequence of other ineﬃciencies, that
may or may not be related to bankruptcy, which is far from saying that they have
been or should be introduced as a commitment device.
To sum up, ineﬃcient renegotiations may add credibility to a tough contract,
but cannot guarantee it. While some sources of ineﬃciency arise naturally (the
multiplicity and diversity of creditors), others are artiﬁcial. In either case, the
contracting parties will try hard to negotiate around the obstacles, thereby wa-
tering down their commitment to be tough.
A ﬁnal method to deal with renegotiation problems is to accomodate them,
and to design bankruptcy laws such that the conﬂict cannot arise anymore. One
way of doing this is to introduce a real soft procedure, which rewards cooperation
in reorganisations, and nevertheless does not worsen the ex ante incentives of
managers or owners too much. The problem with this solution is that if the
creditor breaks even with a tough contract, but not with a soft one, a potentially
proﬁtable project will not be undertaken.
2.6 Is Chapter 11 the ‘Soft’ Procedure?
The similarity between the soft bankruptcy clause in Proposition 2.2 and Chapter
11, the US reorganisation procedure, is striking. Both promise some direct or
indirect reward to the entrepreneur, if he ﬁles for bankruptcy. Indeed, it was the
intention of the drafters of the procedure to induce ﬁrms to admit their diﬃculties
as soon as possible (See House of Representatives 1977, p.233–4).
There are two major diﬀerences between the two procedures, however. First,
the US courts systematically reject ﬁlings by ﬁrms with a single lender. The
argument behind those rejections is that there cannot be any bargaining problems
with only two parties (there is no ‘Common Pool Problem’, See Jackson (1986)).
However, the reason for rewarding and protecting the entrepreneur under a soft
contract was diﬀerent: he is only willing to reveal his type if this does not make
him too vulnerable. If his ﬁling for a reward under CS is rejected, he has revealed
his type, and is at the mercy of the investor. With the US rejection rule, Chapter
11 is a tough reorganisation procedure for borrowers with exactly one lender, and
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a soft procedure if there are more lenders.
Second, Chapter 11 contains Absolute Priority Rules, which are supposed to
be enforced by the bankruptcy courts. The recent discussions around the ‘New
Value Exception’ (see e.g. Baird and Jackson (1988), Baird (1993, Chapters 3 and
10), or Westbrook (1993)) make clear that ﬁnancial reward to the entrepreneur,
as suggested by the model, are not feasible. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 has charac-
teristics that makes it a soft procedure. There is a system of indirect rewards at
use, which the entrepreneur can earn, because Chapter 11 endows him with con-
siderable bargaining power. If he ﬁles for protection under Chapter 11, this puts a
stay on all claims against the ﬁrm. No trustee is appointed, and the entrepreneur
cannot easily be removed from his position. As a ‘Debtor in Possession’, he can
take on new debt, which has higher priority than all earlier debt, to keep the ﬁrm
running. Finally, and most importantly, he has the exclusive right to propose a
reorganisation plan for at least a couple of months, possibly for years. There is
ample evidence that this system of indirect rewards is eﬀective and actually being
used (See e.g. Franks and Torous (1989)).
Unfortunately, this indirect type of reward has proved costly. Rescues are
delayed, unnecessary uncertainties are created, and the assets of a distressed ﬁrm
are not used in the most eﬃcient way. Furthermore, large legal and administrative
costs are associated with Chapter 11 cases. There is a large literature now,
which lists the diﬀerent types of costs that can arise in Chapter 11 procedures.
Below we list some important points that are raised, and then show that many
of the conclusions that are made in this literature are less robust than one would
imagine.
Frequently mentioned drawbacks of Chapter 11 in both the business press (see
e.g. Fortune (1983) and Economist (1992)) or the bankruptcy literature (see e.g.
Aghion et al. (1994)) include:
1. The loss of stigma that used to be attached to bankruptcy;
2. Chapter 11 is soft on management: this weakens the bonding role of debt;
3. A powerful debtor means smaller payoﬀs for the creditors;
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4. The procedure is time consuming, which can lead to considerable losses of
value;
5. There are high legal and administrative costs.
Chapter 11 is judged as being ineﬃcient because the entrepreneur has too
much bargaining power. Its ‘softness’ seems to be directly or indirectly responsible
for the costliness of the procedure, which should therefore be made ‘tougher’.
Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) collected data on the relative performance of
Chapter 11, and its predecessors, Chapters X and XI. Their paper is a particularly
sharp criticism of Chapter 11, and it is frequently quoted in the literature. Some
of their results are the following:4
Since the introduction of Chapter 11 in 1978,
1. the bankruptcy decision has become more endogenous
2. the frequency of bankruptcy ﬁlings has “increased dramatically”
3. a smaller fraction of bankrupt ﬁrms are delisted from the major exchanges
in the year before their ﬁling
4. bankrupt ﬁrms are generally in better ﬁnancial condition
Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) ﬁnd that managers can ﬁle for protection
from their creditors whenever it pleases them (result 1), and that this possibility
is being made use of without real need (results 2 to 4). They conclude that
Chapter 11 protects bad or lazy managers from the market for corporate control,
both outside and in bankruptcy, and should therefore be amended.
Using the model, we will now show that many of the above arguments do not
necessarily imply that Chapter 11 should be made tougher on management, or
even amended. We look at the results in Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), ﬁrst.
Their ﬁrst ﬁnding is actually a desired result. It was the intention of the soft
procedure that ﬁrms ﬁle before their distress must be publicly admitted. As the
entrepreneur ﬁles voluntarily in the model, his ﬁling must be ‘endogenous’. The
4A series of papers has attacked the authors’ methodology; See e.g. Bhandari and Weiss
(1993), and the references cited in their footnote 4. See also Bradley (1997).
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second ﬁnding follows necessarily from the fact that the ﬁrms are to ﬁle earlier.
While under a tough bankruptcy procedure, a project is completed without in-
terruptions and earns a high payoﬀ with probability e+ab(1−e) (the probability
of type g and a ‘lucky’ type b), the same probability with a soft procedure is e.
In the latter case, the formerly ‘lucky’ bad types count as ‘bankrupts’ as well.
Nothing about welfare losses can be derived from simply counting the number of
ﬁlings, however: as was shown in the model, the higher number of ﬁlings may be
preferred by the investor. The third and fourth ﬁndings of Bradley and Rosen-
zweig (1992) are again a consequence of the earlier ﬁlings. The gain from the
earlier ﬁling derives from the possibility to reorganise an acceptably healthy ﬁrm,
which is much cheaper and easier than to reorganise a deeply insolvent ﬁrm. As
with ﬁnding 2, nothing can be said about the aggregate eﬀects.
Thus, the results in Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), when reinterpreted, state
that Chapter 11 may be doing quite well. Its introduction in 1978 seems to have
had a positive eﬀect on both the number of ﬁlings, and on the economic conditions
of the ﬁling ﬁrms, as was the intention of the creators of the law.
Similarly, the other arguments (points 1 to 5 above) can be reviewed. Consider
ﬁrst point 2, the idea that the bonding role of debt is weakened. We have seen
that a procedure can be soft and nevertheless preserve the bonding role of debt. In
the model, the eﬀort incentive constraint is always binding, and the entrepreneur
always invests the high eﬀort level. The key is that the procedure should be soft,
but not too soft. Chapter 11 is soft on the manager: Lo Pucki and Whitford
(1993) found ﬁve in 43 studied cases, in which the CEO of a ﬁrm in Chapter
11 received considerable payments during the proceedings (These payments were
agreed to as employment contracts). However, it is not too soft: even though the
entrepreneur is treated well in Chapter 11, he is not invulnerable. Gilson (1990)
and Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show that directors and CEOs of publicly
traded ﬁrms that ﬁle for Chapter 11 frequently lose their jobs (about one in two)
and that the remuneration of the remaining managers is signiﬁcantly reduced.
Thus, in Chapter 11 cases, we observe that managers are treated badly, but
not too badly. The lower bound to the reward is determined by the alternatives
that the entrepreneur can choose. Typically, these consist of a later bankruptcy,
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that may be much more harmful than Chapter 11. Thus, there is evidence both
for the suﬀerings of managers in Chapter 11 (ZSb is not too high in the language
of the model) and for a reward for ﬁling (ZSb is not too small), and the bonding
role of debt may still be eﬀective.
The criticism in point 1 points at the danger of putting too much emphasis
on the bonding role of bankruptcy procedures when designing a soft procedure.
As was shown above, this can lead to a ‘hybrid’ procedure which is strictly worse
than both a soft or tough procedures.
Similarly, one has to be more precise when arguing that a soft procedure
increases the cost of capital (point 3). It is true that the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs
are higher under the soft procedure (this is why he strictly prefers it to the
tough one). However, when designing the contract, the investor also takes into
consideration the gains from a more eﬃcient rescue decision. If these are high,
she prefers to oﬀer the soft contract, which indicates (since she keeps all proﬁts)
that the ex ante costs of capital are lower.
Arguments 4 and 5 remain true, but, as was mentioned in the last section,
these ineﬃciencies are required because the entrepreneur cannot, presently, expect
a direct reward. As reorganisations in other countries and informal workouts
show, there is no need for a reorganisation to be costly or time consuming. Thus,
if one wants to make the procedure more eﬃcient, the question should be whether
direct rewards can be introduced, and whether some form of Absolute Priority
Rule is necessary in Chapter 11.
To summarise, the evidence of the performance of Chapter 11 leads to some
negative results for the design of the procedure, but it does not follow that a soft
procedure does worse than a tough procedure. Early rescues may pay, and, as
was shown in the model, even with limited liability, which makes the revelation
of project types costly, the incentive to invest eﬀort can be suﬃciently strong.
Undoubtedly, the entrepreneur does better under a soft procedure, as his expected
payoﬀ after bad outcomes is increased. However, his payoﬀ for good outcomes
is increased even more. The wedge between the two payoﬀs is large enough to
provide him with incentives to invest eﬀort, if this can reduce the probability of
bad outcomes, and the investor is glad to ﬁnance these higher payoﬀs, as she
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gains from the more eﬃcient use of the assets.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies both the decision of an entrepreneur, when to reveal to his
lenders that his ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress, in order to initiate a reorganisation.
As early rescues are likely to be more successful and cheaper than delayed res-
cues, the creditors want to receive this information as early as possible. The
entrepreneur must be convinced to reveal his information, as he could carry on,
playing a ‘wait and pray’ strategy at the creditors’ expense. It may pay for the
latter to be ‘forgiving’, if the entrepreneur admits that he lost their money, even
if they are in a much stronger bargaining position than the entrepreneur. This
may also be too expensive in terms of ex ante incentives of the entrepreneur,
however, and the creditors could prefer to ignore the possibility of more eﬃcient
rescue decisions in this case.
Assuming that ‘optimal laws’ should replicate the clauses of those ‘optimal
contracts’ that the parties would write if the transaction costs of contracting were
suﬃciently low, we derive implications for the design of bankruptcy laws. Both
soft and tough bankruptcy laws may be optimal in equilibrium, depending on
the economic and legal environment. A procedure which contains both soft and
tough elements, however, is never better than both of the other two, and may be
strictly worse.
A soft bankruptcy law requires that a reward is paid to the entrepreneur, if
he successfully cooperated in a rescue by starting it early. This reward must be
paid even if some of the debt of the ﬁrm is not repaid. At the extreme, it must
be paid even if the ﬁrm must be liquidated, and the returns are negligible (as
with a failure type in the model). This may seem ‘unfair’ at ﬁrst. It makes clear,
however, how important it is to separate clearly between the diﬀerent goals that
a bankruptcy procedure is supposed to achieve, and how important it is do design
a procedure consistently.
Chapter 11, the US reorganisation procedure, has much in common with the
soft bankruptcy law, but there are some relevant diﬀerences. The most important
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of these is that the creditors can demand that the ‘Absolute Priority Rule’ be
enforced, which prohibits payments to equity if claims with higher ranks have
not been repaid. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 is a soft procedure. It provides the
entrepreneur with indirect rewards: by endowing him with bargaining power (he
can make the procedure costly and ineﬃcient), he can extract a payoﬀ from the
creditors. This may be an ineﬃcient reward scheme, but the main goal of a
soft procedure, inducing early bankruptcy ﬁlings, may be achieved. This is one
of the insights that the model provides, when we look at empirical evidence on
Chapter 11. While there are undoubtedly severe ineﬃciencies in a Chapter 11
procedure, these are not necessary elements of a soft procedure. The arguments
against Chapter 11 may be valid, but they do not imply that the ‘softness’ of the
procedure should be reduced.
It would be interesting to analyse the possibility of choosing between several
bankruptcy procedures. It could be that having e.g. two bankruptcy procedures
(as is the case in the US) or even more (as in the UK) provides a more ﬂexible
legal environment and thereby allows for easier contracting (see Schwartz, 1997).
One problem that must arise here is that of signalling through the choice of
procedures. White (1994) analyses these problems at the stage where a distressed
ﬁrm has to select a bankruptcy procedure. More severe signaling problems may
arise, however, when two parties want to sign a lending contract and the borrower
proposes to be treated well in the case of bankruptcy. This must make the lender
rather pessimistic about the borrower’s intentions.
The paper has important consequences for the review of the US Bankruptcy
Code, which is currently in progress. Over the past years there has been a dis-
cussion about the New Value Exception, and whether it is or should be part
of Chapter 11. It deals with the question under what circumstances the former
shareholders should be allowed to participate in the reorganised ﬁrm, e.g. as ‘new’
shareholders. There is concern about the unfairness of the possibility to abuse
this option, as e.g. a majority shareholder must be assumed to have superior in-
formation about the value of the assets and investment opportunities of the ﬁrm.
However, exactly this represents a cheap way to ‘reward’ (as required by a soft
procedure), as the lenders’ loss is much smaller than the gain to the shareholder,
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if the latter gets a good deal.
In a similar spirit, the idea that shareholders get ‘unfairly’ good deals in
workouts or prepackaged Chapter 11 ﬁlings should be reconsidered. As noted
by e.g. Bebchuk and Chang (1992), Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1995) and
Franks and Torous (1989), shareholders have a de facto right to delay regular
Chapter 11 procedures, and use it as a threat point in Chapter 11 negotiations to
improve their payoﬀ. Allowing the use of such threats in workout and ‘Prepack’
negotiations could greatly improve the eﬃciency of the US code. As anecdotal
evidence shows (for instance from Germany), there is no need for rescues to be
time consuming, or connected with high costs.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proofs of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2
The direct mechanism consists of:
A message space M = {g, b, φ}
rescue decisions Pg, Pb, Pφ ∈ [0, 1]
a payoﬀ function (for E) Z : {Y, y, 0, Y − J,−J} ×M → IR+
The optimal direct mechanism is found by solving the following maximisation
program:
max e
(
Pg(Y − J − Zg) + (1− Pg)(Y − ZY g)
)
(Max)
+ (1− e)a
(
Pb(Y − J − Zb) + (1− Pb)
[
b(Y − ZY b) + (1− b)(y − Zyb)
])
+ (1− e)(1− a)
(
Pφ(−J − Zφ) + (1− Pφ)(−Z0φ)
)
such that
PgZg + (1− Pg)ZY g + r − a
(
PbZb + (1− Pb)
[
bZY b + (1− b)Zyb
]
+ r
)
(ICe)
− (1− a)
(
Pφ(Zφ + r) + (1− Pφ)Z0φ
)
≥ c
PgZg + (1− Pg)ZY g + r ≥ PbZb + (1− Pb)ZY b + r (ICgb)
PgZg + (1− Pg)ZY g + r ≥ Pφ(Zφ + r) + (1− Pφ)Z0φ (ICgφ)
PbZb + (1− Pb)
[
bZY b + (1− b)Zyb
]
+ r (ICbg)
≥ PgZg + (1− Pg)
[
bZY g + (1− b)Zyg
]
+ r
PbZb + (1− Pb)
[
bZY b + (1− b)Zyb
]
+ r ≥ Pφ(Zφ + r) + (1− Pφ)Z0φ (ICbφ)
Pφ(Zφ + r) + (1− Pφ)Z0φ ≥ Pgr (ICφg)
Pφ(Zφ + r) + (1− Pφ)Z0φ ≥ Pbr (ICφb)
are satisﬁed, as well as the limited liability conditions (no transfer Zij may be
negative). The ﬁrst constraint (ICe) is the (simpliﬁed) eﬀort constraint. As we
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assume that the inequality in (2.7) is suﬃciently strict, the investor will want
the entrepreneur to invest the high eﬀort level. The truthtelling constraints are
(ICgb) to (ICφb), where the ﬁrst index refers to the true type, and the second to
the type the entrepreneur should not pretend to be.
The propositions are proved by simplifying the program, and by reducing it
to case distinctions. For every case we will either derive the optimal transfer
scheme, or show that it leads to a contradiction.
The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation is to set Zyg = 0, which cannot violate any ICs, since
it appears on the RHS of (ICbg), only. Next, Pφ = 0. Suppose it were strictly
positive. Then the investor could decrease it by some ε > 0, and increase Z0φ by
δ1 =
Zφ−Z0φ+r
1−Pφ ε, without violating any of the ICs. If δ1 < 0, and Z0φ = 0, she can
instead increase Zφ by δ2 =
Zφ+r
Pφ
ε > 0, again without violating any of the ICs.
Her own payoﬀ is thereby increased.
There is no need for the investor to set Z0φ > r. Otherwise, it could be reduced
without violating any of the ICs, thereby improving the investor’s payoﬀ. With
Z0φ ≤ r, (ICgφ) and (ICbφ) are redundant, as they must be satisﬁed from the
limited liability constraints.
Pg must be zero. Otherwise, the investor could proﬁtably reduce it by ε > 0,
thereby saving J · ε > 0. By increasing Zg by δ1 = Zg−ZY gPg ε, no IC is violated
(The eﬀect on (ICbg) is that the RHS is decreased by (1− b)ZY gε). If δ1 < 0, and
Zg = 0, she can instead decrease ZY g by δ2 =
ZY g
1−Pg ε > 0, which has the same
eﬀect on the ICs. ZY g must be strictly positive because of (ICe).
With Pg = 0, (ICφg) is always satisﬁed, and we can omit it. Therefore, (ICφb)
must be binding, as the investor could otherwise proﬁtably decrease Z0φ.
Next, (ICbg) must be binding in equilibrium. Suppose it is not. The investor
could decrease either of Zb, ZY b, or Zyb (at least one must be strictly positive
from (ICbg) and (ICe)), without violating any of the ICs.
From this follows that (ICe) must be binding, as well. Suppose it is not.
Then (ICgb) must be binding, as the investor could otherwise reduce ZY g, without
violating any of the ICs. Then, ZY b must be zero. Otherwise the investor could
decrease it by ε > 0, and increase Zyb by δ1 =
b
1−b ε > 0, without violating any of
the ICs. (ICgb) would not bind anymore, and the investor could proﬁtably reduce
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ZY g. Similarly, we can conclude that Zb = 0. Then, however, from (ICgb) follows
ZY g = 0, which contradicts (ICe).
Consider ﬁrst the case in which (ICgb) is binding. From (ICgb) and (ICbg)
follows that PbZb = 0 and (1 − Pb)Zyb = 0. We can calculate the following
equilibrium transfers as a function of Pb:
ZY g =
c− (1− a)(1− Pb) r
1− ab , ZY b =
c− (1− a)(1− Pb) r
(1− Pb)(1− ab) , Z0φ = Pbr. (2.12)
We can substitute these values into the investor’s objective function (Max). Dif-
ferentiating with respect to Pb gives the optimal contract for this case. This
derivative is Δ, as deﬁned in (2.8). If Δ < 0, the investor wants to set Pb = 0,
while if Δ > 0, she wants to choose the highest value of Pb that is possible. The
equilibrium transfers if Δ < 0 are those of the tough contract CT in Proposition
2.1. The optimal transfers if Δ > 0 cannot be determined, as ZY b goes to inﬁnity
as Pb approaches one. The limits are
lim
Pb↑1
ZY g =
c
1− ab, limPb↑1(1− Pb)ZY b =
c
1− ab, limPb↑1Z0φ = r. (2.13)
These values can be used to calculate an upper bound to the investor’s payoﬀ.
This is not done here, since one can easily verify that the payoﬀ from the soft
contract (which is an optimal transfer scheme if Δ > 0) is strictly higher.
Consider now the case where (ICgb) is not binding. We can calculate the
transfers to the entrepreneur, as a function of Pb, except for the ‘bad’ type. For
the ‘bad’ type, we can calculate the utility transfer:
ZY g =
c− (1− a)(1− Pb)r
1− ab , (2.14)
PbZb + (1− Pb)[bZY b + (1− b)Zyb] = bZY g, Z0φ = Pbr.
We can now determine the investor’s payoﬀ, as a function of Pb, and, as before,
take the derivative with respect to Pb. Again, this derivative is Δ. If Δ > 0,
Pb = 1 in the optimum, and the transfers are those of the soft contract CS in
Proposition 2.2. If Δ < 0, the investor would prefer to set Pb = 0. This gives us a
continuum of equilibria, which are all equivalent in their payoﬀ with the transfer
scheme in the tough contract, CT . The multiplicity derives from the fact that
there is some scope to vary ZY b and Zyb without any eﬀect, as long as neither of
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them is negative, and [bZY b + (1− b)Zyb] = bZY g. Since the payoﬀ is unchanged,
we have restricted our attention on the case where Zyb = 0: this is the only
transfer scheme which is easy to implement (in the form of CT ). 
Proof of Proposition 2.3
As has been shown in the Proof of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, contracts other than
CT and CS are either not incentive compatible, or do not achieve a higher payoﬀ
than both CT and CS. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5
If Δ ≤ 0, the investor’s payoﬀ is maximised by choosing the tough mechanism,
while if Δ ≥ 0, she prefers the soft mechanism. This can easily be shown by
calculating and comparing the four payoﬀs. 
Proof of Proposition 2.8
Suppose the tough transfer scheme is ZTY g = Z
T
Y b = Z
T , and all other transfers
are zero. The investor can oﬀer the following soft contract at t = 1.5:
ZˆY g = Z
T − (1− e)(1− a)
e+ (1− e)ab r, Zˆb = bZˆY g, Zˆ0φ = r. (2.15)
This leaves the entrepreneur’s expected payoﬀ unchanged, and leads to truthful
revelation of types and the rescue of the ‘bad’ type. Because of the more eﬃcient
rescue decision, the investor’s payoﬀ must be strictly higher. Next, we show
that, if the entrepreneur can predict such renegotiations, his eﬀort constraint is
violated. The LHS of (ICe) under the renegotiated mechanism is changed to
(1− ab)ZˆY g, or
c− (1− a)r − (1− ab)(1− e)(1− a)
e+ (1− e)ab r, (2.16)
which is strictly smaller than c: (ICe) is violated. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.9
As in Propositions 2.1 and 2.2, we apply the Revelation Principle, using as ‘types’
not the project types (which are not known yet), but the eﬀort level that the
entrepreneur has invested, either e or 0. The investor can oﬀer mixtures of soft
and tough contracts, i.e. lotteries over the two that will be played in period 3,
after the entrepreneur has observed the project type. The (slightly simpliﬁed)
investor’s program consists of an objective function (omitted here), two interim
individual rationality constraints,
P(aZ
S0
b + r) + (1− P)(abZT0Y b + ar) = abc1−ab + a−ab1−abr +M, (IIR0)
Ph[eZ
Se
Y g + (1− e)aZSeb + r] + (1− Ph)[e(ZTeY g + r) + (1− e)a(bZTeY b + r)] (IIRe)
= ec+ abc
1−ab +
a−ab
1−ab +M,
and two interim incentive (truthtelling) constraints,
P(aZ
S0
b + r)+ (1−P)(abZT0Y b +ar) ≥ Ph[aZSeb + r]+ (1−Ph)a[bZTeY b + r], (IIC0)
Ph[eZ
Se
Y g + (1− e)aZSeb + r] + (1− Ph)[e(ZTeY g + r) + (1− e)a(bZTeY b + r)] (IICe)
≥ P[(e+(1− e)a)ZS0b + r]+ (1−P)[e(ZT0Y g + r)+ (1− e)a(bZT0Y b + r)].
P and Ph are the probabilities with which a soft contract will be used in period
3 (Ph if eﬀort was invested, P if not). Z
Te
Y g etc. are transfers to the entrepreneur.
The lower indices refer to the outcome (Y , and g was announced), and the upper
indices to the type of contract (Te for the tough part of the contract for the
e type). The program is formulated in a less general than that of Propositions
2.1 and 2.2, but the omitted additional variables would cancel out anyway. M
is the information rent that the entrepreneur may earn by renegotiating. It
must be identical for both types, as without renegotiation the entrepreneur is
indiﬀerent between investing eﬀort and not, while with renegotiations he should
be indiﬀerent (because he is to play a mixed strategy).
We ﬁrst show that P = 1. Suppose P < 1. The investor could increase it
by ε > 0, and increase ZT0Y b by δ1 =
abZT0
Y b
−aZT0
b
−(1−a)r
(1−P)ab · ε. This leaves (IIR0)
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and (IIC0) unchanged, decreases the right hand side of (IICe), and increases
the investor’s payoﬀ. If ZT0Y b = 0, she can decrease Z
S0
b by δ2 =
aZS0b +(1−a)r
Pa
· ε,
which has the same eﬀects. ZY bb = 0 would lead to a contradiction with either
M ≥ 0 or the assumption that abc > (1 − a)r, as we could rewrite (IIR0) as
−(1 − P)(1− a)r = abc−(1−a)r1−ab +M .
The simpliﬁed program can now be solved. It yields the following constraint,
Ph ≤ (1− ab)M
(1− a)r , (2.17)
which gives us an upper bound for Ph for every level of information rent. This
allows us to reduce the investor’s program to a maximisation with only M as a
variable. The derivative of this objective function with respect to M is negative,
and therefore the investor will set Ph = M = 0. The renegotiated contracts are
thus
P = 1, Z
S0
b =
1
a
[
abc
1− ab −
1− a
1− abr
]
, ZS00φ = r,
(all other transfers zero) for the 0 type, and no new contract for the e type. 
Proof of Proposition 2.10
As in Proposition 2.5. 
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Abstract
This paper analyses the eﬀects of liquidity constraints on a ﬁrm’s output decisions
by emphasizing the role of production costs. We present a simple duopoly model
in which ﬁrms have to produce goods and incur production costsbefore they can
oﬀer their products in the market. A ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm may choose
to obtain external funds by agreeing on a ﬁnancial contract with a bank, which
we derive endogenously. After signing the contract, the ﬁrm chooses its level of
production. Finally, its revenue, and hence the ability to repay the loan, depends
on the ﬁrms’ output levels and the realization of a stochastic demand function.
We ﬁnd that with endogenous debt contracts, existing debt has no eﬀect on
a ﬁrm’s desired output level, as compared to a ﬁrm with a deep pocket. The
requirement that production costs be debt-ﬁnanced, however, places a constraint
on the output level. As a result, in equilibrium, ﬁrms are forced to internalise
the expected costs of possible bankruptcy, which leads ﬁrms to reduce output.
This main result, and some other results we obtain, are consistent with empirical
evidence.
Keywords: liquidity constraints, debt contracts, product market competition
JEL-Codes: G32, G33, L13
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3.1 Introduction
There is a large literature which analyses the interdependence of ﬁnancial and
product market decisions of ﬁrms. The theoretical work is inconclusive: Most
notably, Brander and Lewis (1986) have argued that leveraged ﬁrms compete
more aggressively in the output market, because in the presence of uncertainty,
debt should make borrowers more risk–loving, or more “aggressive”.1 Several
other theories predict that for diﬀerent reasons, debt or ﬁnancial constraints
leads ﬁrms to compete less aggressively.2 Most empirical studies conclude that
ﬁrms with high debt levels and/or in ﬁnancial distress compete less aggressively,
i.e. invest less and set higher prices.3
In this paper, we emphasise the role of debt–ﬁnanced production costs for a
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial and output decisions. We analyse the interdependence of the two
decisions in a model in which debt contracts arise as optimal contracts, designed
as a solution to agency problems that are caused by asymmetric information. In
so doing, we synthesise the analyses of Brander and Lewis (1986), Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) and Gale and Hellwig (1985), and extend several of the results
obtained in these key papers. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms produce
less than unconstrained ﬁrms. This and other results we obtain are consistent
with the empirical evidence.
We focus on the case of Cournot duopolists, one of which is “ﬁnancially con-
strained”: it cannot produce the standard Cournot output using its internal funds,
only (or it may even have inherited debt, which must be reﬁnanced). Unlike most
of the recent literature,4 we study the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation (in-
herited from the past) on its current decisions (ﬁnancing, output), instead of the
1 Maksimovic (1988) obtains a similar result. In Hendel’s (1996) model, ﬁrms in distress
generate cash by cutting price in order to dump their inventories on the market.
2cf. Gale and Hellwig (1985), Jensen (1986), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Bolton and Scharf-
stein (1990), Phillips (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996).
3 cf. Opler and Titman (1994), Chevalier (1995a,1995b), Phillips (1995), Kovenock and
Phillips (1997). Zingales (1997), however, ﬁnds evidence of tougher pricing by overleveraged
ﬁrms in the trucking industry.
4 An exception is Gale and Hellwig (1985).
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correlation of current debt and current output decisions.
The structure of our model is as follows. First, the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm
may design a ﬁnancial contract, which it oﬀers to competing investors. Second,
each ﬁrm produces its output, where variable costs are ﬁnanced by both retained
earnings and borrowed money. Third, the ﬁrms’ stochastic earnings are realised:
revenue is determined by both the output choices and a stochastic demand in-
tercept. These earnings are not observable. All along the way, the ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm fulﬁls its obligations as speciﬁed in the contract (e.g. it makes a
repayment after obtaining its earnings). Finally, the ﬁrms earn a second period
payoﬀ. This payoﬀ is contractable, and the ﬁnancial contract will make use of
a possibility to liquidate the ﬁrm, such that it cannot earn this second period
payoﬀ.
We obtain the following results:
1. Extending the work of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), we derive an op-
timal, incentive–compatible, renegotiation–proof contract between the ﬁrm and
an Investor, given the assumption that the ﬁrm’s realised proﬁt is not veriﬁable.
The resulting contract has a simple structure which resembles a standard debt
contract in that the ﬁrm is required to repay a ﬁxed amount. If the ﬁrm fails to
repay in full, however, it is not forced to go bankrupt for sure as with a standard
debt contract. Rather, the probability of bankruptcy is a decreasing function of
the amount repaid. This provides the incentive for the ﬁrm to repay as much as
it can, possibly its entire earnings. Thus, instead of assuming that ﬁrms issue
debt (as in Brander and Lewis (1986)), we analyse a setup in which debt arises
naturally, as an institutional solution to some agency problem.
Extending Bolton and Scharfstein’s analysis from their two–state model, in
which there is no output decision for the ﬁrm to make, to a full oligopoly model is
not straightforward. In our model, realised proﬁt depends on a stochastic demand
intercept, which is a continuous random variable, and on the respective output
decisions of two ﬁrms. More importantly, however, the revelation game which
leads to the optimal contract has a much more complicated structure. Firstly,
the ﬁrm’s output is unobservable, and must also be revealed to the lender (it is
private information). The optimal contract must also make sure that the ﬁrm
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produces exactly the output level that the parties have agreed on. The contracting
problem in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) is simpler, because investment is a
veriﬁable zero–one decision. Second, the ﬁrm’s earnings depend on its output
choice, and the earnings that it can report at the last stage depend on both the
real output level, and the reported one.
With one output choice stage and (potentially) two revelation stages, the
borrower has a much richer strategy set than if he simply had to reveal a state
of the world once. It is therefore surprising, that the simple debt contract, which
makes little use of revelation games, turns out to be an optimal contract.
2. If debt serves no direct purpose except possibly to ﬁnance ﬁxed costs
(as in Brander and Lewis (1986), and many related papers), and a ﬁrm and an
Investor sign an optimal contract as described above, then debt has no eﬀect on
the choice of output at all. As a consequence, a ﬁrm cannot gain anything by
issuing “strategic debt” — the result in Brander and Lewis (1986) is driven by
the assumption that debt is used.
3. If variable costs must be ﬁnanced, however, the (inherited) ﬁnancial con-
straints of a ﬁrm do have an eﬀect on its decisions (and those of its rivals): the
constrained ﬁrm produces less than it would without its constraints. Two eﬀects
are at work here: Firstly, the amount of borrowing puts a limit on the output
that can be produced, because we look at a case with positive marginal costs.
Secondly, borrowing is costly, as the (endogenous) debt contract leads to dead-
weight losses if promised repayments cannot be made. Both eﬀects work against
the “limited liability” eﬀect modeled in Brander and Lewis (1986), and more than
compensate it.
Even though we analyse sequential decisions (ﬁrst borrowing, then output,
then uncertain earnings and repayments), the model is relatively easy to handle.
In equilibrium, the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm commits to some output level at
the ﬁnancing stage, by borrowing an amount that is exactly suﬃcient to cover the
production costs. Brander and Lewis’ “limited liability eﬀect” works in a model
that has the same sequential structure, and in which the lenders can correctly
predict all actions, and their result is that ﬁrms want to incur debt, because
this commits them to be more aggressive quantity–setters. By ﬁne–tuning their
3.1. INTRODUCTION 103
debt level, a ﬁrm can aim for the payoﬀ of a Stackelberg–leader, and therefore
increase its ex ante value. We get the opposite result: ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms produce smaller outputs than ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms, and a ﬁrm’s
value does not increase in its ﬁnancial constraints.
Gale and Hellwig (1985) also derive an underinvestment result, but in a diﬀer-
ent model. Firstly, theirs is a costly–state–veriﬁcation model, in which a lender
can observe and verify the borrower’s (stochastic) earnings, but only at a cost.
In our model, this is not possible (the ‘inspection costs’ are inﬁnitely high), and
the contract has to use other means to ensure that the expected payments to the
lender are suﬃciently high (our contract uses the ﬁrm’s survival, i.e. its possi-
bility to earn additional payoﬀs, as a ‘hostage’). Secondly, In Gale and Hellwig
(1985) the borrower’s investment is contractable, and the agreed on output level
is part of the contract. This also means that the ﬁnancial and output decisions
are simultaneous. In our model, the output level is unobservable, and therefore
cannot be element of a contract. We also study a sequence of decisions, where
borrowing is followed by output choice.5,6
These diﬀerences are not reproduced in the results, as in both Gale and Hellwig
(1985) and our model there is underinvestment by ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
While one would have expected that the sequential structure leads to moral haz-
ard problems at the output choice stage (as in Brander and Lewis (1986)), the
opposite is the case: because the ﬁrm has to ﬁnance variable production costs, the
amount it borrows puts a limit on the output it can produce, and the risk–shifting
problem has no bite.
4. The degree of underinvestment is not monotonically increasing in a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial constraints. It is monotonic for ﬁrms with limited retained earnings,
but not for ﬁrms with negative levels of retained earnings, which we interpret
5 An additional diﬀerence is the assumption in Gale and Hellwig (1985) that a ﬁrm is
bankrupt with probability zero or one. See e.g. Mookherjee and Png (1989), for an extension
of the costly–state–veriﬁcation model (without investment decisions) to a continuous outcome
space.
6 Faure–Grimaud (1997) analyses a model with observable but nonveriﬁable output decisions,
and also derives an underinvestment result. His analysis implicitly uses the assumption that
ﬁnancial and output decisions are simultaneous, as in Gale and Hellwig (1985).
104 Liquidity Constraints, Production Costs and Output Decisions
as ‘inherited debt’ (obligations which have to be paid oﬀ before production can
start). The eﬀect of inherited debt is similar to that of ﬁxed costs: the initial
loan must pay both the initial obligations and the current production costs, and
the higher the amount that has to be rolled over, the larger the share of the
ﬁrm’s earnings that has to go to the lender. This also increases the probability
of liquidation, which follows insuﬃcient repayments by the borrower.
With small ﬁnancial constraints, an increase in the constraints will lead to
reduced borrowing and output: the ﬁrm trades oﬀ current earnings and liqui-
dation probability, and the eﬀect on the latter is stronger. With high levels of
inherited debt, however, the situation is diﬀerent. Here, the ﬁrm may not be able
to transfer suﬃcient amounts of money to the lender if it reduces its borrowing:
increasing the ﬁxed costs of production means that production has to become
more proﬁtable, if it is to take place at all. Thus, with high inherited debt, a ﬁrm
ﬁnds itself with its back to the wall, and must become suicidal to survive.7
5. Perhaps surprisingly, constrained ﬁrms with relatively high retained earn-
ings (i.e. not too far below the deep–pocket level) choose not to incur any debt,
and rather ﬁnance production only out of retained earnings. The reason is that
even if the level of debt is close to zero, a ﬁrm that chooses debt ﬁnancing faces
a discrete increase in its eﬀective marginal cost of production. Therefore, a ﬁrm
chooses debt ﬁnancing for production only if it is suﬃciently constrained. Thus,
precisely because there is a discrete diﬀerence between the costs of internal and
external funds, the absence of debt does not rule out the presence of ﬁnancial
constraints.
As mentioned above, our analysis can be viewed as combining the analyses of
Brander and Lewis (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Gale and Hellwig
(1985). From Brander–Lewis, we adopt the explicit oligopoly model and the two–
7 Gale and Hellwig also obtain a nonmonotonicity result. See also Aghion, Dewatripont and
Rey (1997), who analyse the eﬀort incentives of the manager of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm.
In a patent race model, in which R&D eﬀort is not fully contractable, the manager’s eﬀort
provision depends in a nonmonotonic way on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation.
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stage structure of the game: When choosing its output level, an indebted ﬁrm
takes the required repayment to the bank as given, but takes into account the
eﬀect of its output choice on the current–period proﬁt and hence the ability to
repay. In Brander–Lewis, the combination of this sequential structure with the
assumption that standard debt contracts are used drives the eﬀect that makes a
leveraged ﬁrm more aggressive. Here, we show that with endogenously derived
contracts, this eﬀect vanishes.8
Note that the need to pre–ﬁnance production costs drives the underinvest-
ment result in our model. With marginal costs of production equal to zero, debt
obligations have no eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s output choice. The same holds for a ﬁrm’s
desired output choice in a model with positive marginal costs of production: this
desired level is the same for any debt level, but the ﬁrm is not able to achieve it,
because at the (earlier) contracting stage it decided not to borrow enough money.
What drives down its output aspirations are the (increasing) marginal costs of
borrowing, which are caused by the need to sometimes liquidate the ﬁrm.
The use of non–liquidation as a ‘hostage’ in the ﬁnancial contract exactly
wipes out the “limited liability eﬀect” that is modeled in Brander and Lewis
(1986). This reminds of the use of the “punishment function” in Diamond (1984).
We want to stress that this eﬀect arises as a by–product of the revelation mech-
anism: The incentive constraints for the truthful revelation of the ﬁrm’s income
generate the debt–like structure, and the incentive problem at the output choice
stage does not add any structure, because it is not binding anymore, once the
truthtelling problems have been solved. Solving the incentive problems ‘back-
wards’ is the right approach, because of the sequential structure of the game: no
decision by the ﬁrm can be observed by the lender, and therefore all decisions at
all stages can only be made contingent on earlier revelations by the ﬁrm.
The predictions of our model are consistent with most existing empirical ev-
idence: debt weakens a ﬁrm’s competitive position. An alternative theory to
explain why debt may make ﬁrms less aggressive is oﬀered by Chevalier and
8 With small but positive marginal costs of production, the results of Brander and Lewis
(1986) are unchanged: A ﬁrm that issues “strategic debt” will simply have to use up some of
the borrowed funds to ﬁnance production.
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Scharfstein (1996). They model a market with switching costs, in which the
short–run proﬁt–maximizing prices exceeds the prices that maximize proﬁts in
the long–run. The latter are relatively low because ﬁrms are concerned about
attracting new customers in order to maintain their market share; in the short
run, however, a ﬁrm may want to exploit its locked–in customers and raise its
price, thereby increasing its current period proﬁt, at the expense of its future
market share. A highly indebted ﬁrm faces an existential threat (of bankruptcy),
which gives it a double incentive to concentrate on short–run proﬁt maximisation:
ﬁrstly because this increases its survival chances, and secondly because it must
discount future gains from investing in market share more heavily.
Other theories are based on ‘classical’ papers in corporate ﬁnance, which anal-
yse overinvestment and underinvestment problems as a function of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnan-
cial structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that issuing debt leads to poor
investment incentives. They analyse a manager’s eﬀort incentives, which are also
the central problem in the model of Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997).
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that ﬁrms may want to ignore positive NPV in-
vestments if they cannot ﬁnance them internally, because external funds are more
expensive than internal funds. Jensen (1986) and Hart and Moore (1995) extend
this, by showing that debt is a valuable tool in that it forces a ﬁrm to pay out its
earnings to investors. Jensen argues that managers of highly leveraged ﬁrms have
less opportunities to waste ‘free cash ﬂows’ on unproﬁtable investments, which
increase their own private beneﬁts. Chevalier (1995a, 1995b) speculates that this
could have been the reason for ‘unnecessary’ price wars between supermarket
chains in the U.S., and that improved governance (through takeovers) led to a
reduction in these negative NPV ‘investments in market share’. Phillips (1992)
analyses a market model with two periods, in which there is not enough room
for two ﬁrms in the second stage. Predation in the ﬁrst stage is one (costly) way
to lead to a rival’s exit. His model uses the idea that debt ﬁnance is more costly
than internal funds in a duopoly model, and a ﬁrm may want to incur debt to
drain its future funds, and therewith signal to its rivals that there is no need for
predation, as it will not be able to proﬁtably ﬁnance its second period investment.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model and the contracting
problems are introduced in Section 3.2. We ﬁrst analyse a monopolist’s choice
of ﬁnancial contract and then output, solving for his equilibrium strategy by
backwards induction (we set up the mechanism design problem in Appendix A).
in Section 3.3 we show how problems of asymmetric information (after the ﬁrm’s
output choice) structure the ﬁnancial contract. In Section 3.4 we analyse the
ﬁrm’s output choice (given the contract), and the preceeding contract choice
decision. We show how our results extend to the case of a duopoly in Section 3.5.
The empirical implications of our model are discussed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7
concludes.
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3.2 The Model
There are two players, an entrepreneur (E) who can start a project, and an
investor (I). Both are risk neutral. The timing is as follows:
1. E owns retained earnings k0 (if k0 < 0, we will also speak of ‘inherited
debt’). He can oﬀer a ﬁnancial contract to I to borrow k1. I can accept or
reject.
2. E produces output q at cost c · q ≤ k0 + k1. I cannot observe E’s choice of
q.
3. E oﬀers his output q for sale in a market with stochastic demand. The
realised price is max{0, θ − q}, where θ is a stochastic intercept uniformly
distributed over [a − ε, a + ε]. Thus, E’s earnings are max{0, q(θ − q)}.
While the distribution of θ is common knowledge, only E, but not I, can
observe θ and the earnings.
4. The project can be terminated or continued. If the project is continued,
E earns an additional payoﬀ π2. If it is terminated, there is no additional
payoﬀ.
Notice that E produces some output and is then committed to selling every
single unit in the market, at price zero if necessary. In reality E would want to
destroy part of the output if he learns that demand is weak, to maximise his
proﬁt. For instance, the output could be perishable goods (e.g. fashion items,
bestsellers, etc.) and once the output is inside the retail distribution network E
cannot control or recall it anymore. Similarly, E cannot produce to order, or store
some of the redundant output for later sales (as the diamond cartel seems to do).
We analyse the extreme case in which all output that is produced is actually sold,
even at a price of zero, because it greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. We believe that
this assumption does not aﬀect our results qualitatively. We plan to use a richer
model at a later stage, in which we also analyse issues of predation: a ﬁnancially
sound ﬁrm may want to dump large quantities into the market if its rival is highly
indebted, because driving the rival into bankruptcy means being able to enjoy a
monopoly in future periods.
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If q and θ were observable and veriﬁable, E and I could agree to produce the
proﬁt–maximizing quantity
q¯ = argmax
q
∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ − c · q (3.1)
=
2
3
(a+ ε)− 1
3
√
(a+ ε)2 + 12cε.
Assuming that it is proﬁtable (in expected terms) to do so, E and I could also
agree on a division of proﬁts (depending on θ) such that both break even on
average.
However, q and θ are unobservable, and the contract cannot be made directly
contingent on these values, nor on the ﬁrm’s earnings. This severely constrains
the set of ﬁnancial contracts, under which both parties break even on average.
Due to Limited Liability constraints, a contract cannot force E to pay out more
than the project earned. The uncontingent repayment stipulated in the contract
must therefore be no higher than the earnings that the project generates if the
worst state of the world was realised. If E produces some output q ≥ a − ε, the
earnings are zero if θ ≤ a− ε, and so must be the repayment — borrowing with
uncontingent contracts is only feasible if the contract induces an output choice
q < a− ε.
While the realisations of q and θ may be unobservable, the parties can ex-
change messages about the realisations, and the latter are veriﬁable. Further-
more, a contract can specify transfer payments, and it can be made contingent
on certain transfer payments. Finally, a contract can make use of randomising
devices. The size of the space of possible contracts is very large, which makes
the search for the optimal contract quite diﬃcult, but we can simplify the task
by making use of the Revelation Principle. With its use, we can determine an
upper bound to the expected payoﬀ that E might expect from any contract. As
will be shown below, this highest payoﬀ can be achieved by use of a very simple
contract (see Proposition 3.2), which resembles a standard debt contract.
The standard mechanism design approach is to add ‘message games’ to a given
game form: Whenever a player obtains new information, which is not shared by
the other player, a mechanism (“contract”) may make use of messages about this
new information. Instead of being directly contingent on the information itself,
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the contract is contingent on messages about it. Obviously, a party with private
information may try to misrepresent it, and the optimal contract has to take this
possibility into account.
Nontrivial message games can be added to our game (as deﬁned above) after
two arrivals of private information: Firstly, E’s quantity decision q is not observed
by I. Secondly, only E can observe the realisation of θ. We solve for the optimal
contract using backwards induction: The optimal contract is supposed to induce
some output choice q and some repayment (as a function of θ), i.e. both parties
expect these actions to be taken, and we require that at no time the players have
an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium behaviour.
The design of an optimal contract, and the use of the Revelation Principle,
are complicated by the fact that E has to choose two actions sequentially. It
is well known that the application of the Revelation Principle is less straight-
forward with extensive form games, as compared with normal form games (see
e.g. Myerson (1986)). Complications may arise as the extensive form allows for
‘multistage’ manipulations, and one must check that no player has an incentive to
misrepresent his information at an early stage, only to (proﬁtably) misrepresent
other information at a later stage. On the other hand, some forms of misrepre-
sentation may not always be available at later stages, which may limit the set of
incentive constraints that an optimal contract has to take into consideration.
The optimal contract and the ﬁnancial and output decisions are analysed
in the two next Sections. In Section 3.3 we assume that the parties want to
sign a contract which induces some output choice q, and determine a ﬁnancial
contract which ﬁrstly leads to this output choice, and which secondly is optimal:
it maximises the payoﬀ of the party who proposes the contract, while the other
party breaks even in expected terms. In Section 3.4 we identify a simple contract
which resembles a debt contract, and which has the same strategic properties as
the optimal contract derived in Section 3.3 (it leads to the same payoﬀs and to the
same revelation of information). We determine the set of feasible contracts, and
we show that this is equivalent to determining the set of implementable output
decisions. Given this set of feasible alternatives, we analyse E’s contract and
output choice.
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3.3 Financial Contracts: The Monopoly Case
Let us start by explaining what complications one may expect. Given the infor-
mation structure described in Section 3.2, E ﬁrst decides on q, and then he can
send two messages: one after his choice of q but before θ is realised, the other
after θ has been realised. Depending on each message, the mechanism might also
deﬁne payments that one party has to make to the other. It could therefore be
the case that some messages are not feasible under certain circumstances, because
the corresponding transfers cannot be made. For instance, assume that when de-
ciding what quantity to produce, E owns some amount of money k, and that he
produces output q at cost c · q. The mechanism could require that after sending
the ﬁrst message E pays all his cash to I — he would be unable to claim (as part
of his message) to have produced qˆ < q, as he would not be able to transfer k− qˆ.
As we will show below, these problems will not arise, i.e. the entrepreneur has
no incentive at any stage to deviate from either the quantity choice that the con-
tract is meant to induce, or from truthtelling. We proceed in two steps. First we
analyse the requirements that the truthtelling constraints impose on an optimal
contract (Lemma 3.1). Then we consider the entrepreneur’s output choice prob-
lem, after having signed a ﬁnancial contract which satisﬁes those requirements,
and ﬁnd that E’s output choice is uniquely determined by the amount he borrows
(Lemma 3.2). Proposition 3.1 then characterises the optimal ﬁnancial contract
that E will oﬀer to I, if he intends to produce some output q.
In the Appendix, we show that the Revelation Principle can indeed be applied
to our problem, and that the ‘multistage’ complications are not relevant. We
deﬁne a game form for the direct mechanism, and solve for the best mechanism
by backward induction, making sure that ‘truthtelling’ is indeed an equilibrium
at every stage. Lemma 3.1 summarises the results of analysing the two revelation
stages:
Lemma 3.1 (Structure of the Optimal Direct Mechanism) Assume that
E has produced an output q ≤ (k0+k1)/c in stage I, and that the realised state of
the world is θ. Consider a direct mechanism with announcements q˜ and θˆ. Denote
by r(θˆ|q˜) the payment that E has to make if he announces ﬁrst q˜, and then θˆ, and
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by β(θˆ|q˜) the corresponding probability that the project can be continued, i.e. that
E can earn the additional payoﬀ π2. Finally, let δ˜ := k0 + k1 − cq˜ ≥ 0 be E’s
‘savings’, i.e. the amount that was not spent if q˜ < k0+k1
c
.
Then this direct mechanism is optimal, and it leads to truthful revelation of
both q and of the realised state of the world θ, if it has the following structure.
r(θˆ|q˜) = min
{
D , δ˜ + q˜(θˆ − q˜)
}
, (3.2)
β(θˆ|q˜) = min
{
1 , 1− D
π2
+
δ˜ + q˜(θˆ − q˜)
π2
}
, (3.3)
where D is a constant, i.e. independent of both q˜ and θˆ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Lemma 3.1 is that E tries to maximise his monetary
repayment, in exchange for a higher probability of being rewarded (of earning
π2). The contract uses π2 as a ‘hostage’, which E can buy back from I, if his
funds are suﬃciently high. E has the choice of repaying either with money, or
with ‘pain’: the Investor does not derive any utility from liquidating, which there-
fore represents a deadweight loss. The optimal contract aims at minimising the
probability that this happens, by requiring that after bad outcomes E transfers
as much money as possible to I.
There is no scope for renegotiation of the threat to liquidate, if the repay-
ment is insuﬃcient, even though liquidating is wasteful. Our model could be
reformulated in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), who analyse a twice
repeated funding problem. Lending in the second period is unproﬁtable for the
lender, since due to the unobservability of the borrower’s earnings, the latter can
always claim to have earned very little. However, borrowing in the second period
is highly proﬁtable for the borrower. The lender can commit to lending in the
second period, if the repayment in the ﬁrst period was suﬃciently high. The sec-
ond loan is used as a hostage, and renegotiation is made diﬃcult by the fact that
‘returning the hostage’ (i.e. providing the second loan) is costly for the lender.
In our model we analyse a limit case of this setup, by setting the lender’s loss–
from–lending in the second period equal to zero, while the proﬁt of the borrower
is a (positive) constant, π2.
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Given the structure that truthtelling imposes on the best direct mechanism,
what is E’s output choice? We can construct his expected payoﬀ for any choice of
q that he can ﬁnance (recall that c · q cannot be higher than k0 + k1). Given the
mechanism as described in Lemma 3.1, the project is continued with probability
one only if the earnings and savings are suﬃcient to repayD, i.e. if q(θ−q)+δ ≥ D.
In all other cases E hands over all money and the project is continued with
probability β, as described in Lemma 3.1. E has an expected payoﬀ of
EU(q) =
∫ q
a−ε
(
1− D
π2
+
δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ (3.4)
+
∫ D−δ
q
+q
q
(
1− D
π2
+
q(θ − q) + δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ
+
∫ a+ε
D−δ
q
+q
(π2 −D + δ + q(θ − q)) 1
2ε
dθ.
The ﬁrst integral contains payoﬀs for the cases in which θ ≤ q. In these cases
the earnings are zero and the continuation probability is constant. The second
integral contains payoﬀs if the earnings are positive but not suﬃcient to repay D:
θ ∈
(
q,
D − δ
q
+ q
)
⇔ δ ≤ q(θ − q) + δ ≤ D. (3.5)
The third integral contains E’s payoﬀs if the earnings are suﬃcient to repay
D, and therefore β(θ) = 1. We can simplify (3.4), and substitute δ:
EU(q) = π2 −D +
∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ + k0 + k1 − cq. (3.6)
Note that the payoﬀ function (3.6) is identical, up to a constant, with E’s payoﬀ
function if his funds k0 were unlimited:
EU(q) =
∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ + k0 − cq + π2. (3.7)
If we compare the ﬁrst order conditions for the two maximisation problems, we
see that they are identical, and we can conclude:
Lemma 3.2 Assume that E has signed a ﬁnancial contract with the structure
described in Lemma 3.1. Then his output choice is uniquely determined by the
amount k1 that he borrows:
if k0 + k1 < c · q¯, E produces q = k0+k1c < q¯
while if k0 + k1 ≥ c · q¯, he produces exactly q¯.
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Proof:
From the deﬁnition of q¯ we know that E’s ﬁrst order condition at the quantity
choice stage is positive if q < q¯ and negative otherwise. Thus, he will produce
q = q¯, if this is feasible, and the highest feasible output otherwise.
We had noted above that once a ﬁnancial contract has been signed, the debt
level per se has no eﬀect on the output decision. From Lemma 3.2, however, we
can conclude that there is an indirect eﬀect of debt on E’s output choice. The
latter is constrained by the size of the available funds, i.e. by the size of k1, and
this is of course correlated with D.
This result is important not only because of the implications discussed above
(We will discuss this result in more detail in Section 3.6). It also means that when
the borrowed amount is determined, the parties also determine the quantity that
will be produced. While the two decisions (the oﬀer of a ﬁnancial contract, i.e.
of a loan, and the output choice) are made sequentially, and should therefore be
independent, the link via the availability of funds is so strong that — technically
— the two decisions are made simultaneously.
At this point it is worth pointing out the following simplyfying result:
Lemma 3.3 Without loss of generality, an optimal contract will provide for Max-
imum Equity Participation, i.e. the entrepreneur invests all his retained earnings
k0.
Proof:
Suppose that E borrows k1 and the intention of the contract is that he produces
some output q < (k0+k1)/c, thus retaining δ := k0+k1−cq for later repayments.
δ is not ‘riskless debt’: as E’s output choice is not contractable, he could invest
the whole borrowed amount and would choose to do so if k0 + k1 ≤ cq¯. If this
would hurt the Investor, she would not accept the contract initially. While if the
Investor gains, the Entrepreneur could design a diﬀerent contract, under which
the Investor’s participation constraint is binding, and increase his own payoﬀ.
Thus, if E wants to produce some output q, he can do so by designing a
contract such that k0 + k1 = cq ≤ cq¯ (Lemmata 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3), and D is
suﬃciently high, such that the Investor breaks even. This is summarised in the
following Proposition:
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Proposition 3.1 The best direct mechanism that E can design to implement an
output q ≤ q¯ consists of β and r, as described in Lemma 3.1, a borrowed amount
k1 = cq¯ − k0, and the smallest value of D (the promised repayment) such that
(1) D ≤ π2, and
(2) q, k1, and D solve I’s participation constraint with equality:∫ D
q
+q
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ +
∫ a+ε
D
q
+q
D
1
2ε
dθ − k1 = 0. (3.8)
Proof:
Follows from Lemmata 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, and the fact that E has all bargaining
power when the contract is designed. D may not be larger than π2 as otherwise
E would always claim that the earnings were zero.
Note that complications may arise if for the optimal output q the promised
repayment D is too large, compared with π2 (part (2) of Proposition 3.1 is satis-
ﬁed, but part (1) is violated). The last requirement in Proposition 3.1 constrains
the set of feasible contracts but it does not prevent E from being ﬁnanced. If
D (as deﬁned in (3.8)) is larger than π2, both D and k1 (and therefore q) have
to be reduced, until D = π2. Solving (3.8) with D = π2 and q = (k0 + k1)/c
for k1 yields the highest amount that E can borrow (in this case, β(θ) = 0 for
all θ ≤ q). Our results remain valid, however. The additional constraint does
not aﬀect the truthtelling constraints when θ has to be announced, because the
structure in Lemma 3.1 is preserved. The same holds for the revelation of q,
since D is constant. At the quantity choice stage nothing is changed since even
without this additional constraint E’s choice is a corner solution: the quantity
that he can produce is determined by (k0 + k1), and it is probably smaller than
what he would like to produce (q¯). From here onwards, we ignore the possibility
that the optimal D may be too large, by assuming that π2 is always suﬃciently
large.
3.4 AMonopolist’s Contract and Output Choice
In Section 3.3 we have derived the structure of an optimal ﬁnancial contract which
induces an output choice q by the Entrepreneur, and makes sure that the Investor
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breaks even in expected terms. The former decision is not straightforward to
implement, as E’s output choice is unobservable. The latter result (the Investor
breaks even) is similarly diﬃcult to obtain, as E’s earnings are unobservable, and
he must be provided with an incentive to admit that there were some earnings,
and to pay out some of it to the Investor.
The contract uses the future payoﬀs that E gains from the project as a
‘hostage’: if E claims that the earnings were low, and therefore repays little,
his project is terminated with a probability that is increasing in the ﬁnancial
shortfall. In the optimum, E is indiﬀerent between revealing the true earnings
(and making the corresponding repayment) and claiming that the earnings were
lower than they actually are (the repayment would be smaller, but so would be
the continuation probability). With the optimum contract described in Lemma
3.1 and Proposition 3.1 E weakly prefers to reveal the realised state of the world
(i.e. his earnings). This contract looks somewhat abstract, but we can construct
a much simpler mechanism which leads to exactly the same incentives and out-
comes:
Proposition 3.2 (Structure of an Optimal General Mechanism) If E
wants to produce some output q, he can achieve his highest payoﬀ by oﬀering
the following contract:
§1 E borrows k1 from I, where k1 = cq − k0
§2 E promises to repay D to I
§3 If E repays less, his ﬁrm is liquidated with probability (1− β), where (if we
denote with $ the repayment)
β($) = 1− D
π2
+
$
π2
. (3.9)
Proof:
The mechanism achieves the same outcomes as the one that was derived in Section
3.3, and the Entrepreneur’s incentives are unchanged.
The contract described in Proposition 3.2 has much similarity with a standard
debt contract. I is only interested in E’s cash holdings after he has sold his
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products in the market. The contract need not specify an output or include any
message games around the chosen output level. Similarly, the state of the world
is only of indirect interest. The contract has an additional, more realistic feature:
failing to repay 99% of a debt obligation is ‘worse’ than failing to repay 1%, as
the probability of liquidation (1−β) is increasing in the share of debt that is not
repaid.
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Figure 3.1: Repayment and continuation probability as a function of earnings
The repayment and continuation functions are depicted in Figure 3.1. E is
‘bankrupt’ if his earnings are below D, and in this case the continuation proba-
bility is less than one. The top graph shows E’s payment to I, either D, or all
earnings (if R < D). The bottom graph shows the continuation probability β,
which is increasing in the repayment and exactly one if D is repaid. Note that
even if the earnings and therefore also the repayment are zero, β may neverthe-
less be positive. This follows from the fact that E tries to maximise the expected
probability of continuation (we would observe β(0) = 0 if π2 is ‘small’, see the
discussion after Proposition 3.1).
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Proposition 3.2 almost concludes the application of the Revelation Principle
to our model, which we discussed in Section 3.3. The aim had been to ﬁnd the
optimal contract, i.e. the best contract that E might possibly design. The solution
to the ‘related’ problem of ﬁnding the optimal direct mechanism provided us with
an upper bound to what E can achieve, and left us with the need to characterise
a mechanism that actually implements this ‘best’ outcome. One example for such
a ‘more general’ optimal mechanism is the contract above: For each output that
E wants to produce, we can either determine a contract that allows him to do so,
or we can be sure that this output is not feasible.
What remains to be determined is ﬁrstly the set of implementable outputs, i.e.
which outputs q E can credibly commit to produce, if he proposes some optimal
contract. This contract must make it feasible to produce that output (i.e. the
borrowed amount must be suﬃciently high), and E must have the incentive to
produce that output, given his cash holdings (for instance, a promise to produce
q > q¯ is not credible, because E would prefer to produce exactly q¯).
From here on, we will consider both positive and negative levels of retained
earnings k0. If k0 < 0, we interpret it as ‘inherited debt’, which must be paid oﬀ
if the project is to be continued.
Lemma 3.4 A lower bound to the output levels that can be implemented by an
optimal contract is determined by
q ≥
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
k0
c
if k0 ≥ 0
q(k0) if k0 ≤ 0
(3.10)
where q(k0) ∈ [0, q¯] is the smallest nonnegative solution (if it exists) to∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ − cq ≥ −k0. (3.11)
If k0 < 0 and there is no q ∈ [0, q¯] which satisﬁes (3.11), then the project cannot
be ﬁnanced for any output level.
Proof:
From Lemma 3.2 follows that E will produce q = (k0 + k1)/c as long as this is
less than q¯. If k0 ≥ 0, the ﬁrst part follows trivially. For k0 < 0, we have to
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consider the project’s net returns, and compare these with the cost of repaying
(rolling over) the ‘inherited debt’. Since the net returns that a project generates
are increasing in q if q ∈ [0, q¯], the smallest implementable q is found by assuming
that all earnings are handed over, and solving (3.11) for q with equality. If the
smallest positive solution is higher than q¯, ﬁnancing is not feasible, since E cannot
credibly commit to both invest some q > q¯ and repaying.
(Note that none of the parties will want to implement some q < a − ε, as with
q ≤ a − ε all borrowed funds constitute riskless debt. However, implementing
some q < a− ε is possible, by setting k0 + k1 < c(a− ε).)
We denote the highest level of inherited debt with k0, i.e. k0 is the most
negative level of retained earnings k0 which can still be reﬁnanced. If k0 = k0,
then all earnings are handed over to the Investor, whatever the state of the world
(θ) is. Formally, D = q¯(a + ε − q¯), i.e. E promises to repay an amount that
is equal to his earnings in the best state of the world. By deﬁnition, we must
have θ1 = a + ε, and therefore the probability that E is not bankrupt (that he
can repay his loan) is zero. Furthermore, it must be the case that the output
is q¯: smaller outputs reduce the expected earnings of the project, and therefore
violate the Investor’s participation constraint; higher outputs than q¯ cannot be
implemented because E would choose q¯ at the output–choice stage.
Two further constraints (additionally to Lemma 3.4) have been derived in
Section 3.3. We restate them here:
Lemma 3.5 No output q > q¯ can be implemented.
Lemma 3.6 Incentive compatibility requires that D ≤ π2.
Both constraints in Lemmata 3.5 and 3.6 are imposed on E’s maximisation
program as boundary conditions, i.e. if the optimal choice of q for some k0 lies
outside the boundary, E will have to pick some corner solution (we have discussed
the constraint D ≤ π2 in more detail after Proposition 3.1).
We noted after Lemma 3.2, that the debt level has an indirect eﬀect on E’s out-
put choice, as the latter is constrained by the size of the available funds (k0+k1).
This implies that when E chooses the amount that he borrows, he simultane-
ously chooses the quantity that he will produce. For simplicity, we assume in
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the following that E chooses an output q that he wants to produce, and thereby
determines the amount that he borrows by setting k1 = cq − k0.
Proposition 3.3 If E is ﬁnancially constrained, i.e. if k0 < c · q¯, he chooses to
borrow less than he would need to produce the deep pocket output q¯, and therefore
his output will be strictly smaller than q¯.
Proof:
See the Appendix.
(There is one exception to Proposition 3.3, to which we will come back when
discussing Proposition 3.4 below).
The reason for this underinvestment is that external ﬁnance is strictly more
costly than internal funds:
Corollary 3.1 The marginal costs of expanding output are strictly higher if the
funds for such an expansion are borrowed.
Proof:
We want to show that (∂D/∂q) > c, as the former is the marginal cost of ex-
panding output if funds are borrowed (see Appendix B). Using D := q(θ1 − q),
∂D
∂q
= −
∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ − c(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
) , (3.12)
which is larger than c if∫ θ1
q
(θ − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ −
∫ θ1
a−ε
c
1
2ε
dθ < 0. (3.13)
From the Proof of Proposition 3.3 we know that this is the case in equilibrium.
The marginal costs of increasing output are higher with debt ﬁnance because
of the deadweight loss that arises if the project has to be liquidated. The informa-
tional problems require that with the optimal contract the size of the ‘payment’
that E has to make is identical for all states of the world θ. If θ is low, some of
this ‘payment’ will be made in liquidation probability: if E cannot repay D with
his earnings, the contract ﬁlls in the shortfall with (1 − β(θ))π2, and E ‘pays in
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pain units’, instead of cash. Since the lender breaks even in expected terms with
the optimal contract, the increase of the marginal costs is uniquely due to the
deadweight loss.
Corollary 3.2 The Entrepreneur (E) is not credit constrained. The Investor
would be willing to provide more funds to increase his output, but E chooses to
limit his borrowing. In particular, for intermediate levels of retained earnings, E
chooses not borrow at all: There is a k˜0 ∈ (0, c · q¯) such that for all k0 ∈ [k˜0, c · q¯],
E produces q = (k0/c).
Proof:
Follows from Lemmata 3.2 and 3.4 (which determine the set of feasible contracts),
and the strictness of the result in Proposition 3.3. If there is a feasible contract
with q < q¯, then increasing q also increases the net total returns from the project.
Therefore a higher output q˜ ∈ (q, q¯] must be feasible, as well.
The reason for the lenders’ willingness to provide funds is that E would re-
ally invest the additional funds (see Lemma 3.2), and would therefore generate
suﬃcient earnings to repay a higher level of D. E does not take on more funds,
because borrowing makes output expansions more expensive: it increases the
marginal costs of production, as was shown in Corollary 3.2. This can be seen
most strikingly if the retained earnings are ‘almost’ suﬃcient to produce the out-
put q¯. Here the ﬁrm is not suﬃciently constrained, and it prefers not to borrow
at all.
After having established this underinvestment result, we can study E’s con-
tract/output choice in more detail. In Proposition 3.4 we show that the output
is not monotonic in E’s ﬁnancial constraints:
Proposition 3.4 If E has small retained earnings or little inherited debt, his
output is decreasing in his ﬁnancial constraints, i.e. increasing in retained earn-
ings and decreasing in inherited debt. If E has large retained debt, however, his
output is increasing in the level of inherited debt. More precisely, there is a
k̂0 ∈ (k0, 0) such that for all k0 ∈ (k̂0, c · q¯], output q is increasing in k0, while for
all k0 ∈ [k0, k̂0), output q is decreasing in k0.
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Proof: See Appendix B.
The ﬁrst part of this result is very intuitive. Financial constraints are a
handicap for the ﬁrm, because of the increase of the costs of borrowing which
was described in Corollary 3.1. (in terms of the payoﬀ π2 which is lost in the
event of bankruptcy).
For strongly negative values of k0, E is extremely constrained by the lender’s
participation constraint. He would like to borrow little (to decrease the proba-
bility of bankruptcy), but he must produce large outputs by borrowing more, as
only by doing so he can repay enough to ﬁnance both the inherited debt and the
production costs. This eﬀect drives up E’s quantity choice as k0 becomes more
and more negative: increasing output actually decreases the costs of capital, and
the tradeoﬀ between high current earnings vs. high continuation probability is
not a tradeoﬀ anymore: both goals are achieved by increasing q (to some extent).
The same eﬀect determines the lower bound q to the set of feasible outputs if k0
is negative. The minimal output is increasing in inherited debt (i.e. decreasing
in k0 if k0 < 0), as is described in Lemma 3.4.
As before, Proposition 3.1 applies, and the analysis can become more diﬃcult
is π2 is small. Suppose that k0 is strongly negative, i.e. close to k0. The lender’s
participation constraint determines the minimal output that must be produced,
such that a lending contract is feasible at all. It also determines the promised
repayment D. Now, with D > π2, a ﬁnancial contract is not viable. The highest
level of initial debt that can be reﬁnanced is thus bounded not only by the lender’s
participation constraint, but also by the requirement that it be satisﬁed if D = π2.
We can summarise Lemmata 3.4 and 3.5 and Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 in
Figure 3.2. The area inside the dotted lines is the set of outputs that can be
induced by some optimal contract. For positive levels of k0 it is constrained by
the loan being needed, i.e. by the requirement that c ·q > k0, as otherwise E could
rely on his retained earnings, only. If k0 < 0, the smallest output that can be
sustained is q(k0), as deﬁned in Lemma 3.4. In any case, no output q > q¯ can
be induced, as was shown in Lemma 3.5, as at the output choice stage E would
never choose an output larger than q¯.
For high values of k0, the ﬁrm is not ﬁnancially constrained, and it chooses
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Figure 3.2: Output as a function of retained earnings / inherited debt
to produce q¯. For lower retained earnings, the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained, but
nevertheless does not want to borrow to increase its output. Instead, it relies on
its retained earnings to produce some output (k0/c). A ﬁrm with small retained
earnings ﬁnds it advantageous to borrow, as in the tradeoﬀ between survival
and current earnings the current earnings become more attractive. Caution,
however, leads these ﬁrms to limit the extent of their borrowing. In particular,
the produced quantities decrease, as k0 decreases. The same holds if k0 is negative
— we interpret this as ‘inherited debt’, which must be paid oﬀ if the ﬁrm is to
be continued. Increasing levels of initial debt should make the ﬁrm more and
more conservative, i.e. it wants to reduce its output. At the same time, however,
the lender’s participation constraint must be satisﬁed: the quantity that the
borrower would want to produce cannot generate suﬃcient earnings to cover the
costs of both rolling over the initial debt and the production costs. In this range,
a continuation of the ﬁrm is only feasible if it borrows more than it would like,
i.e. ﬁrm must become ‘suicidal’ to survive.
3.5 The Duopoly Case
Assume now that there are two ﬁrms 1 and 2 which produce homogeneous goods
at output levels q1 and q2, respectively. Assume that the (stochastic) demand
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function is now
p(q1, q2) = max{0, θ − q1 − q2}. (3.14)
Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which both ﬁrms have unbounded internal funds.
For notational ease we consider Firm 2’s maximisation problem:
max
q2
∫ a+ε
q1+q2
q2(θ − q1 − q2) 1
2ε
dθ − c · q2 + k20 + π2. (3.15)
Its ﬁrst order condition is∫ a+ε
q1+q2
(θ − q1 − 2q2) 1
2ε
dθ − c =! 0. (3.16)
We can derive the reaction curve,
q2(q1) =
2
3
(a+ ε− q1)− 1
3
√
(a + ε− q1)2 + 12εc (3.17)
and ﬁnd that the problem is well behaved: the reaction curves are negatively
sloped, and they are ‘ﬂat’: |∂q2/∂q1| < 1, which can be found diﬀerentiating
either (3.17) or the integral of (3.16), and noting that a + ε− q1 − q2 > 0:
∂q2
∂q1
= −2
3
+
a+ ε− q1
3
√
(a+ ε− q1)2 + 12εc
= − a+ ε− q
1 − 2q2
2a + 2ε− 2q1 − 3q2 (3.18)
(the slope must therefore lie between −2
3
and −1
3
). The symmetric equilibrium
output is
q∗ :=
3
8
(a+ ε)− 1
8
√
(a + ε)2 + 32cε. (3.19)
By looking at the reaction curves we could repeat the analysis of Sections 3.3
and 3.4, as the rival’s output is taken as constant in the above analysis. We
assume that Firm 1 is ﬁnancially constrained, while Firm 2 is not. Thus, k0 and
k1 without superscripts refer to Firm 1 from here on.
As in the case of a monopolistic ﬁrm, we solve the game by backwards induc-
tion, starting with the last stage, in which the Firm 1 has to reveal its earnings,
back to the ﬁrst stage, in which it oﬀers a ﬁnancial contract to an Investor.
One can easily verify that the following holds:
Proposition 3.5 With one ﬁnancially constrained and one unconstrained ﬁrm,
the equilibrium ﬁnancial contract has the structure described in Section 3.3 and
Proposition 3.2.
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The contract is unchanged because its structure was derived from incentive con-
straints after some output has been chosen. This led to the structure described in
Proposition 3.2, and other incentive problems may, but need not, add structure
to the contract.
As in the monopoly case, one can easily show that the amount of borrowing
only determines the output that Firm 1 can choose, but not which output it may
want to choose (cf. Lemma 3.2):
Proposition 3.6 Assume that Firm 1 has signed a ﬁnancial contract as de-
scribed in Proposition 3.2. Then its output choice is uniquely determined by the
amount k1 that it borrows:
if k0 + k1 < c · q∗, Firm 1 produces q1 = k0+k1c < q∗
while if k0 + k1 ≥ c · q∗, it produces exactly q∗.
In other words, a ﬁnancially constrained Firm 1 that borrows ‘too much’ is not
constrained at the output choice stage, and an output higher than q∗ (the Cournot
equilibrium output) cannot be a Nash equilibrium for this subgame. On the other
hand, if it remains constrained, it is committed to produce as much as possible.
Formally, Firm 1’s reaction curve at the output choice stage is kinked downwards
(to become vertical) at q1 = (k0+k1)/c, while Firm 2’s reaction curve is unchanged
(cf. Figure 3.3). If the kink lies to the left of q1 = q∗, Firm 1 is committed to spend
everything on production, and the equilibrium output choice (for this subgame)
is the intersection of the (kinked for Firm 1) reaction curves. If the kink lies to
the right of q1 = q∗, however, Firm 1 cannot commit to spend everything, and
the equilibrium output choices (for this subgame) will be q1 = q2 = q∗.
The analysis of a ﬁrm’s borrowing and output decisions is more complicated
in the duopoly setup, because the timing of the model gives it a possibility to
(sometimes) precommit to some output q1. From the analysis above we know that
if Firm 1 borrows less than it would need to produce the deep–pocket output, at
the output–setting stage it will spend all cash holdings on producing output. We
have implicitly assumed that ﬁnancial contracts are observable. Firm 2 there-
fore can only react to Firm 1’s output choice, which was made earlier, at the
contracting stage.
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Figure 3.3: Reaction curves at the output choice stage (equilibrium circled).
Thus, as long as its total funds at the output choice stage do not exceed c · q∗,
Firm 1 can choose any output combination (q1, q2) on Firm 2’s reaction curve,
by borrowing just enough to produce q1. Firm 1 has a ‘ﬁrst–mover advantage’ in
this game, as it can commit to some output level before Firm 2 can decide.
However, this ‘ﬁrst–mover advantage’ is of limited value for Firm 1. Where it
would be interesting, the precommitment possibility does not exist: Firm 1 cannot
commit to produce some output that is larger than the Cournot equilibrium
output, and enjoy the beneﬁts of being a Stackelberg–leader: if k0 + k1 > c · q∗,
the kink in the reaction curve of Firm 1 has no eﬀect on the intersection of the
two reaction curves at the quantity–setting stage (cf. Figure 3.3(b)).
Firm 1’s (limited) precommitment possibility complicates the analysis of its
borrowing decision, as it has to take into account a feedback over Firm 2’s reaction
curve. Technically speaking, Firm 2 must substitute Firm 1’s reaction curve (3.17)
for q2 in its maximisation program,
max
q1
∫ a+ε
q1+q2(q1)
q1(θ−q1−q2(q1)) 1
2ε
dθ−q1
(
θ1(q
1, q2(q1))−q1−q2(q1)
)
+π2 (3.20)
s.th. ∫ θ1(q1,q2(q1))
q1+q2(q1)
q1(θ − q1 − q2(q1)) 1
2ε
dθ (3.21)
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+
∫ a+ε
θ1(q1,q2(q1))
q1
(
θ1(q
1, q2(q1))− q1 − q2(q1)
)
1
2ε
dθ − cq1 + k10 = 0,
which complicates its ﬁrst order condition at the contract choice stage.
Lemma 3.7 The (limited) precommitment possibility of Firm 1 increases its in-
centives to borrow, and therefore its output.
Proof:
This can easily be shown by diﬀerentiating (3.20), and collecting the terms with
∂q2/∂q1. The sum of the terms with ∂q2/∂q1 is negative, so is ∂q2/∂q1, and
therefore the ﬁrst order condition becomes more positive.
However, the model still allows for clear results. A major simpliﬁcation of
the algebra is obtained by observing that Firm 1 is monopolist over the ‘residual’
demand function p(q1, q2(q1), θ) (as long as k0 + k1 ≤ q∗):
p(q1, q2(q1), θ) = max
⎧⎨⎩ 0 , θ − q13 − 2(a+ ε)3 +
√
(a + ε− q1)2 + 12εc
3
⎫⎬⎭ .
(3.22)
This ‘new’ demand function is diﬀerentiable, downward sloping and convex. Most
results from the monopoly case can actually be derived for ‘general’ return func-
tions R(q, θ), which we will use in this Section. The only change of notation that
is necessary is the introduction of a value of θ, for which the price is zero given
output q1:
θ(q1) := q1 + q2(q1) =
q1
3
+
a+ ε
3
−
√
(a + ε− q1)2 + 12εc
3
(3.23)
(note that θ(q∗) = q∗ + q∗). We also make an assumption that brings some
‘Cournot’ elements into the earnings function R(·):
Rq1θ(q
1, θ) :=
∂2R(q1, θ)
∂q1∂θ
> 0, (3.24)
where the lower indices refer to partial derivatives. As in the case of a monop-
olistic ﬁrm, we can show that the set of feasible contracts can be characterised
by two parameters, the retained earnings (or inherited debt) k0, and the output
of Firm 1, q1. The set of feasible contracts is constrained by a smallest level of
output q1 if k0 < 0 (deﬁned as in Lemma 3.4), q
1 ≥ (k0/c) and q1 ≤ q∗ (cf.
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Lemma 3.4 and Proposition 3.6, and Figure 3.2). We can also deﬁne the highest
level of inherited debt (k0 < 0 that can be reﬁnanced, which leads to the output
q∗ and promised repayment q∗(a + ε − 2q∗) (Firm 1 will partially default with
probability 1). Finally, the ﬁnancial contract must satisfy D ≤ π2.
We can derive an underinvestment result similar to Proposition 3.3:
Proposition 3.7 If Firm 1 is ﬁnancially constrained, i.e. if k0 < c·q∗, it chooses
to borrow less than it would need to produce the deep pocket output q∗, and there-
fore its output will be strictly smaller than q∗.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The reason for this underinvestment is that the costs of expanding output
are strictly higher with debt–ﬁnanced production (cf. Corollary 3.1): while a
deep–pocket ﬁrm’s marginal costs of expanding output are c, for the ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrm they are
∂D(q1, k0)
∂q1
= −
∫ θ1
θ Rq1(q
1, θ) 1
2ε
dθ − c(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
) , (3.25)
which is strictly larger than c. As in the case of a monopolistic ﬁrm (cf. Corollary
3.2), a ‘slightly’ ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm will not borrow, and instead produce
using its retained earnings, only:
Corollary 3.3 Firm 1 is not credit constrained. The lender would be willing
to provide more funds to increase its output, but Firm 1 chooses to limit its
borrowing. In particular, for intermediate levels of retained earnings, it chooses
not borrow at all: There is a k˜0 ∈ (0, c · q∗) such that for all k0 ∈ [k˜0, c · q∗], Firm
1 produces q1 = (k0/c).
This result points at the need to be precise when talking about credit constraints.
Obviously, Firm 1 is ﬁnancially constrained, as it produces less than it would with
larger retained earnings. At the same time, it does not borrow as much as it could:
for any k0 ≥ k0, a lender would be willing to lend enough to both roll over k0 and
produce q∗.
The only result that cannot be easily reproduced in the duopoly setting is
the u–shaped nonmonotonicity of output as a function of retained earnings (cf.
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ﬁgure 3.2 and Proposition 3.4). However, the slope of q1(k0) can be determined at
the extremes of the nonmonotonicity. At one extreme, Firm 1 decides to default
(partially) with probability 1 (at k0 = k0, with q
1 = q∗ and θ1 = a+ε) because of
its high inherited debt. Here the output is increasing in inherited debt (decreasing
in k0), because in order to be able to generate suﬃcient income to repay both
the production costs and the rolled over debt, output must be high. At the other
extreme, Firm 1 is just indiﬀerent between borrowing an inﬁnitesimal amount and
not borrowing: at k˜0, Firm 1’s production costs equal its retained earnings, i.e.
c · q1 = k˜0, and the slope of q1(k0) is positive. Together with the underinvestment
result (Proposition 3.7) this allows to conclude:
Proposition 3.8 A ﬁrm with intermediate ﬁnancial constraints produces less
than a ﬁrm with extremely small or large ﬁnancial constraints.
Proof: See Appendix C.
3.6 Implications
It is important to note that the underinvestment result is driven by the assump-
tion of costly expansion, i.e. that production costs have to be paid before the
products can be sold. Assume instead that that the variable production costs c
are zero, and that instead the ﬁrms have to ﬁnance some ﬁxed costs K. We can
apply our analysis as before. The optimal contract will again be a contract as
described in Proposition 3.2, consisting of a ﬁxed promised repayment D and a
continuation probability function β. The diﬀerence is that at the output choice
stage Firm 1 is not constrained by the funds that it borrowed, as the expan-
sion costs are zero. Therefore it will always choose the output that a ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrm would choose. One can easily show:
Proposition 3.9 Suppose that c = 0, and that instead Firm 1 must borrow to
ﬁnance ﬁxed costs K. Then current period debt has no eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s output
decision. Furthermore, ﬁnancial constraints have only a zero–one eﬀect on the
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decision: ﬁnancing is either available or not, but it does not aﬀect
the ﬁrm’s output decision otherwise.
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Thus, as long as K−k0 is not too large, Firm 1 can ﬁnd a lender who is willing to
provide a loan. No matter how it obtains the money, the ﬁrm will always produce
the same output that it would choose if it was not ﬁnancially constrained.9 The
upper bound to K is
K =
∫ a+ε
q∗
(c=0)
q∗(c=0)(θ − 2q∗(c=0))
1
2ε
dθ + k0. (3.26)
Note that the underinvestment result with costly expansions is not driven
by the lender’s worries over risk shifting. Even though she can constrain Firm
1’s output choice by reducing the size of the loan, she does not want to do so.
She would be willing to lend a larger amount than she does in equilibrium (cf.
Corollary 3.3), and it is Firm 1 that decides to borrow less (cf. Proposition 3.7).
How do our results compare to those in Brander and Lewis (1986)? From
Proposition 3.6 we can derive:
Corollary 3.4 Firm 1’s desired output does not depend on its ﬁnancial situation.
However, with positive variable costs its actual output choice is limited by the
available funds, k0 + k1. This led to the underinvestment result: while at the
quantity setting stage Firm 1 does not take into consideration the eﬀects of his
decisions on I’s payoﬀ, when oﬀering a contract it has to internalise these eﬀects.
On the other hand, with zero variable costs Firm 1 can choose the desired output
level. This implies that the overinvestment result in Brander and Lewis (1986)
is driven by the exogeneity of the contractual structure. In their model debt
changes the borrower’s incentives at the quantity choice stage, which does not
happen here. Furthermore, if one would introduce production costs which have
to be paid before output can be sold, one should expect that if these costs are
suﬃciently high, the overinvestment result vanishes. In model with debt as an
optimal contract and zero variable costs the overinvestment eﬀect is exactly oﬀset,
while if the variable costs are positive, it is more than oﬀset.
9 This result contrasts with that in Faure–Grimaud (1997), who analyses a similar model,
with the diﬀerence that output is observable but not veriﬁable. He derives an underinvestment
result, which seems to be driven by his implicit assumption that the ﬁnancial and output deci-
sions are simultaneous (when choosing an output level, his ﬁrms take the lenders’ participation
constraints into consideration).
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Brander and Lewis (1986, 1988) also have results on the slope of output as a
function of debt, which, if positive, could be seen as a sign of a ﬁrm’s increased
“agressiveness”. We obtained this type of result in Proposition 3.8: if a ﬁrm’s
initial debt is suﬃciently high, then its output is increasing in this debt level.
In Brander and Lewis (1986), output is increasing in current–period debt, not
in inherited debt, which we regard as a better measure of ﬁnancial constraints. In
Brander and Lewis (1988), bankruptcy costs are added to the 1986 model10. The
result was that with exogenously given debt obligations, a ﬁrm’s output choice is
increasing in the debt level, and it is smaller than the no–debt output if the debt
level is small, and larger otherwise.
This result is not the same as ours, however. Our result is driven by the need
to pre–ﬁnance the output costs and possibly some inherited debt (k0 < 0). If
the latter is high, the project is only viable if a high output level is chosen, as
low outputs cannot generate suﬃciently high expected earnings to let the lender
break even. The “limited-liability eﬀect” in Brander and Lewis (1986,1988) is a
risk shifting result: the borrower’s payoﬀ as a function of the state of the world
becomes a convex function, which gives him an incentive to choose a more risky
strategy — in a Cournot context this would mean a more aggressive strategy.
Under a standard debt contract, a ﬁrm is only interested in the payoﬀ it receives
in the survival states. These are the high–demand states, which are associated
with high marginal proﬁts related to output. Hence, as debt increases, output
increases. Under an optimal debt contract, however, a ﬁrm cares not only about
the states in which it survives for sure (i.e. where β = 1), but also about the
probability of continuation when it cannot repay its loan in full. It turns out that
the gain from increasing quantity in the survival states identiﬁed by Brander
and Lewis is exactly oﬀset by the loss due to a decrease in the probability of
continuation in the bankruptcy states, and without expansion costs the output
decision is unchanged.
10 The model is diﬀerent, but can be reformulated to be more similar to the 1986 model:
their notion of maximizing the value of the ﬁrm is equivalent to maximising the value of equity
while making sure that the debtholders break even.
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If we combine the deﬁnition of q∗ (cf. (3.19)) with the underinvestment result
(Proposition 3.7), we can conclude:
Corollary 3.5 There is no scope for strategic debt, as opposed to debt which is
incurred to ﬁnance some existing costs. A ﬁrm will not borrow and pay out the
loan to its shareholders, as it cannot derive a beneﬁt from doing so.
In Brander and Lewis (1986) the advantage of debt is that it introduces a commit-
ment to be agressive. While this has no advantage in the case of a monopolistic
ﬁrm, in a duopolistic Cournot setup such a commitment is valuable, as it may
force the opponent to reduce its output to that of a Stackelberg–follower, thereby
increasing the indebted ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
In our model, however, this commitment is not available in this form. Debt
has no eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s desired output level, as we had shown in Corollary
3.4. Additionally, it may even be connected with reduced ‘agressiveness’, if the
ﬁrm decided to borrow to ﬁnance a costly output expansion. The ﬁrst–mover
advantage modeled in Brander and Lewis (1986) exists, but only where Firm 1
is handicapped and forced to produce less than a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm.
We can analyse the eﬀect of Firm 1’s retained earnings or inherited debt on
the value of the ﬁrms. We consider the market capitalisation, i.e. the sum of
debt and share value. Since the value of debt is exactly zero in our model, this is
equivalent to looking at the share value, only.
Proposition 3.10 The value of Firm 1 increases in its retained earnings (k0 >
0) and decreases in its inherited debt (k0 < 0). The eﬀect on the value of its ﬁnan-
cially unconstrained rival Firm 2 is unclear: it may either increase or decrease
in k0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
This result explains the result in Corollary 3.5, that a ﬁrm will not issue
‘strategic debt’. If its value were decreasing in k0 over some interval [k
a
0 , k
b
0], it
would pay for Firm 1 to issue some strategic debt, if it had retained earnings kb0.
It could borrow kb0− ka0 and distribute it to its shareholders, and only then apply
for a loan to reﬁnance ka0 and cover its production costs c · q1(ka0).
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The nonmonotonicity of q1 in k0 explains the second part of the result: the
value of Firm 2 must be decreasing in Firm 1’s output, and therefore it varies with
q1. Therefore, it will also be diﬃcult to derive results on the aggregate market
capitalisation of an industry as a function of the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial constraints.
The result that output is nonmonotonic in k0, and that this function may be
u–shaped, could have several interesting implications, which we plan to analyse
at a later stage.
For instance, if two ﬁrms have to pay oﬀ signiﬁcant levels of initial debt, before
they can produce, then we might observe that the more ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrm is more aggressive than its competitor. This is a situation in which a ﬁ-
nancially constrained ﬁrm would like to be cautious and produce little, but its
ﬁnancial situation forces it to become aggressive. This could be a factor working
against debt–ﬁnanced predation. Suppose that two ﬁrms are ﬁnancially con-
strained to diﬀerent degrees: the ‘stronger’ ﬁrm may forgo a possibility to ‘hurt’
its competitor, as an attempt to do so could easily backﬁre (a similar eﬀect has
been modeled by Glazer (1994)).
On the other hand, it could be that a more general model could explain preda-
tory behaviour. Consider two ﬁrms, with Firm 1 being “almost” ﬁnancially con-
strained, while Firm 2 is unconstrained. Then it may pay for Firm 2 to increase
its output in that period, such that the price is low (as in Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990)). With minimal retained earnings in the next period, Firm 1 is forced to
borrow, and therefore reduce its output below q∗. Firm 1’s ﬁnancial constraints
may last for several periods, not only due to bad luck, but also because a high
probability of bankruptcy in the future decreases the value of future production,
which we had modeled as π2. A small value of π2 reduces D, the amount that
Firm 1 can promise to repay, and therefore Firm 1’s borrowing capability. Thus,
by hurting an opponent, a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm may force it to remain
a ﬁnancially constrained small ﬁrm for a while, shifting the output structure
towards something that to an outsider looks like a Stackelberg–leader/follower
situation.11
11 This would be the continuous analogy to ‘predation’ in the discrete Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990) model.
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The result that output can be increasing in inherited debt (if the latter is
suﬃciently high) might explain some ‘outliers’ which are reported in the empirical
literature. While most other empirical studies conclude that debt weakens a
ﬁrm’s competitive position, Borenstein and Rose (1995) ﬁnd that almost bankrupt
(i.e. highly leveraged) U.S. airlines became aggressive, compared with their less
leveraged competitors, after the industry was deregulated. Our model contains
elements of both: ﬁnancial constraints make a ﬁrm weaker, but if the constraints
become strong, they force a ﬁrm to become aggressive.
Another implication concerns the use of ﬁnancial models in macroeconomics.
Gale (1983) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) have shown that capital market
imperfections can amplify business cycles if a borrower’s credit line depends pos-
itively on his own funds (cf. also Gale and Hellwig (1985)). These models rely
on output being monotonically decreasing in a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints. While
we obtain this result for ﬁrms with positive retained earnings and small inherited
debt, we obtain the contrary in the case of large inherited debt.
We can derive some additional empirical implications of the model.
Proposition 3.11 If one ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained, and the other is not,
the total industry output is (almost always) strictly less than what ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms would produce.
Proof: This is an immediate consequence of the underinvestment result (see
Proposition 3.7) and of the ‘ﬂatness’ of the ﬁnancially uncostrained rival’s re-
action curve (cf. (3.18)). For any output q2, the best response of a ﬁnancially
constrained Firm 1 is smaller than if it were unconstrained, and while as a con-
sequence Firm 2 produces more than q∗ in equilibrium, this increase is smaller
than the decrease of Firm 1’s output. The qualiﬁer “almost always” in Proposi-
tion 3.11 refers to the case where both ﬁrms have the highest possible levels of
inherited debt, i.e. k0 = k0.
The result in Proposition 3.11 should also hold if both ﬁrms are ﬁnancially
constrained. While it is diﬃcult to determine precisely the shape of the reac-
tion curves, we can conclude that the aggregate output is smaller than what
a ﬁnancially unconstrained duopoly would produce from the observation that a
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constrained ﬁrm’s best response must lie below its unconstrained best response.
Coming back to the model with one constrained and one unconstrained ﬁrm,
we can conclude the following:
Corollary 3.6 Suppose that Firm 1 is ﬁnancially constrained, while Firm 2 is
unconstrained. If a parameter change leads to a change in q1, the total output
Q := q1 + q2 changes in the same direction as q1.
This follows from the ﬂatness of the unconstrained ﬁrm’s reaction curve: any
change in q1 is less than oﬀset by a change of q2. We can also immediately follow
Corollary 3.7 Suppose that Firm 1 is ﬁnancially constrained, while Firm 2 is
unconstrained. If a parameter change leads to a change in q1, the equilibrium
price will change in the opposite direction.
3.7 Conclusions
While recent empirical research by and large has found that ﬁnancial constraints
make ﬁrms “softer” in the product market, theoretical reasoning is driven by
two apparently contradictory considerations: One the one hand, higher costs of
external funds are expected to make a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm softer. On
the other hand, with existing debt, maximization of the equity value of a ﬁrm
can lead to more risk-taking and aggressive behavior. This contrast cannot be
resolved by pointing out the diﬀerence between ex-ante and ex-post incentives. In
fact, the striking result of Brander and Lewis (1986) is that even if lenders fully
anticipate a ﬁrm’s ex-post behavior, debt can lead to an increase in the value of
the ﬁrm because of strategic interaction in the output market. In this context,
the contribution of our paper is threefold:
First, the optimal ﬁnancial contract which we derive here diﬀers from a stan-
dard debt contract in that a ﬁrm that cannot fully repay the required amount
is not liquidated for sure. Rather, the probability of continuation depends on
the amount it can repay. As a result, Brander and Lewis’ limited-liability eﬀect
vanishes completely; i.e. debt has no strategic eﬀect in the output market.
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Second, in contrast to most of the current theoretical literature, we point
out that both ﬁxed and variable costs of production must be ﬁnanced by the
sum of available internal and external funds. This implies that if production
must be ﬁnanced before demand for the products is known, then, because of the
neutrality result above, a ﬁrm eﬀectively chooses its output level at the time
of obtaining external funds. Hence, a ﬁrm is forced to internalise the costs of
possible bankruptcy, and the resulting higher costs of debt-ﬁnancing lead to a
reduction of output, consistent with the empirical evidence.
Third, instead of distinguishing between “equity-ﬁnanced” and “debt-ﬁnanced”
ﬁrms, we describe a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial situation by its level of retained earnings. This
seems more appropriate considering the fact that short-run debt is endogenously
chosen. In particular, we show that even in the presence of ﬁnancing constraints
a ﬁrm may prefer not to use external ﬁnancing. In addition, we can analyze
how the level of short-run debt and output choice vary with the ﬁrm’s retained
earnings or existing debt, and ﬁnd that this relationship is not monotonic.
3.7. CONCLUSIONS 137
Appendix A:
The Optimal Direct Revelation Mechanism
The Application of the Revelation Mechanism
The only strategic player in this enlarged game is E (I’s only action is to accept
or reject E’s contract). E’s strategy consists of ﬁrstly choosing an output q ∈[
0, k0+k1
c
]
. Secondly, E sends a message mI ∈ MI(q) after his choice of q, where
the set of feasible messages might depend on his choice of q. Thirdly, E sends
a message mII ∈ MII(q,mI , θ) after having observed θ. As before, the set of
feasible messages might depend on past events. A strategy s = (q, sI(·), sII(·))
determines an action for the three decision, for each node that might be reached.
Denote with Γ = (S, g) a mechanism that E could choose. It consists of a
strategy space S for E and of an outcome function g, which determines both
players’ payoﬀs (U for E, V for I) as a function of the chosen actions and realised
random variables. For example, g can determine monetary payoﬀs for both play-
ers and the probability of premature termination of the project, both depending
on mI and mII . E’s payoﬀ depends on q and θ, as well, while I’s payoﬀ can
depend on the messages, only.
Let Γ∗ = (S, g) be a mechanism that implements the outcome (s∗, U∗, V ∗) as
a subgame perfect equilibrium. Denote with s∗ E’s optimal strategy if he plays
the mechanism Γ∗:
s∗ = (q∗, s∗I(q
∗), s∗II(q
∗, s∗I(q
∗), θ)). (3.27)
As s∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium, the following inequalities must hold:
EU(q∗, s∗I(q∗), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ), θ) ≥ EU(q′, m′I , m′II(θ), θ) (3.28)
∀ feasible q′, m′I , m′II ,
EU(q∗, s∗I(q∗), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ), θ) ≥ EU(q∗, m′′I , m′′II(θ), θ) (3.29)
∀ feasible m′′I , m′′II ,
U(q∗, s∗I(q
∗), s∗II(q
∗, s∗I(q
∗), θ), θ) ≥ U(q∗, s∗I(q∗), m′′′II(θ), θ) (3.30)
∀ feasible m′′′II , ∀θ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε],
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where E is the expectation operator with respect to θ. These inequalities must
hold in particular if the messagesm′I , m
′
II , m
′′
I , m
′′
II andm
′′′
II are equilibrium strate-
gies for oﬀ equilibrium histories, i.e. histories other than (q∗, s∗I(q
∗), s∗II(q
∗, s∗I(q
∗), θ)):
EU(q∗, s∗I(q∗), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ), θ) ≥ EU(q′, s∗I(q′), s∗II(q′, s∗I(q′), θ), θ) (3.31)
∀ feasible q′ such that s∗I(q′) and s∗II(q′, s∗I(q′), θ) are feasible,
EU(q∗, s∗I(q∗), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ), θ) ≥ EU(q∗, s∗I(q′′), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q′′), θ), θ) (3.32)
∀ feasible s∗I(q′′) such that s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q′′), θ) is feasible,
U(q∗, s∗I(q
∗), s∗II(q
∗, s∗I(q
∗), θ), θ) ≥ U(q∗, s∗I(q∗), s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ′), θ) (3.33)
∀ feasible s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q∗), θ′), ∀θ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε].
To apply the revelation principle, we have to show that there is a direct mecha-
nism Γd, which implements the same outcome and payoﬀs as Γ∗ as a truthtelling
equilibrium. That is, in each stage E is asked to reveal his new private informa-
tion and to choose certain actions. E should have no incentive to manipulate the
mechanism by misrepresenting his private information, including manipulations
of the mechanism that extend over several stages.
Deﬁne functions fI and fII to reproduce E’s optimal strategy under the mech-
anism Γ∗, given the new information qˆ and θˆ that he reveals:
fI(qˆ) = s
∗
I(qˆ), (3.34)
fII(θˆ|qˆ) = s∗II(qˆ, s∗I(qˆ), θˆ). (3.35)
Thus, instead of playing mechanism Γ∗, E could use a direct mechanism and a
mediator, who oﬀers to use the functions fI and fII to determine the payoﬀs. We
can rewrite (3.31), (3.32) and (3.33):
EU(q∗, fI(q∗), fII(θ|q∗), θ) ≥ EU(q′, fI(q′), fII(θ′|q′), θ) (3.36)
∀ feasible q′ such that fI(q′) and fII(θ′|q′) are feasible,
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EU(q∗, fI(q∗), fII(θ|q∗), θ) ≥ EU(q∗, fI(q′′), fII(θ′′|q′′), θ) (3.37)
∀ feasible f ∗I (q′′) such that fII(θ′′|q′′) is feasible,
U(q∗, fI(q∗), fII(θ|q∗), θ) ≥ U(q∗, fI(q∗), fII(θ′|q∗), θ) (3.38)
∀ feasible fII(θ′|q∗), ∀θ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε].
We can conclude from (3.36), (3.37) and (3.38) that truthtelling is an undomi-
nated strategy at all stages, and therefore that any payoﬀ that can be achieved
with some mechanism can also be achieved with the help of a mediator and a
direct mechanism.
We have assumed in (3.37) that if E would decide to lie about his choice of q,
there is always a feasible lie when he has to announce θ, such that
fII(θ
′′|q′′) = s∗II(q∗, s∗I(q′′), θ) (3.39)
where q and θ are the real values and q′′ and θ′′ the announcements. We will show
below that this simplifying assumption has no side eﬀects, as the revelation of q
does not add any binding restrictions to the contract (the truthtelling constraints
for the revelation of θ also lead to the truthful revelation of q).
If this were not true, the direct mechanism could be more restrictive than the
corresponding indirect mechanism: only announcements of the type sII(q1, sI(q2), θ)
with q1 = q2 are possible when E has to send the second message. In other words,
the direct mechanism could oﬀer less scope for manipulation than its correspond-
ing indirect mechanism, and the set of implementable outcomes may seem larger
than it actually is.
We now proceed to the construction of the optimal contract by backwards
induction. We analyse the incentive constraints at each stage of the direct mecha-
nism, starting with the last revelation stage, and assuming truthtelling/equilibrium
behaviour at the earlier stages.
Proof: State–of–the–World Truthtelling Constraints
Lemma 3.8 Assume that E has produced q˜ ≤ (k0+k1)/c in stage I, and revealed
it in stage II. Denote with θ the realised state of the world, and with θˆ its
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announced value. Let δ˜ := k0 + k1 − cq˜ ≥ 0 be E’s ‘savings’, i.e. the amount that
was not spent if q˜ < k0+k1
c
. Then a direct mechanism Γd is optimal and provides
incentives to announce the real θ if
r(θˆ|q˜) = min
{
D(q˜) , δ˜ + q˜(θˆ − q˜)
}
(3.40)
β(θˆ|q˜) = min
{
1 , 1− D(q˜)
π2
+
δ˜ + q˜(θˆ − q˜)
π2
}
(3.41)
where β is the probability that the ﬁrm can be continued (and E earns the private
beneﬁt π2), and r is the payment that E has to make to I. D(qˆ) is independent of
θˆ.
Proof:
We simplify the notation by writing r(θ) and β(θ) instead of r(θ|q˜) and β(θ|q˜).
Deﬁne R(θ|q˜) := q˜(θ − q˜) + δ˜. As with r and β, we write R(θ) for simplicity.
Using k0, k1 and the (truthfully) announced q˜, the mediator knows the size of
δ˜. Thus, if E announces θˆ, the mediator believes that E’s total cash holdings are
q˜(θˆ − q˜) + δ˜.
The truthtelling constraint for the announcement of θ requires that
q˜(θ − q˜) + δ˜ − r(θ) + β(θ)π2 ≥ q˜(θ − q˜) + δ˜ − r(θˆ) + β(θˆ)π2 ∀θˆ, θ, (3.42)
i.e. that
−r(θ) + β(θ)π2 ≥ −r(θˆ) + β(θˆ)π2 ∀θˆ, θ. (3.43)
The required payment r(θ) must be feasible, i.e.
r(θ) ≤ q˜(θ − q˜) + δ˜ ∀θ (3.44)
(this may constrain the ﬁrm’s ability to misrepresent the state ‘upwards’, i.e. to
announce a state θˆ > θ, if θ is the real state).
Step 1 For any θ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε],
β(θ) < 1 ⇒ r(θ) = R(θ), (3.45)
r(θ) < R(θ) ⇒ β(θ) = 1. (3.46)
Suppose there is a θ such that both β(θ) < 1 and r(θ) < R(θ). Then E could
increase both β and r such that his payoﬀ is unchanged. I’s expected payoﬀ must
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have increased, and E has scope to improve his payoﬀ (for instance, he could
borrow a larger amount k1).
Step 2 For any two θ, θ′ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε],
β(θ) = β(θ′) ⇔ r(θ) = r(θ′) (3.47)
If this were not true, the truthtelling constraint (3.43) would be violated for either
θ or θ′.
Step 3 For any two θ, θ′ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε] such that β(θ) < 1 and β(θ′) < 1,
θ < θ′ ⇔ β(θ) < β(θ′). (3.48)
Notice ﬁrst that r(θ) = R(θ) and r(θ′) = R(θ′) (this follows from Step 1). Suppose
that β(θ) < β(θ′) but θ > θ′. Then r(θ) = R(θ) > r(θ′) = R(θ′). But then E’s
truthtelling constraint (3.43) is violated if the state is θ. Next, consider θ < θ′.
From this follows that R(θ) < R(θ′), and therefore that r(θ) < r(θ′). But then
it must be the case that β(θ′) > β(θ), a s otherwise E’s truthtelling constraint
(3.43) is violated if the state is θ′.
Step 4 For any two θ, θ′ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε] such that β(θ) < 1 and β(θ′) < 1,
(β(θ)− β(θ′))π2 = r(θ)− r(θ′). (3.49)
Assume (w.l.o.g.) that θ < θ′. From Steps 1 and 3 follows that r(θ) = R(θ) and
r(θ′) = R(θ′) and that β(θ) < β(θ′). From the truthtelling constraint for any θ′
with respect to any lower θ follows that
(β(θ′)− β(θ))π2 ≥ r(θ′)− r(θ). (3.50)
If we divide both sides by (θ′ − θ) and take limits as θ ↑ θ′, we derive
∂β(θ)
∂θ
· π2 ≥ ∂r(θ)
∂θ
∀θ s. th. β(θ) < 1. (3.51)
Suppose that in the optimal mechanism the inequality in (3.51) can be strict.
Denote with θ˜ the highest value of θ such that β(θ) < 1 and the slope of β is
strictly higher than (3.51). Deﬁne a function ψ(θ) such that
ψ(θ˜) = β(θ˜) and
∂ψ(θ)
∂θ
· π2 = ∂r(θ)
∂θ
∀θ. (3.52)
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Because of (3.50) and (3.51), β must lie below ψ. Then E could increase β for all
θ < θ˜ up to ψ, without aﬀecting any truthtelling constraint. This increases his
payoﬀ without changing I’s payoﬀ, and the original mechanism cannot have been
optimal.
Step 5 For any two θ, θ′ ∈ [a− ε, a+ ε], θ = θ′,
β(θ) = β(θ′) ⇒ β(θ) = β(θ′) = 1. (3.53)
Suppose that β(θ) = β(θ′) < 1. Then from Step 2, r(θ) = r(θ′), and from Step 1
r(θ) = R(θ) and r(θ′) = R(θ′), and therefore R(θ) = R(θ′), a contradiction.
From Steps 1–5 follows that the shapes of β and r are as described in Lemma
3.1: There is a θ1 such that for all θ ∈ [θ1, a + ε], the repayment and the rescue
probability are constant. For all θ ∈ [a− ε, θ1], the repayment includes the total
cash holdings, and the rescue probability is increasing in the repayment. Denote
with D(q˜) the amount that has to be repaid if θ > θ1:
β(θ1) = 1 and r(θ1) = D(q˜) := q˜(θ1 − q˜) + δ˜. (3.54)
Then we can calculate β(θ) for all θ < θ1 (remind that (3.51) holds with equality):
∫ θ1
θ
∂β(θ˜)
∂θ˜
· π2 dθ˜ =
∫ θ1
θ
∂r(θ˜)
∂θ˜
dθ˜, (3.55)
or,
(β(θ1)− β(θ))π2 = r(θ1)− r(θ). (3.56)
If we substitute β(θ1) = 1 and r(θ1) = D(q˜) using (3.54) and r(θ) = q˜(θ− q˜) + δ˜,
we can derive β as deﬁned in Lemma 3.1.
Proof: Output–Choice Truthtelling Constraints
The truthtelling constraints for the last revelation stage require that the mech-
anism has the simple structure described in Lemma 3.8. We now analyse E’s
truthtelling constraints when he has to reveal his output choice, knowing that his
announcement q˜ will determine the promised repayment D(q˜), i.e. the transfer
r(θ|q˜) and continuation probability β(θ|q˜), as deﬁned in Lemma 3.8.
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Lemma 3.9 Assume that E has produced output q, and denote his announcement
with q˜. Assume also that the mechanism has the structure described in Lemma
3.8. Then E has no incentive to lie about his choice of q if D(q˜) is constant for
all q˜.
Proof:
Consider ﬁrst the case in which E announces the true value q. Given the mecha-
nism described in Lemma 3.1, the project is continued with probability one only
if the earnings and savings are suﬃcient to repay D(q), i.e. if q(θ−q)+ δ ≥ D(q).
In all other cases E hands over all money and the project is continued with
probability β, as described in Lemma 3.1. E has an expected payoﬀ of
EU(announce q|q) =
∫ q
a−ε
(
1− D(q)
π2
+
δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ (3.57)
+
∫ D(q)−δ
q
+q
q
(
1− D(q)
π2
+
q(θ − q) + δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ
+
∫ a+ε
D(q)−δ
q
+q
(π2 −D(q) + δ + q(θ − q)) 1
2ε
dθ
if he reveals the true value of q. The ﬁrst integral contains payoﬀs for the cases in
which θ ≤ q. In these cases the earnings are zero and the continuation probability
is constant. The second integral contains payoﬀs if the earnings are positive but
not suﬃcient to repay D(q):
θ ∈
(
q,
D(q)− δ
q
+ q
)
⇔ δ ≤ q(θ − q) + δ ≤ D(q). (3.58)
The third integral contains E’s payoﬀs if the earnings are suﬃcient to repay
D(q), and therefore β(θ) = 1. We can simplify (3.57):
EU(announce q|q) = π2 −D(q) + δ +
∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ. (3.59)
Suppose now that E lies and announces q˜ = q, instead. For low values of θ, E
will have to lie and announce θ˜ = θ,
θ˜ =
1
q˜
(
q(θ − q) + δ − δ˜
)
+ q˜ ⇔ q(θ − q) + δ = q˜(θ − q˜) + δ˜, (3.60)
as his announcements will have to lead to the same repayment that he should
make if he announced the correct values of q and θ. We ignore complications that
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arise if q˜ < q and θ < q: in these cases E does not have enough cash to pay the
transfer that follows any announcement (as δ < δ˜). Denote with $ the repayment
that E can make. We assume that if $ < δ˜,
β($) = 1− D(q˜)
π2
+
$
π2
, (3.61)
as with this formulation the continuation probability is maximised, and no new
incentive problems are introduced. Alternatively, we could also assume that E
simply keeps his cash and the project is terminated with probability one. E’s
payoﬀ would be strictly lower, however.
If θ ≤ q, E’s earnings are zero. E will announce a wrong value θ˜ and repay δ.
The continuation probability is
β(θ˜) = 1− D(q˜)
π2
+
δ
π2
, (3.62)
and the part of his expected payoﬀ for these cases is∫ q
a−ε
(
1− D(q˜)
π2
+
δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ. (3.63)
If the earnings are positive but insuﬃcient to repay D(q˜), E will pay all money
to I, in order to increase the continuation probability β:
β(θ˜) = 1− D(q˜)
π2
+
q(θ − q) + δ
π2
, (3.64)
and the part of his expected payoﬀ for these cases is
∫ D(q˜)−δ
q
+q
q
(
1− D(q˜)
π2
+
q(θ − q) + δ
π2
)
π2
1
2ε
dθ. (3.65)
If θ is suﬃciently high, E can repay D(q˜), and the part of his expected payoﬀ for
these cases is ∫ a+ε
D(q˜)−δ
q
+q
(π2 −D(q˜) + δ + q(θ − q)) 1
2ε
dθ. (3.66)
The sum of (3.63), (3.65) and (3.66) is
EU(announce q˜|q) = π2 −D(q˜) + δ +
∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ. (3.67)
Obviously, there are no incentive problems if (3.67) is exactly equal to (3.59), i.e.
if D(q˜) = D(q) ∀q˜, q.
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Appendix B: The Monopoly Case
Proof: The Underinvestment Result
The ﬁrm maximises ∫ a+ε
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ − q(θ1 − q) + π2. (3.68)
There is no “−cq” term, as the costs of production are paid by using up the loan
k1; either the loan is insuﬃcient to produce q¯, and the ﬁrm spends everything, or
it is more than suﬃcient, and the ﬁrm has taken on ‘riskless debt’. We assume
that in the latter case the ﬁrm reduces its borrowing.
When designing the debt contract, the ﬁrm must take the lender’s participa-
tion constraint into consideration:∫ θ1
q
q(θ − q) 1
2ε
dθ +
∫ a+ε
θ1
q(θ1 − q) 1
2ε
dθ + k0 − cq = 0. (3.69)
The ﬁrst order condition at the contract choice stage is
−(θ1 − 2q)− q∂θ1
∂q
+
∫ a+ε
q
(θ − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ. (3.70)
The partial derivative of θ1 with respect to q is obtained by implicit diﬀerentiation
of the lender’s participation constraint (3.69):
∂θ1
∂q
= −
∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ +
∫ a+ε
θ1
(θ1 − 2q) 12ε dθ − c
q a+ε−θ1
2ε
. (3.71)
Rewrite the ﬁrst order condition as
−(θ1 − 2q)
a+ε−θ1
2ε
a+ε−θ1
2ε
+
∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ + (θ1 − 2q)a+ε−θ12ε − c
a+ε−θ1
2ε
+
∫ a+ε
q
(θ − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ.
(3.72)
Simplify, and ‘split’ “−c” in the fraction into ∫ θ1a−ε c 12ε dθ and ∫ a+εθ1 c 12ε dθ. The ﬁrst
order condition can then be rewritten as(∫ a+ε
q
(θ − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ − c
)
+
∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ −
∫ θ1
a−ε c
1
2ε
dθ
a+ε−θ1
2ε
. (3.73)
The ﬁrst term is exactly zero, if the ‘deep pocket’ quantity q¯ is chosen, and the
second must be negative. Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition is negative, and the
optimal output is smaller than q¯.
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Proof: Concavity of the Objective Function
Diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst order condition (3.73) with respect to q,∫ a+ε
q
(−2) 1
2ε
dθ − (q − 2q) 1
2ε
(3.74)
+
(∫ θ1
q
(−2) 1
2ε
dθ−(q−2q) 1
2ε
+(θ1−2q) 12ε
∂θ1
∂q
−c 1
2ε
∂θ1
∂q
)
a+ε−θ1
2ε
( a+ε−θ12ε )
2
−
(∫ θ1
q
(θ−2q) 1
2ε
dθ−
∫ θ1
a−ε c
1
2ε
dθ
)
(− 12ε
∂θ1
∂q )
( a+ε−θ12ε )
2 .
Rearrange,
−2(a+ ε− q)
2ε
+
q
2ε
+
−2(θ1−q)
2ε
+ q
2ε
a+ε−θ1
2ε
(3.75)
+
1
2ε
⎛⎜⎝∫ a+εθ1 (θ1 − 2q) 12ε dθ − ∫ a+εθ1 c 12ε dθ(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)2
⎞⎟⎠ ∂θ1
∂q
+
1
2ε
⎛⎜⎝∫ θ1q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ − ∫ θ1a−ε c 12ε dθ(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)2
⎞⎟⎠ ∂θ1
∂q
,
and use (3.71) to obtain
−2(a + ε)− 3q
2ε
−
2θ1−3q
2ε
a+ε−θ1
2ε
−
(∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ +
∫ a+ε
θ1
(θ1 − 2q) 12ε dθ − c
)2
2εq
(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)3 . (3.76)
We can show that this is negative ‘over the relevant range’, i.e. if q < (a+ ε)/3.
Since q¯ < (a+ ε)/3 and the ﬁrm will never choose a q > q¯ at the quantity setting
stage, higher values of q need not be taken into consideration when analysing the
concavity at the contracting stage.
We use only the two ﬁrst terms of (3.76). This sum is negative if
−2(a+ ε)2 + 2(a+ ε)θ1 + 3q(a+ ε)− 3qθ1 − 2θ1 · 2ε+ 3q · 2ε < 0. (3.77)
As q < q¯ < (a + ε)/3, it is suﬃcient to show that
−2(a+ ε)2+2(a+ ε)θ1+(a+ ε)(a+ ε)− 3qθ1− 2θ1 · 2ε+(a+ ε) · 2ε < 0. (3.78)
This can be simpliﬁed to obtain
−(a + ε)(a− ε)− 2θ1
(
q − (a− ε)
)
− qθ1, (3.79)
which is indeed negative.
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Proof: Slope of q(k0)
The derivative of q with respect to k0 is found by implicit diﬀerentiation of the
ﬁrst order condition (3.73):
∂q
∂k0
= −
θ1−2q−c
2ε
(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)
∂θ1
∂k0
−
(∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ −
∫ θ1
a−ε c
1
2ε
dθ
) (
− 1
2ε
)
∂θ1
∂k0(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)2
SOC
,
(3.80)
where SOC stands for the second order condition (3.76). As the latter is negative
in equilibrium, the slope of q(k0) is the same as that of the Numerator of (3.80).
Cancel constant terms from the Numerator, and rearrange,(∫ a+ε
θ1
(θ1 − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ −
∫ a+ε
θ1
c
1
2ε
dθ +
∫ θ1
q
(θ − 2q) 1
2ε
dθ −
∫ θ1
a−ε
c
1
2ε
dθ
)
∂θ1
∂k0
.
(3.81)
The second term can be found by implicit diﬀerentiation of the lender’s partici-
pation constraint (3.69):
∂θ1
∂k0
= − 1
q
(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
) , (3.82)
which is negative. Thus, the slope of q(k0) has the same sign as
−
∫ θ1
q (θ − 2q) 12ε dθ +
∫ a+ε
θ1
(θ1 − 2q) 12ε dθ − c
q
(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
) , (3.83)
which is the derivative of θ1 with respect to q. We analyse the Numerator:
Integrate,
θ21 − q2 − 4q(θ1 − q)
4ε
+
(a+ ε− θ1)(2θ1 − 4q)
4ε
− 4εc
4ε
, (3.84)
and substitute θ1, which can be found by solving the lender’s participation con-
straint (3.69) with equality:
θ∗1 = a+ ε−
√
(a+ ε− q)2 − 4ε
q
(c · q − k0). (3.85)
This yields
−q(a + ε− q)− 2ε
q
k0, (3.86)
Which is negative if k0 is positive or not too negative.
148 Liquidity Constraints, Production Costs and Output Decisions
If k0 ≈ k0, q ≈ q¯, D ≈ q(a+ ε− q), and θ1 ≈ (a+ ε). Then (3.80) reads
∂q
∂k0
∣∣∣∣∣ q↑q¯
θ1↑a+ε
=
∫ a+ε
q¯ (θ − 2q¯) 12ε dθ − c
−2(a+ε)−3q¯
2ε
q¯
(
a+ε−(a+ε)
2ε
)3 − 2(a+ε)−3q¯
2ε
q¯
(
a+ε−(a+ε)
2ε
)2 − (∫ a+εq¯ (θ−2q¯) 12ε dθ−c)2
2ε
,
(3.87)
which tends to minus inﬁnity. Thus, there must be at least one minimum of q(k0),
which lies strictly to the right of k0. This minimum is unique, which we show by
contradiction. Suppose there is more than one. Pick the maximum between two
minima, and denote the corresponding value of k0 with kˆ0, and the output with
qˆ. In kˆ0, we must have
qˆ2(a+ ε− qˆ)
2ε
+ kˆ0 = 0, (3.88)
while for some value k0 < kˆ0 we must have q < qˆ (because q(k0) has a maximum
at kˆ0), and
q2(a+ ε− q)
2ε
+ k0 > 0. (3.89)
Combining these two equations with kˆ0 > k0 leads to
q2(a+ ε− q) > qˆ2(a+ ε− qˆ), (3.90)
which is only possible if q > q¯, as q < qˆ < a+ε
3
.
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Appendix C: The Duopoly Case
Firm 1’s maximisation program is
max
q1
∫ a+ε
θ(q1)
q1(θ− q1 − q2(q1)) 1
2ε
dθ− q1
(
θ1(q
1, q2(q1))− q1 − q2(q1)
)
+ π2 (3.91)
s.th. ∫ θ1(q1,q2(q1))
θ(q1)
R(q1, q2(q1), θ)
1
2ε
dθ (3.92)
+
∫ a+ε
θ1(q1,q2(q1))
R
(
q1, q2(q1), θ1(q
1, q2(q1))
)
1
2ε
dθ − cq1 + k10 = 0
(the lender’s zero–proﬁt condition). We omit q2(q1) in the following. The deriva-
tive of θ1 with respect to q
1 is
∂θ1
∂q1
= −
∫ θ1
θ(q1)Rq1(q
1, θ) 1
2ε
dθ +
∫ a+ε
θ1
Rq1(q
1, θ1)
1
2ε
dθ − c
Rθ(q1, θ1)
a+ε−θ1
2ε
. (3.93)
We can derive the ﬁrst order condition and rearrange it as in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.3:(∫ a+ε
q1
Rq1(q
1, θ)
1
2ε
dθ − c
)
+
∫ θ1
q1 Rq1(q
1, θ) 1
2ε
dθ − ∫ θ1a−ε c 12ε dθ
a+ε−θ1
2ε
. (3.94)
Given the deﬁnition of q∗, this must be negative if q1 = q∗, and the underinvest-
ment result follows.
The concavity of the maximisation problem for a ﬁnancially unconstrained
ﬁrm is easy to show: the second derivative of the objective function (3.15) for
Firm 2 is
−2(a+ ε)− 2q
1 − 3q2
2ε
, (3.95)
which is negative as max{q1, q2} < a+ε
3
and q1 + q2 < a+ε
2
from the deﬁnition of
the reaction curves.
For the case of the ‘residual demand monopolist’, we assume that the max-
imisation problem without ﬁnancial constraints is suﬃciently concave:∫ a+ε
θ
Rq1q1(q
1, θ)
1
2ε
dθ − Rq1(q
1, θ)
2ε
∂θ
∂q1
<< 0. (3.96)
We can derive a second order condition with a structure similar to (3.76) for the
case of a ﬁnancially constrained Firm 1. If (3.96) is suﬃciently negative, Firm
1’s maximisation program will be concave over the relevant range of q1.
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The slope of q(k0) can be derived from the ﬁrst order condition (3.94), and
shown to have the same sign as (3.93). While it is not possible to determine
the sign for general values of (k0, q
1), this is possible for the extremes k0 (where
q1(k0) = q
∗) and k˜0 (where q1(k˜0) = k˜0/c). Not surprisingly (given the underin-
vestment result) the slope is negative in the ﬁrst case and positive in the second.
The value of the ﬁnancially constrained Firm 1 is described in (3.20). An
inﬁnitesimal change of k0 has the following eﬀect on this value:⎛⎝∫ a+ε
θ
Rq1(q
1, θ)
1
2ε
dθ − c+
∫ θ1
θ Rq1(q
1, θ) 1
2ε
dθ − ∫ θ1a−ε c 12ε dθ(
a+ε−θ1
2ε
)
⎞⎠ ∂q1
∂k0
−Rθ(q1, θ1)∂θ1
∂k0
.
(3.97)
The term in brackets in the ﬁrst term is the ﬁrst order condition and must be zero
in equilibrium. The second term is negative, and therefore the whole expression
is positive: the value of Firm 1 is increasing in k0, i.e. increasing in its retained
earnings, and decreasing in its retained debt.
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